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Abstract
International norm echoing in rebel groups:
The cases of the Kosovo Liberation Army and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
by
Jennifer A. Mueller

Advisor: Professor Susan L. Woodward
This research demonstrates that rebel groups use international norms in their discourse and
echo patterns in the discourse of states and that they do so to promote their own legitimacy at key
turning points in their conflicts. Which international norms rebel groups use most frequently is
partially determined by the congruence of those norms with their local norms and beliefs and the
degree to which a group’s internal structure has become more hierarchical and specialized. Two
rebel groups are examined in this study over the course of their conflicts: the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). The international norms under
analysis are human rights, international humanitarian law, genocide, and norms against
terrorism.
Rebel groups echo the broad pattern of change in discourse and behavior exhibited by states:
as states increasingly turned to human rights discourse and focused on the protection of civilians
in conflict during the 1990s, rebel groups did so as well in their discourse. These non-state
actors, however, are not merely echoing the discourse from the international level as passive
recipients: they adopt international norms into their discourse for strategic reasons, namely to
increase their legitimacy with local and international audiences. By tracing the patterns of norm
adoption throughout the course of the conflict and matching peaks of fluctuation with events on
iv

the ground, this research demonstrates that rebel groups increase the frequency of their use of
international norms at key turning points in the conflict, such as during negotiations for ceasefire
or peace agreements, and do so to boost their legitimacy. The research examines the effect of
two additional variables on the changes in the discourse of the groups: the normative culture of
the groups and the internal hierarchical structure. Findings demonstrate that the normative
culture of a rebel group partially determines which international norms are adopted by the group
and that a precondition of a high level of internal hierarchy is necessary before a group echoes
international norms consistently.
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Introduction
Over the course of the 1990s, the polarizing Cold War debates that dominated global
thinking were supplanted by increased attention to the importance of human rights, the protection
of civilians in conflict, and the redefinition of human rights violators as threats to international
peace and security. Parallel to the increasing use of human rights language and human rightsinfluenced behavior on the part of states, this period saw a marked increase in the use of such
language on the part of armed opposition groups—actors not bound by international conventions
governing human rights law and responsible for a great deal of the human rights law violations
during times of conflict. How did international norms that were intended to change the behavior
of states come to have such an effect on the discourse of such non-state actors?
Over the last twenty years, we have seen evidence across the globe of the beginning of
the incorporation of international norms in the discourse of armed opposition groups. For
example, in January 1994, in the jungles of Chiapas, the Zapatistas launched a global campaign
to draw attention to human rights violations in Mexico; in Burundi in February 1995, Jerome
Ndiho of the Conseil National Pour la Défense de la Démocratie (CNDD) framed the
organization’s struggle in terms of human rights violations; in Kosovo in 1998, the spokesman
for the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) publicized the KLA’s struggle by claiming human rights
violations had been perpetrated by the Yugoslav state in Kosovo and Bosnia; and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri Lanka, after years of claiming human rights violations as a
motivating factor for their struggle, formed a human rights organization themselves in 2005 to
document human rights violations.1
1

See, for example, “Rebels Determined ‘to Build Socialism’ in Mexico,” January 4, 1994, New York Times
(front page); Jerome Ndiho on Radio France International, Broadcast February 23, 1995; Jakup Krasniqi, quoted
on ARTA news agency web site, Pristina, August 10, 1998; and (Stokke 2006).
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While a great deal of scholarly attention has been focused on how and why states shift
their discourse and respond to international norms, very little scholarly attention has been paid to
how these norms affect the discourse and behavior of non-state actors. This dissertation
addresses this gap by focusing on the changes in discourse of rebel groups, with the KLA as the
primary case. A second case, the LTTE, is also explored to test the generalizability of the
hypotheses developed and to provide a limited comparison between the two groups.
The norms under examination are human rights, behaviors during armed conflict (which
fall broadly but not exclusively under international humanitarian law), and the use of certain
types of violence (which may be termed terrorism). These groups of norms taken together
address the types of behavior parties might exhibit during violent contestations of power and,
between them, produce expectations of which sorts of behavior are condemned and which sorts
of behavior are legitimate—or at least, not prohibited.
The argument
Norms change over time at the state level, and these changes are reflected in the
discourse and behavior of states. International norms also have an effect on the discourse of
rebel groups. Drawing on constructivist theories, which suggest that state interests may be
shaped by norms and cultural factors, this dissertation offers explanations for the changes in the
discourse of rebel groups, suggesting that these actors may equally find their interests shaped by
international norms and change their use of language accordingly.
Are the changes in international norms at the state level recognized and mimicked at the
non-state level among rebel groups and, if so, why? Not all groups adopt international norms in
their language and those that do, do so to varying extents. What variables might explain why
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groups adopt these norms and which norms are adopted? The following hypotheses examine
these questions.
First, I hypothesize that rebel groups pay attention to the changes in the hegemonic
discourse and change their discourse to match the changes at the state level. When states
incorporate a specific norm into their language, armed groups do so as well. In this regard, they
can be considered norm echoers. I tested this hypothesis by comparing the mention of
international norms in the discourse of two groups, the KLA and the LTTE, over the course of
each of their conflicts and comparing the patterns observed with changes at the international
level.
A further hypothesis is that rebel groups decide to change their discourse in response to
changes at the state level for strategic reasons, which suggests that the armed groups are not
passive recipients of these norms but are active participants who engage with these norms when
it is in their interest to do so. Thus, adopting international norms into their discourse is a strategy
to increase their legitimacy. This hypothesis can be operationalized by examining in detail when
in the course of the conflict the groups chose to incorporate these norms into their discourse. If
groups increase the frequency of the use of international norms at key turning points when the
groups’ legitimacy is most under scrutiny, it is more likely that the adoption of the norm is
undertaken to boost that legitimacy. Key turning points include: stepping into the public eye for
the first time and announcing their goals to domestic and international audiences; being
monitored by outside observers, such as during ceasefire agreements; negotiating agreements
with the host state when third parties are involved; and seeking significant outside support.
The evidence from the discourse of the two rebel groups under study shows that, broadly
speaking, these groups did echo changes in discourse observed at the international level. The
3

evidence further shows much higher levels of use of international norms during key turning
points in the conflict, indicating that the norm usage was intentional, and therefore of a strategic
nature. However, the patterns observed in the discourse of the two groups do not mirror the
changes at the international level exactly, and, further, the patterns vary among norms and
between cases indicating that other variables are also at play.
Drawing on research with rebel groups, such as Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy
Weinstein’s work in Seirra Leone and Marie Joelle Zahar’s work in Bosnia and Lebanon, which
shows that the internal structure of a group has an effect on the behavior of the group, this
research examines the evolving structure of the rebel groups over time and compares the changes
in structure with the observed changes in the discourse (Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Zahar
1999). Thus, the internal structures are investigated to determine if greater hierarchy within the
group is a precondition for the group’s ability to reliably incorporate international norms into the
discourse. This leads to a third hypothesis: that groups with a high level of hierarchy will more
likely be able to see value in following international norm usage by states and more likely be
able to do so. Groups whose structure is more diffuse are less likely to incorporate international
norms into their discourse.
Structure may affect discourse in two ways. The first is through the mechanism of
control—a more hierarchal group will be able to exert more control over the public
pronouncements made by its members and will have greater ability to shape the discourse. The
second mechanism by which structure may affect discourse is through increased specialized
knowledge: as an organization grows more hierarchical and complex, individuals within the
organization are able to specialize and grow more competent in one area (or alternatively, the
organization is able to recruit individuals with more specialized knowledge). My research
4

suggests that armed groups do require a certain level of hierarchical structure before international
norms enter their discourse in a significant way. The evidence in the case of the KLA (the case
in which the structure evolved significantly over the conflict) points to the second mechanism
having the greatest effect on the discourse. The evidence for the first mechanism of control was
much weaker.
Finally, drawing on previous literature, such as Jeffery Checkel’s work on Eurpean norms
on national membership, Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink’s work on transnational actors,
and Jeffrey Legro’s study of military culture, which argues that the congruence of a norm with
the local culture is a vital component in determining whether a state (or organization) adopts a
norm, I hypothesize that the internal normative culture of a rebel group determines which
international norms are adopted by the group (Checkel 1999; Keck and Sikkink 1998; and Legro
1997). If certain features of an international norm are reflected in some way in the internal
culture of the rebel group or the culture within which the group operates, the international norm
will more likely be adopted by the group. Conversely, if the international norm is not congruent
with the local norms, it is unlikely to be adopted, or adopted with any frequency, into the
discourse of the group. Thus, we can expect that groups with widely divergent cultural norms
will exhibit widely divergent patterns of adoption of international norms.
Significance
Why do we care about armed resistance groups adopting human rights norms or
international norms at all?
If we can identify a pattern of adoption of the language of human rights, international
humanitarian law norms, or the norms against terror by rebel groups, a number of avenues
become available for both influencing these groups’ actions and diminishing the level of human
5

rights violations in conflict, in general. It will be useful, for example, to have evidence of
incentives to which a rebel group may respond that will move it toward more acceptable
behavior. Offering legitimacy in negotiations is standard, but knowing more about what a group
might consider to be true measures of legitimacy and under what conditions they might pursue
them could lead to greater success.
Given that armed resistance groups are major perpetrators of human rights and
international humanitarian law violations, setting aside the issues of legitimacy for the moment,
the findings in this study suggest opportunities for encouraging these groups to reduce their
violations. A better understanding of why groups do adopt these norms points to levers that could
be applied by monitors, watch dogs, and others: for example, looking for congruence with local
norms; and highlighting the payoffs others have gained when strategic turning points proved
positive as a result of norm adoption. In addition, recognizing the central role rebel groups have
in human rights and international humanitarian law violations, there has been a trend in recent
years to prod rebel groups to acknowledge officially treaties and human rights norms, by
encouraging the signing of unilateral statements, treaties such as the Mine Ban Treaty, and
bilateral agreements with, for example, bodies such as the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF) to end the use of child soldiers.2 Knowing why some groups may engage with certain
international norms (and not others), and when they might be amenable to negotiations of this
sort, will aid groups seeking to bring non-state actors into the international human rights regimes.

2

The Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines
and on Their Destruction (known as the Mine Ban Treaty) was open for signature in December 1997 and went into
force in March 1999. In addition to having state parties sign the Mine Ban Treaty, the International Campaign to
Ban Landmines (ICBL), the force behind the Mine Ban Treaty, sought out negotiations with groups such as the
LTTE in Sri Lanka and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Philippines, to encourage their signing of a
Deed of Commitment to the treaty.
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A significant problem may be that by using the language of international norms to boost
their legitimacy while not necessarily abiding by those norms, rebel groups may be contributing
to the tarnishing of the human rights discourse itself and the diminishment of the value of those
norms in the public sphere.
Finally, this study contributes to the literatures on both international norms and rebel
groups. The literature on norms has only just begun to address the effect of international norms
on non-state actors and this research helps open up this area of investigation. The research on
rebel groups is rich, but it is limited mainly due to the difficulties and the dangers researchers
face in accessing these groups during a conflict and immediately thereafter. By approaching the
study of rebel groups through a previously under-explored area—that of the discourse of these
groups during conflict—this research sheds more light on rebel groups’ strategies during
conflicts and points to a path of fruitful research in the future.
The first chapter, Chapter 1, “Theoretical Framework and Methodology,” provides the
theoretical underpinnings using literature from four different areas: international norms,
legitimacy, social movements, and civil wars. The literature provides a guide for how the norms
may come to affect the actions and discourse of rebel groups, offers insight into the potentially
strategic thinking and cost-benefit analysis behind the adoption of certain norms in the discourse,
and suggests why rebel groups may adopt the language of international norms to frame their
struggle. Chapter 1 also outlines the methodology employed in this study.
Chapter 2, titled “Background on the Kosovo and Sri Lanka cases,” offers the reader an
overview of the conflicts in the two cases with details of the origins of each of the two groups
under study: the primary case, the KLA; and the secondary case, the LTTE. It includes an
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examination of the structure of each organization and the normative environments of each group,
and looks at the congruence of international norms with local culture in each case.
Chapter 3, “Patterns of change: A state to non-state level comparison,” reviews evidence
that armed resistance groups follow changes in the hegemonic discourse and behavior and
change their discourse to echo the changes at the state level. It compares the patterns in the
changes in the discourse of these groups with the changes observed at the state level over the
course of the 1990s and throughout the period during which the two groups were active. The
international norms analyzed are human rights, international humanitarian law, humanitarian
intervention, genocide, and the norm against the use of terrorism. It further examines the
evidence for the effect that changes in structure have on a group’s use of international norms in
its discourse.
Chapter 4, “Human rights and international humanitarian law: Evidence of incorporation
of norms into the discourse of rebel groups,” looks more closely at the changes in the discourse
related to two particular groups of norms—human rights and international humanitarian law—
comparing the changes between the use of these norms in each group, and between the two
groups. This chapter focuses on the micro-patterns observed in the discourse and ties these
patterns to events on the ground. It also examines evidence for how the international norms may
resonate with local norms.
Chapter 5, “’We were fighting a clean war’: Rebel groups and the norm against the
practice of terrorism,” examines how rebel groups talk about terror and terrorism and when they
are most likely to do so. It explores how groups contest the label of terrorist and try to label their
host states as terrorist states, and analyzes the effect of an abrupt change in states’ discourse on a
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rebel group’s discourse after the events of September 11, 2001. Finally, Chapter 6,
“Conclusions,” summarizes the evidence presented in each of the preceding chapters.

9

Chapter 1: Theoretical framework and methodology
How and why do non-state actors, in particular rebel groups, use international norms in their
discourse? What are the patterns of that usage? These are the main questions under examination
in this study, which lies at the nexus of several fields of research, drawing its concepts and
theories from each of these. The four sets of literature that provide the theoretical framework for
this research are: international norms, legitimacy, social movements, and civil wars. There has
been some scholarship looking at non-state actors and international norms, but very little which
looks specifically at rebel groups and those norms. This chapter draws together these four bodies
of work in a new way to cast light on how norms might affect the discourse of rebel groups, how
the incorporation of norms changes over time, what factors might instigate this change, and
finally, whether rebel groups’ adoption of norms is strategic in nature.
Before examining the literature, the following section reviews definitions.

1.1 Definitions
The definitions for core concepts used in this study—rebel groups, international norms,
human rights, and international humanitarian law—are contested and often ambiguous, so
clarifying these terms is necessary.
Rebel groups
Throughout this research, the terms rebel groups, insurgencies, and armed opposition groups
are used interchangeably to refer to groups that are armed, not under state control, and use force
as part of their strategy to challenge the state. These groups act in opposition to the government
or state in control of the territory, or, where there is no government to oppose (like Somalia), use
force against other groups contending for power. The following terms will not be used to
10

describe the groups in question: militias, a broader term that includes all armed groups,
including those working alongside the state, or under loose control of the state, such as
paramilitary groups; guerrillas, a subset of rebel groups more indicative of their preferred tactics;
and freedom fighters and terrorists, which denote a certain political bias. The name or label
applied to a group can threaten or bolster its legitimacy as naming and labeling are connected to
power—those with power can change how others perceive groups by labeling them a certain way
(Bhatia 2005). This study tries to choose the more neutral terms.
Norms and international norms
How and why non-state actors use international norms in their discourse, and the patterns of
usage, are the main questions under examination in this study. What, exactly, are international
norms? Using a constructivist approach, I consider international norms to be an understanding of
standards of behavior appropriate for international actors shared by states and international
organizations. Constructivists have defined a norm to be a “shared understanding of standards of
behavior” (Klotz 1995) and “a standard of appropriate behavior for actors with a given identity”
(Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 891). A core feature of a norm is that it has legitimacy—meaning
it is widely accepted and viewed as appropriate.
Norms also change over time, and it is the pattern of change to which scholars have drawn
much attention, as will be discussed below. International norms include prohibitions against
such diverse behaviors by states as slavery, colonialism, and the use of certain weaponry or
tactics during war, such as chemical weapons or attacks on civilians. All of these forms of
behavior were deemed legitimate at one time. States once considered trafficking in slaves, for
example, to be appropriate behavior.
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The norms under particular examination in this study deal with human rights, behaviors
during armed conflict (which fall broadly but not exclusively under international humanitarian
law), and the use of certain types of violence (which may be termed terrorism). These groups of
norms taken together address the types of behavior parties might exhibit during violent
contestations of power and, between them, produce expectations of which sorts of behavior are
condemned and which sorts of behavior are legitimate – or at least, not prohibited.
Human rights
Human rights are the basic freedoms to which all humans are entitled regardless of their race,
gender, nationality, age or ethnicity. Alyson Brysk summarizes, “human rights may be
conceived as a set of entitlements to the social prerequisites to human development: protection,
security, freedom, and community” (Brysk 2004: 23). While the modern concept of human rights
has its roots in the writings of Western political philosophers such as Jean-Jacques Rousseau,
John Locke, and Immanuel Kant, our understanding of human rights today is derived from
international human rights conventions and declarations that have been in force since the 1940s.
The central agreement from which other human rights conventions flow is the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), adopted by the United Nations (UN) General Assembly
on December 10, 1948, which declares that “all human beings are born free and equal in dignity”
(Article 1); and stipulates that everyone “has the right to life, liberty and security of person”
(Article 2) and further has the right to be free of slavery, torture, and arbitrary arrest and
detention, among other rights.
Human rights, as defined by the UDHR, thus provide us with the template for conceiving of
how an individual has rights vis-à-vis the state. Human rights serve in some way as a power
equalizer in the relationship between the all-powerful state and the much weaker individual. In
12

addition to the UDHR, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)—which together are
considered the international bill of rights—and a host of other conventions and treaties, such as
the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (CAT), and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide (Genocide Convention), further clarify the internationally protected rights of
individuals and, concomitantly, the responsibilities of states. Nine international treaties together
make up the core of human rights treaties.3 As treaties, they carry more weight than norms or
rules and have international committees that monitor state compliance (Finnemore 1996). An
individual’s human rights can only be violated by a state, while similar actions by individuals are
deemed to be crimes. For example, if a state kills an individual, it deprives that individual of his
or her right to life—a human rights violation—while if an individual kills another, that is a
crime—murder. While human rights law does not traditionally apply to non-state actors, the
norms embodied in the laws have begun to be applied to non-state actors such as rebel groups
and multinational corporations (MNCs).
International humanitarian law
International humanitarian law (IHL) is the branch of international law that provides the
rules that regulate conduct during times of war. Also called jus in bello, it has a long history of
development, building on centuries of interaction between states at war. IHL delineates the
3

The nine core human rights treaties are the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (ICERD), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (CAT), the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), the International Convention on
the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW), the International
Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance (CPED), and the Convention on the
Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD). The treaty texts, as well as their classification as core treaties, may be
found at the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CoreInstruments.aspx, accessed September 11, 2012.
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acceptable behavior of all parties in a conflict (including both states and non-state armed actors)
and circumscribes how these parties may conduct war with each other. While the laws provide
for the protection of individuals not actively involved in the fighting of war, such as civilians or
wounded soldiers, from the worst effects of war itself, they do have modest aims: merely to
restrain the parties of an armed conflict from “wanton cruelty and ruthlessness” (Kalshoven and
Zegveld 2011). International humanitarian law can be divided into two related but conceptually
distinct areas of law: the law of The Hague (based primarily on two international treaties signed
in the Hague in 1899 and 1907), which deals primarily with the conduct of war and with
permissible means and methods of war; and the law of Geneva (based on the 1949 Geneva
Conventions, their two 1977 Additional Protocols, and a third 2005 Additional Protocol) which
is primarily concerned with the protection of civilians and those who are no longer able to fight.
The Geneva Conventions spell out the commitments of states for the protection of civilians, the
security of belligerent populations, the treatment of the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, and the
treatment of prisoners of war during armed conflict. In contrast to human rights law, IHL does
directly address non-state armed groups, spelling out their rights and obligations. Rules
applicable in non-international armed conflicts include Common Article 3 to the four Geneva
Conventions, and the 1977 Protocol II relating to the protections of vicitims of non-international
armed conflict..4,5

4

A non-international armed conflict is an armed conflict which takes place within a state, and may involve the
forces of the state and a non-state actor, or two or more armed groups. Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions includes requirements that the non-state actors have an organized military force and an authority
responsible for its acts, act within a determinate territory, and have the means of respecting and ensuring respect for
the Convention. The conflict must also reach a certain intensity and be of a certain duration, which distinguishes the
conflict from events such as riots.
5
The laws which apply in non-international armed conflict are the following: Common Article 3 of the Geneva
Conventions; Additional Protocols II of 1977; Article 19 of the 1954 Cultural Property Convention (relating to
respect for cultural property); the 1999 Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention on Cultural Property; the
1977 United Nations Convention on the Prohibition of Military or Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental
Modification Techniques; amended Protocol II of 1996 to the 1981 Certain Conventional Weapons Convention
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Human rights vs. International humanitarian law
Despite the clear-cut distinctions between human rights law and international
humanitarian law, there exists a significant confusion between the two bodies of law in practice,
and the question of which applies during times of conflict is still not adequately resolved.
Several reasons for why this might be the case have been suggested by scholars and include: the
nature of modern warfare, which has blurred the demarcation of the battlefield and the soldier
(Kennedy 2006); the difficulty in agreeing on when the threshold of conflict has been reached
and the resultant confusion over which body of law to apply (Tomuschat 2010); and the tendency
of recent treaties to draw from both human rights law and international humanitarian law
(Droege 2007).
The confusion also exists at the sub-state level. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs),
such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International, do most of the human rights
law violation monitoring and their reports are relied upon by states and the media to inform both
policy toward and the framing of specific conflicts (Lutz 2006: 25). These groups have extended
their mandate from pure human rights investigations to researching IHL violations as well. In
addition, individual actors involved directly in conflicts themselves play a great role in how the
framing of the conflict is perceived by outsiders (Bob 2005). Thus, how non-state actors
understand and use these terms may have an effect on how the events are perceived by other
actors such as states, NGOs, or the media.

concerning landmines; the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention; and the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty. In addition, the
statute of the permanent International Criminal Court (ICC) gives the Court jurisdiction over violations of
international humanitarian law whether committed in international or non-international armed conflicts.
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Terrorism
What constitutes terrorism is continually debated in political and academic circles. As a
term, terrorism has eluded a concrete definition. This is due in part to the way the word has
evolved since it was first introduced during the French Revolution in 1793-4, and in part to a
debate over the politics of self-determination, where terrorist and freedom fighter can be used to
describe the same individual (Hoffman 1998). Academics have struggled to clarify the concept
of terrorism in different ways: some mapped the consensus among researchers (Weinberg,
Pedahzur, and Hirsch-Hoefler 2010); some identified commonalities of those using violence
(Tilly 2004); and some identified the goal of the actors involved (Hoffman 1998). Governments
also have difficulty with defining terrorism. One researcher, for example, determined that the US
Government uses 22 different definitions of terrorism (Perry 2004). There is currently no
consensus over the definition of terrorist or terrorism, but the debate over the term has moved
from the center stage of international politics (where it had produced a deadlock at the United
Nations) to the wings, and one scholar has argued that there now appears to be a loose agreement
that a particular act of violence can be described as terrorism whenever a large group of states
regard that act as illegitimate (Keohane 2002).
While there is no broad consensus, it is still useful to identify what may be called
terrorism for the purposes of this study. One widely used definition of terrorism which offers
some basic parameters of what is meant by the term “terrorism” is Bruce Hoffman’s: “Terrorism
is violence—or, equally important, the threat of violence—used and directed in pursuit of, or in
service of, a political aim…it is a planned, calculated, and indeed systematic act” (Hoffman
1998: 15). This definition does not specify the types of violence included in the definition
(bombings, kidnappings, and so forth), who may commit terrorism (for example, whether
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terrorism can only be committed by non-state actors, or whether state actors may commit
terrorism as well), and leaves out acts which serve no political agenda.

1.2 Theoretical framework
There are four areas of literature most relevant to this study: international norms,
legitimacy, social movements, and civil wars.
International norms
Explanations for why armed resistance groups may adopt the discourse of human rights and
other international norms can be drawn from two different traditions: the constructivist tradition,
which emphasizes the importance of ideas, norms, and social actors, and the rational-materialist
tradition, which emphasizes power and self-interest. Both approaches offer explanations
primarily for the behavior of states, but we can assume that some aspirations and pressures faced
by states, such as the desire for legitimacy or prestige or fear of sanctions, may also be faced by
non-state actors, allowing us at least to find a theoretical foundation for the behavior of armed
resistance groups. The explanations they offer are also not mutually exclusive and can both be
applied to gain a better understanding of the behavior and discourse of non-state actors. As
Martha Finnemore and Kathryn Sikkink argue, “rationality cannot be separated from any
politically significant episode of normative influence or normative change, just as the normative
context conditions any episode of rational choice” (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998: 888).
Early works on international law and institutions posed the question of why states abide by
international norms. Scholars provided a variety of answers including a reduction of transaction
costs (Keohane 1984), the resolution of coordination problems (Martin 1992), and the provision
of a language for international politics (Kratochwil 1989). Following on from these original
theories, in the late 1980s and early 1990s constructivist theory began to challenge realist and
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neoliberal institutional approaches by seeking explanations for the behavior of states that draw
on non-material factors, such as ideas and culture. Constructivism is about “human
consciousness and its role in international life” (Ruggie 1998).
Both realist and neoliberal theories explain state behavior based on the fixed, material
interests of states. Constructivist theories challenge these approaches by suggesting that the
interests themselves are not simply a given, but may be shaped by norms, ideas, and/or cultural
factors (Ruggie 1998; Kratochwil 1989). Scholars first began to focus beyond the state on nonstate actors, norms, transnational networks, and transnational relations starting in the mid-1990s.
The literature has explored: how norms might be transmitted from state to state by looking at
how states adopt certain new bureaucratic structures after other states have done so (Finnemore
1996); how specific norms such as nuclear deterrence and the taboo against the use of chemical
weapons alter states’ use of weapons in war (Price and Tannenwald 1996; Price 2008); the
change in the norms of opposition to slavery, decolonization and apartheid (Klotz 1995;
Crawford 1993); how norms may shape US foreign policy, for example, the use of bilateral
agreements to enforce human rights norms in Latin America (Sikkink 2004); and the adaptation
of norms to new situations, such as the evolution of the norm for humanitarian intervention
(Finnemore 2003). Scholars have also argued that international norms affect state behavior via
domestic political processes (see for example, Cortell and Davis 1996). More recently Risse,
Ropp, and Sikkink examined under which conditions actors move from commitment to
international norms to compliance with them (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 2013).
The question of how to explain the variation in the level of adoption of different international
norms among states has been answered in a number of different ways. Cortell and Davis argue
that two national-level factors affect the influence of international norms on domestic political
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processes: first, the domestic salience or legitimacy of the norm; and second, the structural
context within which domestic policy debate occurs (Cortell and Davis Jr. 2000). They define
salience in this way: “salient norms give rise to feelings of obligation by social actors and, when
violated, engender regret or a feeling that deviation or violation requires justification” (Cortell
and Davis Jr. 2000: 69). At a state level, the measures of salience of a norm to a particular state
include an examination of: first, changes in national discourse; second, changes in the state’s
institutions; and finally, changes in the state’s policies, with the changes in the discourse being
the most important. As they state, “paradoxically, the most salient norms will be most evident
when they are violated, as actors will feel a strong need to justify or apologize for
noncompliance” (2000: 71). Theorists suggest that the examination of how international norms
may become salient domestically should take into account at least four different factors: the level
of cultural match or congruence between the international norm and domestic norms; the rhetoric
of leaders; domestic interests; and domestic institutional structure. In terms of the cultural
match, Jeffrey Checkel argues that preexisting domestic understandings or social conditions alter
the effect that international norms can have domestically (Checkel 1999). He argues that
international norms need to resonate with local culture—widely held domestic beliefs,
understandings, and obligations—in order to gain traction at the local level. When there is a socalled cultural match, local actors are much more likely to take the international norm as a given,
recognizing obligations associated therewith and speaking and acting accordingly. When there is
no cultural match, the adoption of an international norm will be much more difficult. Margaret
Keck and Kathryn Sikkink reach a similar conclusion: they argue that transnational advocacy
networks “are more likely to be influential if they fit well with existing ideas and ideologies in a
particular historical setting” (Keck and Sikkink 1998: 204).
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The salience of a norm may also be affected by rhetoric. If leaders repeatedly use the
language of certain norms in speeches, statements, or pronouncements, the cumulative weight of
those pronouncements may shift public sentiment towards acceptance of the norm (Cortell and
Davis Jr. 2000). Even if the use of the norms in the discourse is in a cynical bid to add legitimacy
to the speaker, that usage may alter the discourse around the norm from questioning its
legitimacy to a discussion about its applicability in particular cases (Risse 1998). In addition to
government leaders, societal leaders may also increase the rate of rhetoric around a norm,
thereby altering its salience in political debates (Boli and Thomas 1997).
In their search for explanations for variations between states, some scholars have also
examined differences in domestic structures. Jeffrey Legro explains variations in different
countries’ continued adherence to international norms during the Second World War (drawn
from international humanitarian law), such as the prohibition against the use of chemical
weapons and the use of submarines to attack civilian shipping, with differences in the political
cultures and structures of the militaries in each of three countries—Great Britain, Germany, and
the Soviet Union (Legro 1997). In addition, some scholars have found that if a norm is not
present in existing domestic structures, it will be much harder for that norm to gain salience
domestically. For example, Kevin Hartigan found that the domestic laws of Mexico and
Honduras have no concept of a refugee, resulting in the weak enforcement of international norms
regarding the protection of refugees (Hartigan 1992).
Non-state actors are prominent in this literature mainly as advocates or norm entrepreneurs
promoting new norms, often through transnational networks of NGOs, to affect state behavior
(Keck and Sikkink 1998). Keck and Sikkink argue in Activists Beyond Borders that domestic
NGOs are able to put pressure on their states by working through these transnational networks,
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which have activists at the international level who can lobby international organizations (IOs)
and other powerful states, and which in turn put pressure on the host state, a process Margaret
Keck terms the “boomerang effect.” They study these transnational networks through an analysis
of the evolution of the adoption of human rights norms and environmental protection norms in
particular countries (Keck and Sikkink 1998). An alternative approach is to observe the impact
of one non-state actor: Ann Marie Clark’s study of Amnesty International’s work since 1961
traces this organization over time and finds that Amnesty International has had a significant
impact on the discourse surrounding human rights (Clark 2001). Some scholars are beginning to
look beyond the effect of non-state actors on the behavior of states and are analyzing the
interaction of norms on non-state actors themselves. Giovanni Mantilla, for example, examines
how transnational corporations have begun to comply with international human rights norms
through a variety of mechanisms including voluntary standards of behavior (Mantilla 2009).
There are two dominant theoretical models in this body of literature which propose to explain
norm development and internalization at the state level: the norm cascade model (Finnemore and
Sikkink 1998; Sikkink 2011) and the spiral model (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).6 Other
models, such as the evolutionary model suggested by Ann Forini comparing norms to genes,
appear to have been less persuasive (Florini 1996: 363). Recent studies have added additional
models for norms that do not seem to fit these dominant models—for example, a diffuse
signaling model for the spread of the norm of election monitoring (Hyde 2011), or suggestions of
alternative ways the spiral model may work—for example, arguing for the importance of

6

These are in addition to theories which stressed the institutional cooperative aspect of norms and argued that
norms are embedded in international institutions and are generated along with them usually as a result of demand for
interstate cooperation (Keohane 1984; Axelrod 1986; Keohane 1986). This study is not engaging with this literature
as the mechanisms of cooperation within international institutions are too distant from the world of non-state actors
to have direct applicability.
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contestation in the establishment of the norm of the responsibility to protect (R2P) (Badescu and
Weiss 2010).
The norm cascade, introduced by Finnemore and Sikkink, suggests a model to explain the
change of norms over time. Finnemore and Sikkink argue that norms have a life-cycle, and while
each norm may follow its own trajectory, broadly speaking, norms cycle through stages from
emergence to internalization. The first stage is “norm emergence”; the second stage is the period
of broad norm acceptance, which they term “a norm cascade”; and the third stage involves
internalization (1998: 869).
During the first stage, norm entrepreneurs are very active, seeking to convince states to adopt
or embrace a new norm. These individuals, such as Henry Dunant and his campaign for more
humanity during conflict which led to the establishment of the International Committee of the
Red Cross (ICRC) and the adoption of the Geneva Conventions, act through organizational
platforms to convince states to embrace a new norm.
The second stage, or the norm cascade, is characterized by a period in which early adopting
states attempt to socialize other states to become norm followers. Once a “tipping point” of a
critical number of states has been reached, the norm goes from being something adopted by a
few to something adopted by the majority of states. The process from going from a norm adopted
by few to one adopted by many is termed the “norm cascade” (1998: 901). After the tipping
point has been reached, states need very little pressure to adopt the norms, socialization itself the
dominant mechanism that causes states to adopt new norms. For Finnemore and Sikkink,
socialization is an active process of international pressure brought to bear on non-conforming
states by other states or non-state actors, which may involve diplomatic praise or criticism, either
bilateral or multilateral, and which may be reinforced by material sanctions and incentives. The
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third and final stage is the norm internalization where the states internalize the norms through
domestic legislation and they acquire a “taken-for-granted quality” (1998: 895). Finnemore and
Sikkink argue that the motive for actors engaged in adopting a norm (in their model this is states,
international organizations, and transnational networks) is primarily international and domestic
legitimation. They also argue that desire for esteem (which is related to legitimacy) can explain
norm following in some actors.
In Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink’s The Power of Human Rights (1999), the authors introduce a
different theoretical model, the norm spiral, which outlines the relationship between international
norms and domestic human rights practices. They trace the shift in a state’s behavior from noncompliance with human rights norms to internalization of the norm through the ratification of
human rights treaties and institutionalization of human rights norms in domestic practices and
laws. The spiral model suggests there are five stages in this process. In the first stage, the human
rights violations of a state are brought to the attention of other states and international
organizations by transnational advocacy networks, such as Amnesty International or Human
Rights Watch. Under pressure from these reports, states enter into the second stage, denial, and
invoke counter-claims of sovereignty and nonintervention. In the third stage, violating states
begin to make concessions or “cosmetic changes to pacify international criticism” (1999: 25) and
as part of the process begin to undergo some degree of socialization into the global human rights
regime. Even though these concessions may be merely window-dressing, the state, by offering
any concessions at all, acknowledges the validity of the human rights norm itself, and begins the
process of socialization. The fourth and fifth stages, Risse et al. argue, are the final stages of
socialization and internalization as the state begins to ratify human rights treaties, and
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incorporate the language of human rights norms into its domestic discourse and legal
frameworks, and finally, adopt rule-consistent behavior.
This model does have some shortcomings, for example, by suggesting that once states
embark on this route there is no turning back. However, it does offer a starting point for
examining how non-state actors might be affected by human rights norms, passing through
similar stages of violation, denial, concessions, socialization, and eventual internalization. It is
necessary to look for indicators other than ratification of treaties and incorporation of human
rights legislation into domestic law to determine to what extent these non-state actors might have
progressed along the spiral. In this study, the analysis of a group’s discourse offers insight into
the progress, if any, along the spiral, and when situated in the context of the events surrounding
the group’s activity, provides a deeper understanding of how norms may affect such a non-state
actor’s behavior.
Scholarship in this area has also identified imitation as a mechanism which influences states
in certain areas. For example, research has shown that a state will ratify treaties in the areas of
children’s rights, civil and political rights, and freedom from torture if their neighbors have done
so. However, this imitation appears to be issue specific, as it does not extend to other areas, such
as economic, social, and cultural rights or outlawing of discrimination against racial minorities or
rights of women (Simmons 2009).
A second group of scholars tackling international norms comes from the rational-materialist
tradition, which emphasizes power and self-interest. In general, interest-based approaches offer
explanations for changes in behaviors, such as the adoption of a particular discourse or the
emergence of a new norm or code of behavior, based on the assumption that target actors act
rationally, with a set of ordered preferences, and calculate the costs and benefits of adopting a
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new behavior. They act in order to maximize their utility in view of their stated or assumed
preferences. Scholars have analyzed why states adopt certain treaties based on the “anticipated
positive and negative effects of international laws on states” (Hathaway 2007, 588-621). In this
line of thinking, states conduct cost-benefit analyses in order to determine whether or not to sign
up to international treaties, such as human rights treaties (see for example, Goodliffe and
Hawkins 2006; Cole 2005; Vreeland 2008; Simmons 2000; Smith-Cannoy 2012). Beth Simmons
argues that states follow a logic of consequences: states commit to norms in order to establish
credibility or legitimacy in a certain area (Simmons 2000). Once established, the credibility
allows the state to access benefits from other states or non-state actors such as multinational
corporations (MNCs) or NGOs in the form of investments, trade, aid, or close political ties.
Looking more specifically at human rights treaties, Jay Goodliffe and Darren Hawkins (2006)
identify three main costs governments incur for ratifying one human rights treaty, the
Convention Against Torture (CAT): policy change, unintended consequences, and limited
flexibility. These costs are balanced against the benefits of norm conformity. Oona Hathaway
(2007) argues that states commit to human rights treaties based on a cost-benefit analysis without
a real commitment to the norms themselves—states may, she says, join human rights regimes as
a panacea to relieve pressure for real change by offering a signature on a treaty as a concession to
domestic groups lobbying for change without any accompanying behavioral changes. Heather
Smith-Cannoy (2012) similarly argues that many commitments made by states to human rights
treaties are insincere, but that those commitments may backfire if local groups are able to hold
their governments accountable for treaty violations.
Using this approach for understanding the adoption of international norms, particularly
human rights norms, in the language of armed resistance groups would suggest that these groups
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adopt these norms in their language when it is in their interest to do so, with or without
commitment to the norms themselves. Thus, calculating that the adoption of human rights
discourse, for example, would bring benefits such as increased legitimacy and support from
international actors—greater than costs, such as increased pressure to live up to international
norms of behavior and a curtailing of military tactics—armed groups would similarly begin to
use such language and reference treaties.
From the literature on international norms, we have both a model of how norms may come to
affect the actions and discourse of non-state actors from outside of the group, through the norm
spiral, and an insight into the possibly strategic thinking and cost-benefit analysis behind the
adoption of certain norms in the discourse from within groups. Increased legitimacy is a major
benefit driving many states’ behavior and discourse and we can assume that this is a significant
factor for rebel groups as well. In addition, the literature addresses the question of which norms
get accepted pointing to the need for salience of the norm locally and congruence of the norm
with the local normative environment.
Legitimacy
One problem rebel groups struggle with is that of legitimation—how can they make the use
of political violence acceptable and become a legitimate actor? As Inis Claude reminds us, a
struggle over legitimacy is an essential part of a political struggle: “politics is not merely a
struggle for power but also a contest over legitimacy, a competition in which the conferment or
denial, the confirmation or revocation, of legitimacy is an important stake” (Claude 1966: 368).
David Beetham argues that an understanding of legitimacy “helps to explain the erosion of
power relations, and those dramatic breaches of social and political order that occur as riots,
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revolts and revolutions” (Beetham 1991). The concept of legitimacy remains slightly slippery,
however, partly due to its subjective nature (Luck 2001).
Most discussions of legitimacy tackle two areas in which legitimacy is of primary
importance—the rightfulness of rulers or of a state to rule, and the strength of institutions and
norms. The question of legitimacy has been at the heart of philosophical debate for centuries.
Niccolo Machiavelli argues in Discourses and The Prince that pure power is impotent and that
the stability of a government rests not on its power, but on the voluntary acceptance of that
power. The voluntary acceptance is predicated on perceived legitimacy. Jean-Jacques Rousseau
similarly argues in The Social Contract that a stable order rests on consent, which is a direct
function of the legitimacy of the government (Zelditch 2001). In more recent times, Max
Weber’s typology of social authority—rational-legal; traditional; and charismatic—is based on
different types of legitimacy. And we need look no further than Weber’s famous definition of the
state to understand what he considers to be the central role of legitimacy to the state: “[The state
is] the human community which (successfully) claims the monopoly of legitimate coercion”
(Weber 1948: 78). As some scholars have argued, with the use of the term legitimacy Weber
was not referring to an abstract quality, but to the very act of legitimation itself (Barker 2001).
As Rodney Barker points out, “what characterizes government, in other words, is not the
possession of a quality defined as legitimacy, but the claiming, the activity of legitimation”
(2001: 12). All rulers, thus, engage in acts of legitimation, hoping to cloak themselves with the
mantle of authority. The process of this legitimation requires “defensible criteria for
legitimacy,” which Beetham argues must identify a rightful source of authority and rightful ends
or purpose of the exercise of political power (Beetham and Lord 1998).
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In terms of the rightfulness of rulers, Barker also provides the following definition of
legitimacy: it is “the belief in the rightness of a state…so that commands are obeyed not simply
out of fear or self-interest [but] because subjects believe that they ought to obey” (Barker 1990:
11). Thus, just having the power over subjects is not enough—the power must be considered to
be legitimate. Again, Claude argues that “among statesmen, the lovers of naked power are far
less typical than those who aspire to clothe themselves in the mantle of legitimate authority;
emperors may be nude, but they do not like to be so, to think themselves so, or to be so
regarded” (1966: 368). Ian Hurd argues that states act strategically in their pursuit of legitimacy,
but they act within a socially constructed context (Hurd 2008). Legitimacy, Hurd states, is “a
socially constructed phenomenon, [which] affects the strategic calculations and self-conceptions
of [states]. The payoffs sought by actors through strategic behavior might be material or
symbolic and in either case they depend significantly on sociological processes related to
legitimation” (2008:16).
Theo Van Leewen argues that there are four main strategies for legitimation: authorization
(legitimation by reference to the authority of tradition, custom or law); rationalization
(legitimation by reference to the utility of institutionalized action); moral evaluation
(legitimation by reference to value systems), and mythopoesis (legitimation conveyed through
narrative) (Van Leewen and Wodak 1999). These different forms of legitimation may be
analyzed through discourse analysis (Fairclough 2003).
On the question of the legitimacy of institutions and norms, Alexander Wendt places the
level at which legitimacy is created at the individual level—each actor within a specified
community determines whether the norm is legitimate or not and each of these individual acts
determines the legitimacy of the norm for the community as a whole. For Wendt “to say a norm
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is legitimate is to say that an actor fully accepts its claim on itself” (Wendt 1999: 272). Thus, the
consent of individual actors makes a norm legitimate. Others, such as Thomas Franck, offer a
more legalistic interpretation, arguing that “legitimacy is that attribute of a norm which conduces
the belief that it is fair because it was made and applied in accordance with right process”
(Franck 1995: 26). Thus, the process by which the norm is applied can make the norm legitimate,
not an attribute of the norm itself or the level of acceptance of the norm by the community.
While Adam Przeworski argues that legitimacy is reducible to fear or self-interest (Przeworski
1986), others, such as Hurd, argue that legitimacy is a theoretically distinct mechanism that
induces compliance because complying is considered to be the appropriate thing to do (Hurd
1999).
As this study examines insurgent groups, which are by definition non-state actors, a final area
in the literature on legitimacy that is relevant looks beyond the legitimacy of the state to the
legitimacy of organizations. Legitimacy is essential to most organizations and most particularly
to organizations with international reach (Suchman 1995; Suddaby and Greenwood 2005).
Recent work on the legitimacy of transnational groups provides some insights. For example,
David L. Brown argues that transnational organizations such as NGOs may have a credibility
gap and thus need to make strategic choices to enhance their own legitimacy and accountability
(Brown 2008). To do so, they engage in certain activities, among them complying with
regulations, associating with other legitimate actors, embodying key values and norms, and
associating themselves with practices and actors to confer legitimacy (2008: 11). In particular,
such organizations may try to establish six different types of legitimacy: regulatory,
associational, performance, political, normative, and cognitive, and will perform different acts to
increase these different types of legitimacy (2008: 35).
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Social movements
From the social movements literature, there are two areas most helpful for thinking about the
discourse of armed opposition groups: the literature on framing and the literature on the
mechanisms which groups may employ, particularly in the process of legitimation.
The concept of framing is pivotal in research on social interaction among sociologists,
anthropologists, psychologists, linguists, and political scientists. It features prominently in the
social movement literature and is here described as a process by which meaning is assigned to
objects, events, and experiences by groups or individuals in an interactive manner. It is an
“active, processual phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality
construction” (Benford and Snow 2000: 614). The literature on social movements (which also
include violent groups) suggests that these movements use framing to position themselves with
multiple audiences: “they frame, or assign meaning to and interpret relevant events and
conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and constituents, to garner
bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists” (Snow and Benford 1988:198). According to
David Snow and Robert Benford, frames have three core framing tasks: “diagnostic framing”
(identification of the problem); “prognostic framing” (what can be done about the problem); and
“motivational framing” (encouraging action on the problem). Benford further determines that
frames employed by groups vary across many dimensions including problem identification, the
flexibility or rigidity of the frame, the interpretive scope, and the degree of resonance (Benford
and Snow 2000). The success of the framing depends on three attributes: frame consistency,
empirical credibility of the frame, and the credibility of the frame articulators (2000: 620). For
the frame to have empirical credibility, it need not be believable by everyone, but it does need to
be believable by the target segment of the population the group intends to persuade. Thus,
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credibility has a subjective quality (Jasper and Poulsen 1995). James Jasper and Jane Poulsen
further argue that “moral shocks” serve as essential moments in the time of the recruitment to a
movement and that these shocks may be actual events or generated by the movements
themselves—in either case, these shocks need to be reflected in the framing activities (1995).
Movements also may try to extend the framing of the issue to appeal to a wider audience (Snow
and Benford 1992). Examples of the latter are armed opposition groups that tailor their message
to appeal to international actors (Bob 2005) or rights groups which shift their frames from local
to international issues such as women’s rights (Tsutsui 2006). Kiyoteru Tsutsui argues that the
movement to assist former “comfort women” in Asia who had suffered abuse at the hands of the
Imperial Japanese army was able to make headway more than 40 years after the end of the
Second World War by adopting the frame of international human rights and women’s rights in
the mid-1990s.
How do the processes of framing work in the context of rebel groups? Again, drawing from
the social movement literature, I argue that the processes of contention can be broken down into
mechanisms such as boundary-making, claims making, and strategic self-representation, which
may be linked together in various complex combinations (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001;
Tarrow and Tilly 2006). Charles Demetriou’s study of the National Organization of Cypriot
Fighters (EOKA) draws on the work of Doug McAdam et al., and argues that the process of
legitimation requires the mechanisms of boundary-making (identification of the “in-group”) and
certification (validation by outside parties) and suggests that an additional mechanism, which he
terms valorization, is needed to legitimize political violence (Demetriou 2007). Valorization, or
“positive representations of performances or performers” (2007: 173), is a critical mechanism for
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violent movements seeking legitimacy. Thus, an essential part of legitimization of rebel groups
is their own use of positive stories about their own actions.
Rebel groups and civil war
The fourth group of relevant literature concerns civil war and armed opposition groups.
This literature addresses issues such as insurgent recruitment (Gates 2002; Weinstein 2007;
Humphreys and Weinstein 2008), violence against civilians (Kalyvas 2006; Kalyvas 2003;
Humphreys and Weinstein 2006; Zahar 2001), and rebel governance (Mampilly 2011; Mampilly
2007). It offers different theories on how armed opposition groups develop their strategies and
identifies the goals of opposition groups, the structure of the groups, and the environments in
which they arise as the most important variable in determining the variation among the different
techniques employed by armed opposition groups. For example, a group with a more structured
hierarchy is more likely to have greater control over its members than one without.
Whether the goal of the opposition groups is secession, outright replacement of the state,
or resource accumulation, the goal has been identified as likely to determine the development of
the groups’ strategy (Weinstein 2007; Collier and Hoeffler 2000; Collier, Hoeffler, and Rohner
2006). However, Marie-Joelle Zahar argues that strategies change over time—the
institutionalization of armed groups (the gradual increase of their internal structures) over the
course of the conflict, undertaken to increase their legitimacy, leads to a change in their
strategies (Zahar 1999).
Based on this literature, I theorize that groups struggling to increase their legitimacy in the
face of international prohibition will need to show that they can take on responsibilities of states
(including an awareness of international norms and an understanding of how these norms should
alter their behavior), both to civilians within the territory they hope to control and to outside
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actors. Further, a group with a more hierarchical structure will have more control over its
discourse, and therefore be able to use discourse strategically.
The subset of literature on the effect of the involvement of international actors on armed
opposition groups suggests that international actors have an effect on these groups and that
different types of actors have different effects (Nordstrom 2004). Carolyn Nordstrom argues that
extra-state actors, ranging in her account from international arms dealers to international
organizations and humanitarian NGOs, may be the causal agents of conflict or the agents of its
continuation. Jean-Francois Bayart argues that in Africa, state elites seek to increase their power
by interacting with international agencies or transnational actors (Bayart 1993). Interactions
with the UN and the World Bank shape the strategies of armed groups (Barnett 2001) as groups
may seek to boost their legitimacy by their association with international actors (Zahar 2001).
Additionally, armed groups may actively seek to market themselves to NGOs or non-state actors
(Bob 2005). NGOs may also act as witnesses, pressuring armed opposition groups to abide by
human rights or humanitarian laws (Zahar 2001). Arguments in the literature on transnational
actors suggest that the engine of transmission of norms is not states, but the networks of
transnational actors (Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Thomas 2001; Smith, Chatfield, and
Pagnucco 1997). Thus, the degree to which these outside actors have engaged directly with the
insurgents will affect the degree to which these groups may alter their behavior.
The study of the presence of human rights language or international norms in the discourse or
action of resistance groups has been somewhat limited. Some scholars have found the effect of
international norms on discourse and behavior to be less significant than expected. Two cases
from Africa point in this direction. For example, Mariane Ferme and Danny Hoffman suggest
that the massive intervention by international actors in Sierra Leone spread human rights
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discourse to the Kamajors, or civil defense forces. However, they found that the spread of human
rights discourse was limited to areas where there was considerable overlap between the
international norms and discourse and the local ethical codes (Ferme and Hoffman 2004). Claire
Metelits found in Southern Sudan that the supposed pressure of international norms on the Sudan
People’s Liberation Army (SPLA) pushing it towards democratization actually inhibited the
state-building efforts of the organization (Metelits 2004). Metelits argues that the need to unify
the diverse populations of southern Sudan against northern Sudan in order to create a state was in
opposition to the pressures to build democratic institutions, which fostered differences, rather
than unity. In order to successfully build a state, Metelits contends that the SPLA needed to pass
through a unifying authoritarian stage, which was at odds with the effects of the
contemporaneous democratization efforts. Other scholars have found the effect to be significant.
For example, Deepa Prakash has found that the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka responded to the
international sea change in the application of the term “terrorism” after September 11, 2001
(Prakash 2008). In the cases of Bosnia and Kosovo, Alan Kuperman argues that the emergence
of the norm of humanitarian intervention created a moral hazard by encouraging rebels to place
civilians at risk in order to increase the likelihood of an intervention by outside actors on the
rebels’ behalf (Kuperman 2006). However, others have argued that attacks by the state on
civilians, which can enhance a rebel group’s standing with local communities, may have long
been part of rebel groups’ strategies to mobilize the population in favor of the rebels
(Andreopoulos 1994).
Some have argued that international norms form an integral part of rebel groups’ identity.
For example, Kimberly Jones argues that the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Egyptian Muslim
Brotherhood, and Hamas have all used human rights violations strategically in the forging of a
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national identity by defining and reinforcing in-group and out-group boundaries (Jones 2010).
More recently, Dale Walton argues that insurgent groups increasingly have an advantage over
government forces in their ability to harness modern media techniques to spread war crimes
accusations more widely than before in their efforts to delegitimize the state they are fighting
(Walton 2012).

1.3 Methodology
This study is both theory-testing, in that it tests theories created to answer questions about
states in order to answer questions about non-state actors, and theory-proposing, in that there are
new hypotheses generated to explain the behavior of these non-state actors. Case studies are the
preferred methodology when testing to see why a hypothesis holds, rather than a large-N study,
which would test if a hypothesis holds (Van Evera 1997). This research uses primarily one case
study, that of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) in Kosovo, using a process-tracing
methodology. However, a second case of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in Sri
Lanka is also explored, showing that the hypotheses developed in this research have
generalizability to other rebel groups, and allowing for a limited comparison between the two
groups.
Case selection
The primary case was used to allow the in-depth study of the changing patterns of norm
usage of one case, the KLA and Kosovo from 1995 to 1999. This case provides a good test case
for this research for several reasons. First, the KLA adopted numerous international norms in
their discourse, each of which shows a different pattern of use over time, which differences need
to be explained. Second, a variety of outside actors were present in Kosovo at different times
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during the period in which the KLA was active, thus allowing for the examination of the role of
these actors, if any, in affecting change in KLA’s discourse. Third, knowledge about human
rights and its discourse was already present in Kosovo at the time of the conflict, which suggests
the adoption of such language by the KLA was less a matter of discovering this language than a
strategic decision to use it.7 Fourth, the conflict in Kosovo was broadly framed by the outside
world as being about the violation of the international norms of human rights.8 Examining KLA
discourse may reveal to what extent, if any, that framing was being driven by the KLA’s
portrayal of the conflict. Finally, the study of the KLA’s discourse is possible because of the
practice of the KLA to issue press releases at intervals throughout the conflict, even before the
organization was widely known, allowing a longitudinal study as well.
Data from the secondary case were used to test the correlation between the norm usage of the
rebel groups, on the one hand, with the changes in norm discourse at the state level, on the other.
The LTTE’s long history (founded in 1976, the LTTE was defeated militarily by the Sri Lankan
government in May 2009 after 33 years of struggle) offers a chance to analyze the transmission
of the effect of norm change from the international to the non-state level over a long period of
time. Second, the LTTE was able to establish a form of governance over the territory it held in
the north and east of Sri Lanka, functioning more like a state with its own bureaucracy and
providing public services. Third, the different internal normative environments between the
KLA and the LTTE allow for a comparison to be made between the two and their different

7

The two Kosovar human rights organizations operating throughout the 1990s were The Council for the
Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms, headed by Adem Demaci, and the Kosova Helsinki Committee for Human
Rights, headed by Gazmend Pula. Both had grass-roots networks throughout the region for discussion of human
rights and for the collecting of information about human rights violations.
8
The conflict was framed as both a violation of international human rights norms and of international
humanitarian law and both bodies of law are frequently mentioned together. See, for example, the UN Security
Council Resolutions 1160, 1199, and 1203, which state the UN is “deeply concerned by the reports of increasing
violations of human rights and of international humanitarian law.”
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patterns of discourse. And finally, the LTTE leader Vellupillai Prabhakharan made annual
speeches on Hero’s Day, November 27, which allows for a systematic discourse analysis at
regular intervals.
Research design
The methodology combines discourse analysis of existing documents from the period with
interviews with KLA members and other individuals, such as human rights activists and
journalists who were present and active in Kosovo during the period of study.
While discourse analysis has been questioned by some IR theorists as not an appropriate
method for international relations research (see for example, Keohane 1988), it has begun to be
more widely embraced by the discipline (Milliken 1999). For this project on the spread of norms
in language, it presents itself as an excellent method of study. Discourse analysis serves to
“illustrate how… textual and social processes are intrinsically connected and to describe, in
specific contexts, the implications of this connection for the way we think and act in the
contemporary world” (George 1994: 191). Discourse constructs social realities as people
construct meaning using sign systems, which are predominantly linguistic (Milliken 1999).
For the primary case, the research examines the period between June 1, 1995 (the date of the
first press release of the KLA9) and June 12, 1999, when Kosovo Force (KFOR) troops entered
Kosovo with authorization from the UN.10 This is the period in which the KLA was actively
framing their struggle in the public arena. While the KLA was in existence beginning in
December 1993 (when it chose “Kosovo Liberation Army” as its name), between 1993 and June
1995 it had not yet begun to announce itself as an entity and was yet to publicly put forward
9

The first publicly released press release was numbered Communiqué No. 13. Communiqués No. 1 – 12 were
not published but circulated among KLA members themselves.
10
KFOR consisted of troops from NATO countries, partner countries, and other non-NATO countries under
unified command and control.
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reasons for resistance or an agenda (Judah 2000: 115). June 12, 1999 marks the end of the period
of study with the arrival of KFOR ground troops on this date, following the adoption of UN
Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1244 on June 10, 1999. While the KLA remained in
existence until disbanding or re-forming as the Kosovo Protection Corps (KPC) on September
21, 1999 (Bideleux and Jeffries 2007: 562), after June 12, the KLA can no longer be classified as
an opposition group because Yugoslav troops no longer had authority to act in the region and
had begun withdrawing. The Yugoslav withdrawal of troops was complete by June 20.
For the secondary case, the research examines the period from 1992 (the year the first Hero’s
Day speech was made) until 2007, the last year the speech was made. The LTTE was founded in
1976, and its first large scale attack was in 1983. However, the speeches available from the
earlier years are sporadic, and some have a particular focus, such as women’s day, or address a
particular military campaign. It is not until Prabhakaran began issuing regular speeches
addressing the overall position of the LTTE in 1992 that there is a regular, repeated speech
available for analysis.
Discourse analysis
Documents (press releases, political declarations, speeches, and interviews) were obtained
from each of the rebel groups under study. Each of the documents was coded for its use of
international norms—both the mention of the norms themselves and the context within which the
norms were mentioned.11 The norms under study were human rights, international humanitarian
law, humanitarian intervention, and the norm against terrorism. Some of these norms were
analyzed in greater detail. For example, under the human rights coding, the mention of the
following specific references were tracked: human rights conventions, the right to life, torture,

11

A code book is attached as Appendix 1.
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arbitrary arrest and detention, genocide, and social/cultural/economic rights. Thus, a statement
referring to killings committed by, or deaths at the hands of, members of the state apparatus,
such as the police force, was coded as a human rights reference, and specifically as a violation of
the right to life. Statements referring to killings by the army were coded as humanitarian law
references. In each case, coding was determined by the words of the speaker, i.e., the speaker’s
representation of the situation, which is necessarily a subjective perspective, rather than trying to
code based on the historical record or an objective perspective. For example, if the speaker
mentioned that a civilian was killed, it was coded according to the context and frame given by
the speaker, rather than investigating whether the killing had actually occurred or who might
have been responsible.
Given the broader confusion regarding human rights vs. humanitarian law violations, I took
particular care when determining to code a loss of life as a human rights event (violation of right
to life) using a human rights framework, or a humanitarian law event (harm of civilians) using a
humanitarian law framework. For the purposes of this research, it was assumed that human rights
law and IHL might be in effect during the conflict for the periods under study.12 If the death of
an individual was mentioned within the context of military action, it was coded as the harm of a
civilian, which invokes humanitarian law. If a death was attributed to troops, or any military
action in the sentence or the context of the sentence, it was also coded as a humanitarian law
violation. However, if the death of an individual was mentioned separatly from any military

12

The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has addressed the issue of which body of law may take precedence on
two occasions, in 1996, with its Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, and in 2004, with its opinion on the Wall in
Occupied Palestinian Territory. While the ICJ does say that both may apply at one time, in neither case does it
specify what rights fall into what categories in what contexts. Two states, Israel and the United States, have long
maintained that human rights law does not apply in times of war (Hampson 2008). These persistant objections not
withstanding, however, most states have accepted the ICJ proposition that international humanitarian law and human
rights law can exist concurrently.
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action or discussion of troops, or was attributed to the actions of the civilian police force, it was
coded as a human rights law violation invoking human rights law.13
To test for coding bias, a possibility because the same researcher both created the coding
methods and completed the coding, a random sample of the documents was recoded afresh. The
result of the coding test was an overlap of 92 percent, which is a high degree of overlap, allowing
for confidence in the coding methods.
For the main case study, the KLA, three types of documents were analyzed: press releases
and political declarations issued by the armed opposition group; print and radio interviews given
by its members; and radio broadcasts by the KLA. Included in this study are 66 press releases,
dating from June 1, 1995 to May 26, 1999, 11 political declarations dating from March 22, 1998
to February 27, 1999, five other statements and speeches, 77 interviews or interview segments in
the local media, and five months of radio broadcasts.14 These data were primarily collected from
archives in Kosovo, although some material had been published in book form. All of these
materials contain words spoken by or written by a member of the KLA. No articles written by
non-KLA journalists about the KLA, without direct quotes from KLA members, are included.
Articles written by KLA members, however, are included. By ensuring that only words spoken
by KLA members are subjected to analysis, this safeguards that the material analyzed contained
the actual discourse of the group’s members, rather than words or motives attributed to them.
The data collection in the KLA case was exclusively from Albanian language media, rather
than including all international press material. This sampling method was chosen to avert any
potential contamination of the discourse by international journalists who might be more likely to

13

The state is the only party able to violate an individual’s human rights, while a resistance group such as the
KLA may conduct human rights abuses.
14
A full list of these documents is attached as Appendix 2.
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frame the interview with terms from international discourse, including international norms. In
addition, there is a risk that an international journalist might have adopted a particular normative
framework external to the norms in current use by the interviewees and shape the interview
accordingly.
Local newspapers used for this research are four Pristina-based newspapers: Kosova Sot,
Koha Ditore, Bujku, and Rilindja, and an Albanian language newspaper published by the
diaspora community and available underground in Kosovo, Zeri I Kosoves, as well as Kosova
Press, a KLA-sponsored news-service, available online, founded on January 4, 1999. The radio
broadcasts were collected from the archives of Radio Kosova e Lire (RKL), a radio station
sponsored by the KLA, which was broadcast from KLA-controlled territory from January 4,
1999 and continued for many months after the end of the conflict in June 1999. The broadcasts
included in this study are up until June 12, 1999.
For the secondary case, the LTTE, 19 speeches and two interviews by Thiruvenkadam
Velupillai Prabhakaran, the founder and leader of the Tamil Tigers, were analyzed. These
speeches spanned the period from March 1992 to November 2007 and were given at regular
annual intervals allowing for a longitudinal study with evenly spaced data points. Each speech
was considered to be a significant document summarizing the LTTE’s position and views on
important issues and provided a policy statement for the upcoming year (Manoharan 2003). The
speeches were collected from the Tamil Eelam news site.15
Interviews
In addition to document analysis, interviews were conducted with 26 people, 17 former
members of the KLA, including four members of the central command, four Kosovar human

15

A list of the LTTE speeches is included as Appendix 4.
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rights activists who were active during the war, and two Kosovar journalists who covered the
war. There were also supplemental interviews with non-Kosovar actors present at the time, such
as members of Human Rights Watch and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) cease-fire verification mission. The interviews provided more context for the
textual discourse analysis. In addition, interviewees provided background and personal thoughts,
and elaborated on strategies hinted at in the texts. The main interviews were targeted interviews
with senior members of the KLA who were approached directly. Interviews with rank and file
members of the KLA were planned using the snow-ball method. The interview format was
loosely structured, allowing for respondents to elaborate and supplement the interview with
additional material.
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Chapter 2: Background on the Kosovo and Sri Lanka cases
The religion of the Albanian is the Albanian cause.
--Pashko Vasa, 1878-1890

This chapter gives an overall background to the conflict in two cases: Kosovo, as the
main case, and Sri Lanka as the supplementary case. It provides a brief overview of each of the
conflicts, describes the origins of both the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Liberation
Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), and details the structure of the organization and normative
environments of each group.

2.1 Background on the conflict in Kosovo16
At the time of the conflict, Kosovo was a province of Serbia within the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia (FRY) with a majority of ethnic Albanians and minorities of Serbs and other
ethnicities, namely Bosniaks, Goranis, Turks, Roma, Egyptians, and Ashkalis.17 Kosovo is
approximately 4,200 square miles (or slightly smaller than Connecticut), landlocked, and almost
entirely surrounded by mountain ranges, with the Sharr mountains in the southeast, the Kopaonik
mountains in the north, and the Albanian Alps (known locally as the Cursed Mountains) in the
south and west. Located along the southwestern flank of Yugoslavia, Kosovo borders Albania. It
also shares borders with Montenegro to its north, and Macedonia to the southeast. Historically,
16

For the purposes of this research, the conflict in Kosovo refers to the armed conflict between the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) and forces of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY). The KLA began using violent
tactics against the state in 1993 and continued to do so until June 1999. Other discussions of the conflict in Kosovo
refer to the conflict between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and Yugoslav forces, beginning with
the NATO air attacks of March 1999 and ending with the arrival of NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) ground troops
in June 1999. However, the focus of this study is on the conflict between the non-state actor, the KLA, and the
forces of the state actor, the FRY.
17
In 1992, Serbia and Montenegro formed a federation, the FRY, which lasted until 2003 when Serbia and
Montenegro each became independent states from one another. From 1945 to 1963, Serbia was part of the Federal
People’s Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY), which was renamed the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY)
in 1963.
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Kosovo was located at the crossroads of empires and trade routes, and was a strategic prize for a
succession of invaders throughout its history.
Kosovo was for centuries under the control of the Ottoman Empire (1392 to 1912).18
After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire by Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece in the First
Balkan War in 1912, the territory came under Serbian rule. At the end of World War I in 1918,
Kosovo became part of a new Yugoslav state, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. It
remained part of the different iterations of the Yugoslav state until it declared independence in
February 2008.19
The main armed group using violence to challenge the state in Kosovo in the 1990s was
the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). They were founded in at the end of 1993 at a meeting in
Drenica in rural Kosovo west of Pristina. The KLA began activities in 1993 and continued
targeting police stations, policemen, and other individuals sporadically over the next three years
although some founding members, such as the Jasharis, were involved in several attacks on
police in Kosovo before 1993.20 The first multi-city attacks did not occur until 1996. While there
were other armed groups in Kosovo, primarily the National Movement for the Liberation of
Kosovo (LKCK) and the FARK (Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosovo), the KLA emerged
as the main rebel group during the conflict.

18

The well-known Battle of Kosovo in Kosovo Polje (or, the Field of the Blackbirds) in 1389 between Prince Lazar
at the head of the Serbian army, joined by a coalition of Hungarians, Albanians, Bulgarians, and Bosnians, and
Sultan Murad at the head of the Ottoman army was fought to a draw, with neither side emerging a clear victor. It
pre-dated the eventual victory of the Ottoman Empire over all the Serb territory in 1455. See (Fine 1987) for more
detail on the battle.
19
The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929. Yugoslavia became known as the
Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia (FPRY) in November 1945 and was renamed the Socialist Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRY) in 1963.
20
For example, members of the Jashari and Lladrofci families shot policemen in Drenas in March 1992.
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Members of the KLA point to events at the beginning of the twentieth century as
significant to the development of Albanian resistance to Serbian rule of Kosovo.21 In particular,
the December 1912 conference in London, attended by the Great Powers (Austria-Hungary,
Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and Russia) at which the borders of the new state of Albania
were discussed with parts of Kosovo designated as falling under Serbian control, is considered to
be a significant turning point for one senior KLA member.22 The KLA believed that these
decisions imposed by outside actors lacked legitimacy and date the Albanian resistance to
Serbian rule to this time. Some historians considered that the decisions made at the conference
regarding the borders of Albania marked the beginning of the movement in search for a Greater
Albania (see, for example, Batt et al. 2008; McMahon 1998).
Following the outcome of the London Conference, resistance by rural Albanians to
Serbian rule, known as the Kaçak movement, began in 1913. The KLA considered the
antecedents to their struggle to be found in the Kaçak movement. This movement opposed the
policy of Serb colonization of the region that was begun with the enactment of the Regulation for
the Settlement of Southern Regions that helped settle almost 18,000 Slavic families on land
taken from local farmers between 1920 and 1939 (Banac 1984: 300). The Kaçaks fought the
authorities and attacked settlers throughout Kosovo, in parts of Macedonia, and in Montenegro.
The movement was brought to an end with the capture and killing of its leader, Azem Bejta from
Drenica, in central Kosovo in 1924. The Drenica region, a rural region in the hills west of
Pristina, was also one of the strongholds of the KLA, and prominent leaders of the KLA, such as
Hashim Thaçi, Adem Jashari, Fatmir Limaj, and Jakup Krasniqi hailed from the villages of the

21

Author interview with Dr. Ram Buja, senior member of the KLA (Director for Civilian Affairs of its General
Staff) and later Minister of Education of the Republic of Kosovo, Pristina, Kosovo, October 2010.
22
Ibid.

45

region. Adem Jashari, known as the “legendary commander,” was one of the original members
of the KLA, and the stories of his individual acts of resistance to Serbian rule were said by
fellow members of the KLA to be inspirational.23 A “modern Kaçak” (Judah 2000), Jashari and
the story of his life and his death in a massacre at his family compound in Prekaz in March 1998,
took on mythical significance for the Albanian Kosovars.24 It became a central theme of the
narrative of the KLA and later for Kosovo itself after 1999 (Lellio and Schwander-Sievers 2006).
The outbreak of violence in the mid-1990s was not the first expression of resistance to
Belgrade’s control of Kosovo; however, previous periods of violence were short-lived and
directly related to demonstrations. For example, in the spring of 1981, student demonstrations in
Pristina turned violent. The demonstrations initiated by students in Pristina in late March quickly
spread to the urban population and demonstrators made broader political demands and began
condemning the political system as a whole. Thousands of troops were called in on April 2, a
state of emergency imposed, and a province-wide curfew was enforced. The death toll numbers
varied greatly from official Yugoslav numbers of 11 fatalities (Malcolm 1998: 334), to 120
fatalities reported by Albanian sources (Pajazit 1996: 150), to as many as 300 reported dead
according to Amnesty International (Amnesty International 1985: 12). Numerous students and
participants in the demonstrations, fleeing arrest, were forced into exile and many found work
abroad among the tightly-knit expatriate communities in Germany and Switzerland. Those who
fled abroad formed a core group from which the KLA could draw a decade later. In addition,
many of the students jailed in 1981 for lengthy periods experienced harsh conditions in prison
and were primed to join the resistance on their release.
23

Interviews with the author of various KLA members in Kosovo, October 2010.
Not all Albanian Kosovars were taken with the myth of Jashari. One LDK member said confidentially: “Adem
Jashari was not a ‘legendary commander.’ He commanded no one. He was a rural ruffian who was killed in a
botched attempt to arrest him” (Perritt 2008: 35).
24
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Over the course of the 1980s, the relations between the Albanians and the Serbs in
Kosovo deteriorated. Events such as the leaking of a draft “Memorandum” of the Serbian
Academy of Sciences and Arts, the most prominent academic body in Yugoslavia, which
portrayed the Serbs as the only nation in Yugoslavia without their own state, served only to
exacerbate the already tense relations between the two ethnic groups in Kosovo.25 It called the
March and April 1981 demonstrations in Kosovo a declaration of “open war” on Serbs. It
dubbed the creation of autonomy in Vojvodina and Kosovo a dismembering of Serbia and called
for the revoking of the autonomy granted to these provinces in the 1974 constitution (Vickers
1998: 221). In November 1988, the federal parliament in Belgrade adopted amendments that
allowed for the changes in the Serbian constitution, which included reducing the autonomous
regions’ powers in the field of legislation and imposing republican law from Belgrade over
provincial law from Pristina. The changes in Kosovo were met with protests and massive strikes
throughout the region, which were countered with the declaration of a state of emergency.
On March 28, 1989, with Kosovo under emergency rule, the Assembly of Serbia met to
revoke the autonomy granted to Kosovo in 1974 and to restore Kosovo to Serbian control.
Kosovo Albanians protested throughout the province, marching in the streets and chanting
slogans supporting independence for Kosovo and unification with Albania: “We are Albania,”
“Kosova is ours!” (Sullivan 2004: 53). At least 28 Kosovo Albanians were killed in the protests
(Bideleux and Jeffries 2007: 532), although the total might be as high as 100 (Malcolm 1998:
344).
New legislation went into effect and Kosovo Albanians across the region were dismissed
from their jobs. The medical system was revamped with 1,855 Albanian doctors and medical

25

The full text was eventually published in 1989.
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staff losing their jobs (Judah 2000: 62). The main Albanian language daily newspaper, Rilindja,
was shuttered along with the province’s Albanian language radio and television stations, as was
the Kosovo Academy of Arts and Sciences (Vickers 1998: 24). Schools were forced to stop
teaching in Albanian and offer courses only in Serbian. When most teachers refused, police went
into the schools and physically removed the teachers and 21,000 teachers lost their jobs as a
result (Vickers 1998: 247). The University of Pristina was declared a Serbian language
institution and 863 professors were dismissed from their posts (ibid.: 247). In total,
approximately 80,000 Kosovo Albanians lost their jobs (ibid.).
By 1990, the situation for Kosovo Albanians was grim. A journalist from the Washington
Post who visited the province in February 1990 described the situation as a “minority . . . sitting
on a seething majority, using tanks, tear gas, and helicopter gunships to keep the lid on” (Harden
1990, 33). In July 1990, the provincial assembly in Pristina was physically forced from the
building and on July 2 the delegates, locked out of their building, assembled on the steps and
declared the Republic of Kosovo within the SFRY. Most likely invalid on procedural grounds,
nevertheless, it prompted the Serbian authorities to respond by formally dissolving the
government of Kosovo.
Kosovo’s declaration of independence and the non-violent approach
In September 1991, Kosovo Albanians held a referendum and voted overwhelmingly for
independence. The balloting was held in the open in rural areas, and in private homes in urban
areas. The results declared were that 99.87% of the eligible voters supported independence and
the Kosovo parliament, which had continued to meet despite its official dissolution by the
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Serbian authorities, declared independence on October 19, 1991 (Vickers 1998: 251).26 While
the Yugoslav government did not recognize the referendum and the newly declared independent
state of Kosovo was recognized by only one country, Albania, the outlawed Kosovo parliament
set up a shadow state led by its elected president and leader of the political party, the Democratic
League of Kosovo (LDK), Ibrahim Rugova.27 The Prime Minister, Bujar Bukoshi, was in exile,
based in Bonn, Germany. Rugova’s position on the future of Kosovo was clear: while
Yugoslavia still existed, Kosovo should be awarded equal status to its other republics, but once
Yugoslavia disintegrated, the only way forward was independence (Rugova 1994: 172).
From April 1990 onwards, the majority of the population had embraced non-violent resistance,
which became the center-piece of the LDK policy. The majority of Kosovo Albanians believed
in this approach and in the assurances of its champion, Rugova, who whole-heartedly advocated
it as the way forward for Kosovo (Stephan 2005). In April 1992, he argued: “We have no chance
of successfully resisting the army. In fact the Serbs only wait for a pretext to attack the Albanian
population and wipe it out. We believe it is better to do nothing and stay alive than to be
massacred.” (Vickers 1998: 264).
Coupled with the non-violent approach, the LDK urged Kosovo Albanians to refuse to
recognize the legitimacy of the Serbian state in Kosovo. In practice, this meant that Kosovo
Albanians stopped participating in any official state elections and they set up a virtual parallel
state, with education and medical care continuing partly outside official state-led education and
medical systems.
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The LDK won 96 of 100 single constituency seats. Two of the remaining seats were won by “independents” (who
were members of the LDK), one by the Bosniak party, and one by the Turkish People’s Party. Of the 42 seats
distributed by proportional representation, 12 went to the Turkish party, seven went to the Christian Democrats, one
to the Social Democrats, three to the Bosniak party and 13 seats reserved for Serbs and Montenegrins were left
empty (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000: 45).
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Rugova was elected as president in the clandestine elections held in Kosovo on May 24, 1992.
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Despite this approach, however, there was a continuing decline in the human rights
situation in Kosovo throughout the 1990s.28 By 1995, virtually all Albanians in Kosovo wanted
to separate from Serbia: a 1995 survey found 43% favored joining Albania, while 57% wanted
independence (Mertus 1999: 316). There was also a rejection of the pacifist approach from
certain sectors of Kosovo Albanian society, some of whom turned to violent means to bring
about the end of Serbian rule in Kosovo.
The pacifist approach touted by Rugova did not end the frustration and anger in Kosovo.
Shkelzen Maliqi, a leading Kosovo Albanian intellectual and political analyst, and a member of
the Kosovo Helsinki Committee in the 1990s, said of the situation in the mid-1990s in Kosovo:
[It] has turned into a kind of intense war of nerves, in which one side stops at nothing,
committing the most brutal violations of human rights and civil liberties, completely
ignoring the protests of the international organizations which for a while kept monitoring
teams in Kosovo, while the other side bottles up its humiliation, despair, fury, rage and
hatred—but for how long before it explodes? (Maliqi 1998)
Already by the end of 1993, living conditions in Kosovo had deteriorated significantly—
there was very little to buy in any shops, tanks surrounded Pristina, and Serbian military
presence in the province increased. The judiciary in Kosovo was almost entirely in Serbian
control and the concept of a fair trial was largely abandoned (International Helsinki Federation
for Human Rights 1993). Previously preventable or treatable diseases were on the rise, incidents
of polio, tetanus, tuberculosis were increasing, and infant mortality rates were rising (Vickers
1998: 275). Mother Teresa Society calculated that the number of people receiving humanitarian
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The human rights violations in Kosovo were documented by international human rights groups, such as Human
Rights Watch (which published 18 reports on the human rights situation in Kosovo between 1990 and 2000),
Amnesty International, Helsinki Committee for Human Rights in Serbia, International Helsinki Federation, and the
Society for Threatened Peoples, as well as local human rights organizations, the Council for the Defense of Human
Rights and Freedoms and Kosova Helsinki Committee for Human Rights. The majority of the reports, however, do
not focus on statistics as the main goal—they are for the most part narrative, and focus on communicating the nature
and variety of human rights abuses. Therefore, statistics on the abuses, including the number of killings prior to
1998, are not possible to assemble (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000: 302).
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aid was over 370,000, or about 20% of the population (ibid.: 276). It was in this environment
that the KLA arose.
Emergence of the KLA
Formed in 1993, the KLA was in its early days and was in a largely diffuse form (see the
section below “The Establishment of the KLA” for more detail). In 1995 it began taking
responsibility for violent attacks on Serbian police within Kosovo and occasional attacks against
Macedonian police in Macedonia.29
At the negotiations for the Dayton Peace Agreement for Bosnia negotiated in Dayton,
Ohio, in November, 1995, the thorny issue of Kosovo was largely ignored, which was a blow to
Rugova who had attached a great deal of importance to the inclusion of Kosovo in the
negotiations. This outcome gave credibility to the KLA’s argument that the international
community only listened to violence. Veton Serroi, then a journalist and political commentator in
Kosovo, commented, “for many Albanians, one conclusion was inescapable: only violence gets
international attention” (Surroi 1996). A KLA fighter later recounted for Western journalists:
“The so-called pacifist way failed and finally Albanians were convinced that they had to
organize armed resistance….From 1996 we had some movements or groups who didn’t approve
any more Rugova’s peaceful way” (Sell 2002: 274).
Prior to Dayton, violence was sporadic and isolated. For example, in April 1995, a border
post on the border between Kosovo and Albania was attacked, killing a guard and injuring two
others, and in August 1995, a police station in Decan had a bomb thrown inside it, wounding two
police officers. Following Dayton, the violence increased. In April 1996, five Serbs were killed
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The first press release, Communiqué 13, taking responsibility for violence within Kosovo was released on June 1,
1995.
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and four were wounded in what appeared to be coordinated attacks in different towns across
Kosovo.
The violence increased throughout 1996 and 1997 as the KLA became more organized
and able to coordinate simultaneous attacks in different locations. As neighboring Albania
descended into chaos in 1997 following the implosion of a pyramid scheme, vast numbers of
weapons, raided from unprotected military stores, were freely traded on the open market and
made their way across the mountains into Kosovo and into the hands of the KLA (Dannreuther
2001). The organization, however, remained a small one, with about 150 men fighting towards
the end of 1997 (Bardhyl Mahmuti quoted in (Judah 2000: 106). And despite their regular press
releases, the wider Albanian population in Kosovo remained unaware of who the KLA were.
Escalation of violence
In February 1998, the Serbian forces began moving against the KLA in earnest. Serbian
forces in Kosovo, including the Yugoslav Army (VJ), the Serbian Ministry of Interior’s special
police (MUP), and its Special Anti-Terrorist Unit (SAJ), had reached as many as 50,000 troops
(SIPRI 1999). Attacks in the Drenica region, known to be a center of KLA resistance, included
attacks on the villages of Likoshan and Qirez, and were followed by the massacre of the entire
Jashari family in Prekaz in March 1998. These three attacks marked a turning point in the
perception in Kosovo of the use of violence in the struggle in Kosovo (Perritt 2008: 38; and
Xharra 2000). The dead Adem Jashari, writes Howard Clark, “became a more potent symbol in
1998 than the passive Rugova or the erratic Demaci” (Clark 2000). After the massacre in Prekaz,
the cost of the non-violent path advocated by Rugova and the leading political party, the LDK,
seemed too high for many to pay. As a result, the KLA was overwhelmed with volunteers eager
to join and their operation expanded rapidly, thereafter (Krasniqi 2006).
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Labeled a terrorist group by the government in Belgrade since its inception, the KLA was
labeled as a terrorist organization by outside actors for the first time in 1998. Robert Gelbard, the
US special envoy to the region, called the KLA, “without any questions, a terrorist group” in
February 1998 (Agence France Presse, February 23, 1998). This label was seen by some to be a
nod to Belgrade that actions against the KLA would not be opposed by the US (Kola 2003: 334).
The UN Security Council also condemned acts of terrorism employed by the KLA, putting in
place an arms embargo against both the KLA and the Serbian regime.30 The same Security
Council resolution also condemned the excessive use of force employed by the Serbian police
forces.
International response
International efforts to bring peace to Kosovo, for years desultory, were finally beginning
to gain momentum in the spring of 1998, albeit not consistently.31 The Contact Group urged the
FRY to address the status of the province of Kosovo in February 1998, sanctions against the
FRY were imposed (and quickly lifted again) in May, and Milosevic and Rugova were forced to
negotiate directly.32 US special presidential envoy to the Balkans, Richard Holbrooke,
succeeded in getting Milosevic and Rugova to meet in Belgrade on May 15. By June of that
year, it was clear that discussions also had to include the KLA (Bellamy 2002). Holbrooke
became the first foreign diplomat to meet with KLA members and to begin trying to facilitate
30

Security Council Resolution 1160, March 31, 1998.
In 1992 and 1993, there was a period of limited engagement in Kosovo, when the Commission on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) included Kosovo in its Mission of Long Duration to Yugoslavia, and the
International Conference on Former Yugoslavia (ICFY) mandated a minorities rights’ working group to include
Kosovo in its studies. CSCE had permanent missions in both Peja (known at that time by the Serbian name, Pec) in
the west, and Prizren in the south. However, between 1993 and 1997, there was less engagement directly in Kosovo,
following ejection of the Mission of Long Duration from Kosovo, and the removal of Kosovo from the ICFY
working group mandate.
32
The Contact Group was first established to mediate the peace process in Bosnia in April 1994, and consisted of
representatives from Britain, France, Germany, the US, Russia, and Italy. After Dayton, the Contact Group, after
some delay, turned its attention towards Kosovo. It first publicly expressed concern about the Kosovo crisis on
September 24, 1997, and engaged seriously in the matter after the March 1998 killings.
31
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negotiations between Kosovo and Serbia, bringing the KLA onboard as well. Holbrooke’s first
meeting with the KLA was with a local KLA commander, Gani Shehu, and KLA member, Lum
Haxhiu, in the town of Junik, near Decani, on June 24, 1998.33 Throughout the summer, US
Ambassador Christopher Hill engaged in shuttle diplomacy between Pristina and Belgrade and
tried to put together negotiations between the Kosovo Albanians and the Serbs. On July 29, Hill
met with KLA member and former human rights activist Shaban Shala (Judah 2000:170).
International diplomacy efforts and discussions with the KLA continued throughout the summer
months as violence escalated throughout the province, particularly in the rural areas. The
summer 1998 Serbian offensive conducted throughout Kosovo by both the military, providing
artillery and tank support, and special police forces, who went from village to village, engaging
with KLA troops, their supporters, and civilians, forced up to 250,000 Kosovo Albanians from
their homes (Sell 2002: 285).
Not content to allow diplomatic options be the only ones explored, the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) began flexing its military muscles. In June NATO issued a
communiqué, expressing concern at the escalating violence in Kosovo and outlined additional
military steps it planned, including air excercises over the Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia (FYROM) and Albania “to demonstrate NATO’s capability to project power rapidly
into the region.”34 At the same time, NATO military authorities were tasked to assess and
develop a full range of military options. On June 15 and 16, 1998, 13 NATO countries
participated in Operation Determined Falcon—a display of air force power with more than 80
war planes flying over Macedonia and Albania within 10 miles of the border of FRY. Lieutenant
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Shehu was the sub-commander of the Junik area within the Dukagjini zone, interview with author, New York,
June 2010.
34
NATO’s press release M-NAC- 01 (98) 77, issued on June 11, 1998.

54

General Michael Short said of the exercise that it “intended to demonstrate the alliance's
commitment to peace and stability in the region and the alliance's ability to project power into
the region” (Carassavas 1998). The exercise, intended as a threat, may not have been taken very
seriously by Belgrade however—General Klaus Naumann, NATO's Military Committee
chairman, conceded after the fact that Milosevic “rightly concluded that the NATO threat was a
bluff…and finished his summer offensive” (Daalder and O'Hanlon 2000: 33). Operation
Determined Falcon was followed by a ground troop exercise in Macedonia from September 11 to
18, termed Cooperative Best Effort 98. A Partnership for Peace exercise, it involved troops from
20 NATO and partner countries.35 By September 24, NATO’s Supreme Commander was given
permission to issue an activation warning (ACTWARN) by NATO’s Defense Ministers. This
was the first real step in preparation for airstrikes.
By September 1998, the UN was calling for a cease-fire, which was agreed on October
16.36 With agreement from Belgrade, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) launched a cease-fire verification mission (KVM) on October 25, 1998, with civilian
monitors patrolling Kosovo. The agreement was reached only after NATO gave an activation
order (ACTORD) on October 13 to the warning issued in September to authorize air strikes
against Yugoslavia. The ceasefire was shaky at best, and by the New Year both the KLA and the
government forces were accusing the other side of breaking it.
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The Partnership for Peace was a NATO program launched in January 1994 with the goal of promoting trust
between NATO members and other European and former Soviet Union countries.
36
UN Security Council Resolution 1199, September 23, 1998. Acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter the
Security Council members demanded that all parties cease hostilities immediately and take steps to improve the
humanitarian situation on the ground. They called upon the Serbian and Albanian parties to enter immediately into a
dialogue on a negotiated political solution. The resolution made four demands on Belgrade: cease hostilities against
the civilian population and withdraw security units used for civilian repression; enable international monitoring in
Kosovo; facilitate refugee returns; and make progress on reaching a dialogue with the Albanian parties.
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Rambouillet and NATO’s bombing campaign
International efforts to broker peace culminated with discussions between Serbian
officials and the Albanian delegation, which included top commanders from the KLA, in
Rambouillet, France, in February 1999. The two sides were given the option to sign the Interim
Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo. It called for the presence of NATO’s
Kosovo Force (KFOR) on the ground in Kosovo and the withdrawal (or demilitarization) of
Serbian forces. The draft accord also provided for an international meeting after three years to
determine the mechanism for the final solution in Kosovo. The delegation from the FRY
refused to accept the demand that NATO control all FRY air space, a key NATO demand, and
NATO resumed its threats of military force. After a delay, the Kosovo Albanian delegation
signed the February 23 Interim Agreement on March 18 in Paris (Weller 1999). Holbrooke gave
a final warning visit to Belgrade and NATO bombing began on March 24. The bombing
campaign, dubbed Operation Allied Force, aimed to deter Serbian attacks in Kosovo and reduce
Serbian military capability. It continued until June 11, 1999.
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After the failure of Rambouillet and during the bombing campaign, the Serbian forces
launched a massive offensive throughout Kosovo, creating an enormous flow of refugees. An
estimated 1.5 million Kosovo Albanians were forced from their homes and approximately
800,000 fled over the Kosovo borders, primarily into Albania and Macedonia (UNHCR 1999).
The conflict came to an end when, on June 3, 1999, Milosevic accepted NATO’s terms for
settlement presented to him by Finnish president Martti Ahtisaari and Russian envoy Viktor
Chernomyrdin. Serbian popular support for the war had ebbed as the damage from the bombing
of infrastructure in Serbia increasingly affected the economy and ordinary citizens’ lives
(Hosmer 2001). Anticipating intensified bombing and the possibility of an assault by NATO
ground troops, Milosevic felt pressure to settle, particularly when the support from Serbia’s longtime ally, Russia, evaporated (Hosmer 2001: 47). NATO-led KFOR ground troops entered
Kosovo on June 12, 1999.

2.2 The Kosovo Liberation Army
Establishment of the KLA
Prior to the KLA’s formation, there had been groups favoring violence on the radical
fringes of Kosovar politics for decades. Many of the groups active in Kosovo in the 1980s and
1990s had their roots in the underground movements of the 1960s and 1970s. The groups began
to coalesce after the demonstrations in 1981. The student demonstrations in March and April
1981, which led to the wave of arrests and imprisonment of young activists by the authorities,
also led to exile for those who escaped arrest. Summary trials were held, and by the end of
April, 194 people were sentenced to imprisonment for their part in the demonstrations and 28
others were detained for investigation as suspected organizers (Amnesty International 1981).
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Many of those who fled found their way to Germany, where on February 17, 1982, four separate
movements merged into one, the People’s Movement for a Republic of Kosova (LPRK), which
later became known as the People’s Movement of Kosova (LPK). The four merging were the
National Liberation Movement Kosova and the other Albanian Regions in Yugoslavia
(LNCKVSHJ), the Marxist-Leninist Organization Kosova (OMLK), the Communist MarxistLeninist Party of Albanians in Yugoslavia (PKMLSHJ), and the Red Popular Front (FKB)
(Lipsius 1998).
The LPRK became a rallying point for students and activists involved in the
demonstrations of 1981, many of whom were jailed after the demonstrations, and only released
after years behind bars (Judah 2000). Even in Germany, however, participation in these
clandestine groups was not safe. In January 1982, the founders of the LNCKVSHJ, Jusuf and
Bardhosh Gervalla, were assassinated in Stuttgart, but it is unclear who was behind the killings,
the Serbian secret police (Lipsius 1998) or the Albanian intelligence services (Judah 2000: 105).
The LPRK began printing leaflets abroad calling for Kosovo’s independence and distributing
these clandestinely within Kosovo (Sullivan 2004: 54). The LPRK was a focal point for those
seeking to resist Serbian domination of Kosovo and other Albanian-majority areas of Yugoslavia
until the formation of the LDK, and the subsequent declaration of the Republic of Kosova in July
1990. Also, by the early 1990s, activists jailed during the 1981 demonstration began to leave
prison and, radicalized by their experiences, many were willing to turn to violence (Sell 2002:
278). The members of the LPRK did accept the underground state built by Rugova and the
authority of the LDK, but some did not, and some members, such as the former OMLK leader,
Hydajet Hyseni, left the LPRK to join the LDK instead. The LPRK began publishing a weekly
newspaper, initially printed in Germany, and then Switzerland, called Zeri I Kosoves (Lipsius
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1998). This group favored a violent solution to the repression in Kosovo and began some
military training exercises in Albania for its members. It also began connecting with militant
families within Kosovo, such as the Jasharis in Drenica (Perritt 2008). Following clandestine
meetings in Macedonia in late 1992 and Pristina in 1993, this group split into two: the Popular
Movement for Kosova (LPK) and the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosova (LKCK),
the former dedicated to a guerrilla war and the latter to advocating a mass popular uprising
through consciousness-raising.37
A small core group of the LPK, including Hashim Thaçi, renamed themselves the KLA at
the end of 1993. Between 1993 and 1995, the group spent time consolidating, fund raising, and
setting up connections among the small pockets of active resistance within Kosovo. Connections
were made with Adem Jashari in Drenica, the Haradinaj family and others in Dukagjini, and
Zahir Pajaziti in the Llap valley (Perritt 2008: 69). A key point person in Kosovo was Adem
Jashari from the village of Prekaz in Drenica, the region historically associated with the Kaçak
uprising, whose resistance to Serbian authority made him seem like “a kaçak for the 1990s”
(Judah 2000: 111).38 Jashari was nominated as the head of the KLA within Kosovo, operating
out of his compound in Prekaz (Krasniqi 2006: 23).39
The turn towards violence was piecemeal at first, with small groups organizing their own
operations, in a guerrilla style. Groups were organized in cells, with no more than four or five
members in each cell and with very little contact between cells (Bekaj 2010). Some of the
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The LKCK conducted some violent operations in Kosovo after this point and formally merged with the KLA on
May 11, 1998 (Bekaj 2010).
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The Kaçaks were an early twentieth century movement that resisted Serbian rule in Kosovo, active from 1913 to
1924. Kaçak, meaning outlaw, is derived from the Turkish word, kachmak, meaning runaway. At the height of their
activity in central Kosovo, their numbers may have been as high as 10,000 active fighters (Mulaj 2008).
39
For the argument about the central place that Adem Jashari, his role in rural resistance, and the massacre of his
family plays in the post-conflict construction of master narrative of the Albanian experience during the conflict and
its role in the development of a Kosovo Albanian national identity, see Lellio and Schwander-Sievers 2006.
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groups were drawn from single families, some of which had already been targeted by the Serbian
secret police. Ramush Haradinaj, who was the KLA Regional Commander in the Dukagjini
region, said of his choice to take up arms: “Those families were already the targets; they had to
make the choice [to fight] earlier than the others. We didn’t have much choice at the time. We
knew that we could be killed one way or another—in the prisons of Serbia, by being
assassinated, or by resisting them directly” (Perritt 2008: 1).
The date at which the violent resistance started is under dispute. Jashari had begun
attacking Serbian police as early as March 1992, when members of the Jashari and Lladrofci
families shot policemen in the Drenas bus-station. Jakup Krasniqi, who later became the
spokesman for the KLA, termed this operation the first politically motivated violence by the
group (Krasniqi 2006: 21).40 Other sources suggest the violence started later, citing the attack
against Serb policemen near Komorane in Glogovac in May 1993 as the first attack (ICG
1998b:2). In any event, the initial violence was isolated and sporadic. The KLA also conducted a
number of attacks on police outposts outside Kosovo in Macedonia.
The first planned, coordinated assaults began in April 1996. On April 22, four almost
simultaneous attacks were launched in separate locations in Stimlje, Peje, and Mitrovica (ICG
1998b). The simultaneous attacks resulted in the Serbian response being spread over several
areas (Tsekov 2002). At the same time, attacks against Kosovo Albanians who were termed
collaborators and Serbian families who had been resettled in Kosovo began as well. At this
point, the KLA was not a real threat to the Serbian forces, but the use of violence was a symbolic
act, which was used to advertise the existence of the group, raise popular consciousness, and
increase popular participation (Mulaj 2008).
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In March 1992, the group was not formally known as the KLA, but the individuals engaged in these early
activities became part of the KLA when it was so named in December 1993.
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By the end of the summer of 1997, the KLA had grown in size and complexity to be able
to conduct a ten part operation between September 10 and 11, targeting police vehicles and
barracks up to 90 miles apart in coordinated, separate attacks (Kusovac 1998). By this time, more
than 13,000 armed Serbian police were stationed in Kosovo, along with 6,500 soldiers of the
Yugoslav Army (VJ) (ICG 1998a). The KLA made their first public appearance in November
1997 at the funeral of a teacher in Lausha, when three members of the KLA in uniform took off
their masks and spoke to the 15,000 assembled mourners (Kusovac 1998). One Kosovo Albanian
journalist said the appearance of the KLA at the funeral had an electrifying effect on the
population. “Ten years of so-called nonresistance resistance softened the backbone of the
Albanian population. Everyone was surprised when the KLA rose up because there had been no
open defiance for so long” (Stephan 2005: 199).
The ranks of the KLA greatly expanded after the massacres in Likoshane, Qirez, and
Prekaz in March 1998. Some Albanian Kosovars flew back to Kosovo from abroad on hearing
the news to join the fight. “I was in the US at the time, and I heard about the massacres through
the American newspapers. I heard about the massacres, the burning, and the next day I bought a
ticket to fly to Albania.”41 Village militias were formed and began calling themselves KLA and
the KLA found itself inundated with an influx of men willing to fight. In addition, some senior
LDK leaders, such as Jakup Krasniqi, announced themselves to be KLA members, and former
political prisoners who were leaders in the Center for Defending Human Rights and Freedom
(CDHRF) aligned themselves with the KLA (Clark 2000: 176).
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Author interview with U, a KLA soldier, October 2010.
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Structure of the KLA
The structure of the KLA as it grew over time is an important variable under
examination. The degree of formal structure or hierarchy displayed by the KLA affected its
ability to identify and use international norms in its discourse.
Initially, the KLA was made up of disparate groups with loose links between them and
strong bonds of family or friendship within each group keeping each small group together. The
units were very secretive and communication between them was limited. “Our unit functioned
with three members. Each group knew of only one other person outside the unit. We used nick
names, and had limited knowledge of other units, which was done more for our and our families’
protection.”42 Most of the early attacks were separate initiatives by one of these small groups of
individuals acting independently (Perritt 2008: 81). Some groups were started by the members of
the group themselves, and it was only over time that these groups came together and came to be
known as the KLA. “My brother established a group with his friends around 1995 and 1996,
called the Eagles. [Zahir] Pajaziti came up with the idea of cooperating together and somehow
establishing the KLA.[…] In 1996 we got together and joined up with the KLA.”43 Secrecy was
essential to protect members, primarily from the Secret Service. “Our groups were so wellorganized, so that the Secret Service of Serbia could not break it. Before there had been many
people who had tried to start a resistance, but they were infiltrated.”44
It has also been argued that this early loose horizontal structure was a clan-based
structure, wherein the local leaders incorporated traditional social, cultural, and political
elements into the organization (Tsekov 2002). It was not until much later in the war, in the
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Author interview with G, a foot soldier in the KLA from the Dukagjini region, October 2010.
Author interview with S, a foot soldier in the Llapi region, October 2010.
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Author interview with U, a KLA member, October 2010.
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summer of 1998, that a more formal structure was established, with a hierarchical command
added to the loosely formed initial horizontal structure.45
In November 1994, meetings were held in Tirana between the groups inside Kosovo and
those in exile. A group of those in exile were given the task of representing the political platform
of the KLA, fundraising, and weapons supply. They included Xhavit Haliti, Azem Syla, and Ali
Ahmeti, among others (Perritt 2008: 81). These men established themselves as the General Staff,
but none (apart from Ahmeti) saw any military action. Others, including Thaçi, Rexhep Selimi,
and Nait Hasani, worked to coordinate activities within Kosovo, unite the disparate groups, and
connect them with those in exile. Between 1994 and 1998, these three helped to forge links
among the groups within Kosovo and travelled frequently in and out of Kosovo over the border
into Albania to connect those groups with the exiles (ibid.). In addition, each group within
Kosovo had its own links to others in Switzerland, Germany, or the US through family members
in the extensive Kosovar diaspora, which had grown rapidly as the economic and security
situation in Kosovo steadily worsened. The KLA was not large initially—according to Rexhep
Selimi, it had only reached about 200 combatants by November 1997, along with operational and
logistical support (quoted in Bekaj 2010). Selimi also said that “in the beginning, we were all
equal.” And that “decisions were made by consensus. We all listened until everyone was
convinced.”46
The KLA operated in regional zones throughout its development, each led by a local
leader, or regional commander. These seven zones were Drenica in Central Kosovo; Llap in the
northeast, bordering on Serbia and including Pristina; Dukagjini in the southwest from Peja to
Decan and Gjakova, including the essential access to the border with Albania; Shala in the north;
45
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Author interview with Jakup Krasniqi, October 2010.
Author interview with Rexhep Selimi, October 2010.
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Pastriku in the south from Prizren to Maleshevo; Nerodima in the south-central area, around
Lipjan and Ferizaj; and Karadaku in the southeast, bordering on Macedonia (Krasniqi 2006).
Coordination between zones was limited and each zone operated mostly independently (Troebst
1999). There were also significant differences in operating styles, abilities, and levels of control
over the soldiers in different zones. For example, one KLA fighter who had experience in both
the Drenica and Llapi zones said: “the army was much more organized in Llapi than in Drenica.
It was more hierarchical, and there was more education and experience in Llapi. Many of the
officers there were from the ex-Yugoslavian army.”47
In June 1998, the KLA underwent reorganization. It established a political wing with five
senior members: Hashim Thaçi, Sokol Bashota, Rame Buja, Xhavit Haliti and Jakup Krasniqi,
and organized various functions, such as public relations, into a vertical structure. By the end of
the war, the organization had evolved into a more recognizable army, each zone having brigades
and each brigade consisting of four battalions (each battalion may have had as few as 90 to 100
men) (Perritt 2008: 83). Battalions were broken into companies, each of which was made up of
three or four platoons (Perritt 2008: 71). In addition to these forces, there were irregular troops,
or civilian defense militia forces, which defended home villages. There remained considerable
differences between each zone, however, with each zone commander using different tactics and
managing his troops differently (ibid.).
In November 1998, the KLA underwent further reorganization and stratification, with the
introduction of nine departments: Personnel; Information services; Operations; Logistics; Public
relations and Civil administration; Communication and Interdepartmental Relations; Finance and
Economics; Public information; and Military Police (Krasniqi 2006).
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Author interview with P, a KLA soldier active in both Drenica and Llapi zones, October 2010.
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KLA and Media
This section outlines how the KLA worked with the media to publicize its discourse. In
the early days, from 1995 to the summer of 1998, the KLA had no formal mechanism for
contacting and dealing with the press and the media. Although press releases (termed
communiqués) were written and faxed to both local and international press outlets with the help
of the LPK in Switzerland, the authorship of the communiqués was unclear. These communiqués
were transmitted by the BBC Albanian services and were printed in Albanian and foreign
newspapers in Switzerland, the UK, Germany and other countries (Mulaj 2008). The
communiqués were, although imperfect, the only direct method the KLA had to communicate
with the public until the founding of their radio station in January 1999. Initially, communiqués
gave information about all KLA activity, but by 1999, individual zones were also releasing
communiqués, offering information which was zone specific.
In July 1998, Jakup Krasniqi was appointed official spokesman for the KLA and assumed
responsibility for coordinating the official message released by the KLA from the General
Headquarters. Each zone, however, retained its own media point person, each of whom
frequently gave direct interviews themselves.48 The net result was that while there was some
oversight of press contacts about the particulars of items such as troop engagement, even after
July 1998 there remained only loose oversight of how the message was framed and presented to
the public at large.
By the summer of 1998, international media representatives were in Kosovo trying to
identify and interview senior members of the KLA (Judah 2000: 168; and Pettifer 2004).
Initially, the KLA, traditionally suspicious of outsiders, were not terribly receptive to receiving
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members of the foreign press (Hedges 1999). Gradually, they came to realize this was the best
way for them to present their case to the world at large. The interviews, however, were not
tightly controlled from the General Headquarters.
Congruence of international norms with local culture in Kosovo and within the KLA
This section provides an overview of the local culture in Kosovo immediately prior to
and during the conflict, with a focus on parts of the culture with which there was some overlap
with the international norms under discussion (human rights, international humanitarian law, and
the norm against terrorism). This overview is helpful in determining the degree to which the
level of congruence between international norms and the local culture was a factor in which
norms were used in the discourse, and when.
During the 1990s, Kosovar Albanians turned away from official state institutions in the
areas of education, healthcare and justice. As a form of civil resistance, a parallel system of
schools and clinics were set up in homes and other non-governmental buildings and were outside
the control of the authorities in Belgrade. Albanian Kosovars doubting the fairness of the
government became less likely to pursue justice through official channels. This withdrawal from
state institutions from 1990 onwards was coupled with a suspicion of what the state offered and
was accompanied by a return to more traditional modes of interaction which included a return to
the oral culture which had strong historical roots in Kosovo (Krasniqi 2009; Clark 2000).
Official news was no longer trusted, and instead, news was spread by word of mouth, from
neighbor to neighbor. Families gathered together with neighbors to listen to the sparse news
programs broadcast from Albania, jointly financed by the Albanian government and the LDK,
and there was a reemergence of a communal experience.
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In the field of law and justice, as Kosovars withdrew from the official state justice
institutions, they turned to alternative ways to solve disputes, mainly traditional laws and
mechanisms. In Kosovo, the traditional laws, shared orally for centuries, are known as the Kanun
of Leke Dukagjini.49 The Kanun is comprised of 12 books and l,263 articles, which together
form a comprehensive legal framework which governs almost every aspect of rural Albanian life,
from interfamily relationships, to communal matters, to matters of life and death. The twelve
books are Church, Family, Marriage, House, Livestock and Property, Work, Transfer of
Property, Spoken Word, Honor, Damages, Law Regarding Crimes, Judicial Law, Exemptions
and Exceptions. The Kanun applies equally to Catholic and Muslim Albanians. At the heart of
the Kanun are the principles of personal honor, equality of all men, hospitality, and kin loyalty.
For some scholars, like Leonard Fox, the Code of Leke Dukagjini is “the expression and
reflection of the Albanian character, a character which embodies an uncompromising morality
based on justice, honor, and respect for oneself and others” (Fox 1989: xix.). While some dispute
the relevance of the Kanun to modern Kosovar life (see for example Pula 2006), others have
argued that the Kanun has played, and continues to play, an important role in Albanian culture in
Kosovo and northern Albania (see, for example, Mangalakova 2004, Tarifa 2008, Arsovska
2006, and Trnavci 2010).
What parts of the Kanun are relevant to this discussion of international norms? While the
Kanun does specify how disputes may be resolved peacefully, at times with mediators, it also
outlines laws of behavior for individuals involved in deadly conflict, or blood feuds. Known as
gjakmarrja in Albanian, blood feuds are derived from a social obligation to murder or take the
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blood of the individual responsible for the slighting of one’s honor. The murder of a member of
another family in its turn creates the obligation in that family to pursue their honor with a
retaliatory murder, and some blood feuds may continue for generations.50 Of note is that family
members traditionally vulnerable to killing in blood feuds are adult males. Thus, certain
categories of people were immune from the threat of death, namely, children, women, the
elderly, and the mentally ill. Some individuals are, then, legitimate targets during blood feuds,
while others are not. In this specification of targets, there is a foreshadowing of which types of
individuals are considered illegitimate targets under international humanitarian law—namely,
those not directly involved in the conflict, or civilians, which often includes children, women,
and the elderly.
Blood feuds were still very much part of life and the culture in rural Kosovo in the 1990s,
as can be seen from the immense campaign conducted by Anton Cetta in 1990 and 1991 to
reconcile opposing families involved in feuds. In 1990, Cetta, a university professor and
folklorist, founded the Reconciliation Committee to Reconcile Blood Feuds in Kosovo (Komiteti
për pajtimin e gjaqeve ne Kosove). Cetta toured rural Kosovo with hundreds of volunteers,
attempting to mediate between parties, and convince families to forgive their blood feuds. His
form of mediation, outlined in the Kanun, allowed for families to negotiate a besa, or sworn
truce. It is estimated that blood feuds affected as many as 17,000 men in Kosovo at the end of the
1980s, confining many to their homes (Clark 2008: 60). Cetta said at the time: “It is not easy for
families required to draw blood to forgive, because for many centuries, families who did not take
vengeance were considered cowards” (Bytyci 2005). In a large public gathering in rural Kosovo
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to “forgive the blood” on May 1, 1990, at least 100,000 people attended, although the total could
have been many more (ibid: 63). Part of the civil resistance to the Serbian state at that time, Cetta
said of the campaign: “The enthusiasm and sense of fraternity that spread gave courage to our
politicians and also encouraged the self-organization of our population” (Clark 2008: 63). By
halting the blood feuds, the attention of the Kosovo Albanians could be turned to resisting the
Serbian government.
The KLA drew many of its members from rural communities, where the ties of
traditional culture where strong. One Kosovo expert (who wished to remain anonymous) argued
that traditions such as loyalty, honor and vigilante justice were likely to be very strong among
former KLA members: “[The KLA] was rooted in a strong rural culture, and consciously
invoked traditionalist concepts as a way of developing its image as a very ‘Albanian’ army” (as
quoted anonymously in Farquhar 2005).
Another point of evidence to indicate the importance of the blood feud and the Kanun in
Kosovo is the prevalence of blood feuds after the end of the conflict. Some parts of the province
saw a resurgence of blood feuds after the end of the conflict in 1999, including the Dukagjini
region, in the west of Kosovo (Xharra, Hajrullahu, and Salihu 2005; Xharra 2005). Some of
these blood feuds were between families who were active in the KLA, such as the Haradinaj
family in the west of Kosovo (Xharra 2005). One sociology professor, Fadil Maloku at Pristina
University, argued that the new post-conflict legal system failed to take root in Kosovo because
“it does not comply with traditional norms, so many people are turning back to old customs”
(Musliu and Lani 2005).
In addition to the Kanun, another potential source of historical traditions that were
revitalized during the 1990s was the signing of traditional epic ballads. These ballads, many of
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which date to the fifteenth century, are known as the Songs of the Frontier Warriors, or Kenge
Kreshnikesh. They are tales of honor, friendship, ties between brothers and blood brothers, and
bravery on the battle-field, where heroes fight and win battles against dramatic odds. The kenge,
or traditional ballads, were very popular with Adem Jashari, the legendary KLA commander,
who, legend has it, sang the traditional songs as his home was being shelled (Christian Science
Monitor 1999).
Other traditional folk songs were about Skanderbeg, a legendary Albanian warrior who led an
uprising against the Ottomans in the fifteenth century. These songs center around the traditional
themes of honor, hospitality, and revenge and celebrate one man’s struggle against foreign
invaders (Pistrick 2012). Both the Kenge and the songs about Skanderbeg were popular with a
number of KLA leaders, some of whom vigorously embraced traditional parts of Albanian
culture. Over time as one of those leaders, Adem Jashari, came to be mythologized as a heroic
leader of the resistance, the songs came to be identified with the resistance itself. New folk
songs, such as “A vritet pafajesa” (translated as “Should Innocence be Slaughtered”), by Leonora
Jakupi, the daughter of a KLA soldier, became popular. Other songs popular in Kosovo at the
time were folk songs about other Albanian leaders, notably the leaders of the Kaçak uprising at
the beginning of the twentieth century, Azem Bejta and his wife, Shote Galica (Sugarman 2010).
Indeed, during the conflict, multiple songs about the violence were produced in Kosovo and
Albania—those produced in Kosovo with a historic tone and those in Albania explicitly
celebrating the KLA and their fight (Sugarman 2010: 36).
The ballads had a number of themes which could be seen as potential sources of culture
in Kosovo and contributors to the congruence (or lack thereof) with aspects of international
norms: the celebration of fighting on the battlefield; the protection of guests in the home; and the
70

bond that exists between two people. For example, in The Marriage of Halili, warriors are
hailed:
To perish in bed we must not while we’re sleeping
But rather while brandishing swords, loudly singing.51
And in the ballad, The Death of Omer, heroes who die on the battlefield are not mourned:
Mourn not sons who died in battle,
Mourn no living who go raiding,
Death’s none sweeter than in warfare,
To fall in battle yet unvanquished.52
The protection of guests and of children is also emphasized: in Omer, son of Mujo, Mujo tests his
son’s honor by pretending to attack two boys in his care. When his son shows he is prepared to
fight his father to protect his guests, his father relents and recognizes him.
With one hand he [Mujo] seized the twin sons,
With the other seized his sabre,
When he was about to slay them,
His son jumped to his feet, protesting,
Arming himself for a battle,
That his guests should not be slaughtered,
The two men set upon each other,
But in harmony they parted,
Throwing arms around each other,
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Elsie and Mathie-Heck 2004, lines 598, 599.
Elsie and Mathie-Heck 2004: 329, lines 14 – 17.
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‘Hail, my boy, that I now see you,
And you really are my true son.’53
Overall, in Kosovo during the 1990s there was a resurgence of traditional culture,
particularly in the rural areas from which the KLA drew most of its membership. It was this
more traditional culture with which international norms interacted and needed to resonate in
order to be adopted into the discourse of the KLA. Three features of the traditional culture,
namely the justness of the selection of targets, equality of all, and protection of guests have areas
of overlap with three international norms under consideration: human rights, humanitarian law
(in particular protection of civilians), and proscriptions against the selection of civilians in acts of
terror. Other features of the traditional culture, for example, the importance of kin, loyalty, and
the celebration of warriors fighting much larger foes all will have had an effect on the formation
and functioning of the KLA in practice.
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2.3 Background on the conflict in Sri Lanka54
The conflict in Sri Lanka between 1983 and 2009 was seen by many as an escalation of
the communal violence that had broken out at regular intervals in Sri Lanka from 1948 onwards
(Winslow and Woost 2004: 6). Previous periods of violence include the violence around the
1956 elections after the election of Bandaranaike, who ran on a pro-Buddhist and Sinhalese
platform, and the period between 1974 and 1977 (during which time the Tamil Tigers were
founded). Some scholars have suggested that the increasing interethnic polarization between the
Sinhalese and the Tamils was driven by the nature of Sri Lanka’s electoral system, bequeathed to
the country by British colonialism, which magnified slender majorities of national votes into
disproportionately large majority of seats in parliament (Bose 2007; O'Duffy 2007). Beyond
communal violence, political violence has also been part of the landscape in Sri Lanka from the
early 1970s onwards. In addition to the emergence of a movement for Tamil Eelam, with groups
such as the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Eelam Revolutionary Organization of
Students (EROS), and the Eelam People's Revolutionary Liberation Front (EPRLF), the left wing
pro-Sinhala group, Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP), also led armed uprisings in 1971 and
1987 (Gunaratna 2001).55
In the shadow of violence, there was a significant shift within the Tamil community
towards an assertion of the right to self-determination away from demands for structural changes
and constitutional reform of the mid-1970s (De Silva 1998). This shift began with the formation
of the political party, the Tamil United Front (TUF) in 1972, which began to articulate the
demands for Tamil rights. In 1975, the TUF changed its name to the Tamil United Liberation
Front (TULF) and began calling for an independent state of Tamil Eelam. By 1977, the TULF
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had won 17 seats in parliament, primarily in the Northeast. However, the presence of Tamil
politicians in parliament calling for secession and the establishment of an independent Tamil
state did little to alleviate tensions between the Tamils and the Sinhala-dominated government of
Sri Lanka.
Impatient with the pace of political change and with the approach of the political parties,
the LTTE and other groups began the initial stages of a violent campaign in 1977. At this point,
the LTTE’s self-described “national liberation struggle” was proclaimed a struggle against
institutionalized racism and escalating violence against the Tamil people (Balasingham 1983).
The violence was at first on a low level and included assassinations of political actors and attacks
on policemen. The Sri Lankan government criminalized the LTTE specifically under the
Prevention of Terrorism Act in 1979.
On July 23, 1983, the LTTE escalated the level of violence and killed 13 government
soldiers in an ambush in Jaffna. Immediately thereafter there were violent anti-Tamil riots
throughout the Sinhala majority areas, including the capital, Colombo. Accounts of the riots are
contentious, with reports of between 350 to 2,000 Tamil deaths (depending on the source).56 The
government was seen by the Tamils as either turning a blind eye to the violence or actively
encouraging it and, after this point, support for the LTTE among Tamils increased. Some point to
the events of the summer of 1983 as those that “turned a conflict between the state and radical
Tamil youth into an ethnic war” (Herring 2001: 163).
The unrest in 1983 was followed by an amendment to the Sri Lankan Constitution on
August 8, 1983. This sixth amendment prohibited any movement for independence of any part of
the Sri Lankan state. It effectively criminalized the demands of the Tamil militants. The elected
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members of parliament of the TULF resigned in protest. The amendment stated: “No person
shall, directly or indirectly, in or outside Sri Lanka, support, espouse, promote, finance,
encourage or advocate the establishment of a separate state within the territory of Sri Lanka.”
These events marked the start of the First Eelam War and the LTTE forces in the north of the
country began engaging the government troops in heavy fighting. At the same time as support
for the LTTE was growing, other militant groups also enjoyed a similar flourishing of support.57
In July 1985, peace talks were held in Thimpu, Bhutan between the Sri Lankan government and
a number of Tamil groups, including the LTTE. The demands of the Tamil groups were the
recognition of the Tamil people as a distinct nationality, the guarantee of an independent Tamil
homeland, recognition of the right of the Tamil nation to self-determination, and safeguards for
the Tamil people who were outside the independent Tamil nation (Wilson 2000). While these
talks collapsed, the demands made in Thimpu remained fairly consistent as demands made by the
LTTE at periodic intervals.
Initially, the LTTE received support from the Indian government and the state
government of Tamil Nadu in the south of India, including military training, and shipments of
arms, such as grenades and land mines. Indian support ceased in 1987 when Rajiv Gandhi was
elected Prime Minister of India and signed the Indo-Sri Lankan accords on July 29, 1987. The
accords were signed only days after the first suicide bomb attack by the LTTE on July 5, when
an LTTE soldier from the Black Tiger unit, known as “Captain Miller,” drove a truck laden with
explosives into a Sri Lankan army camp in Jaffna, killing at least 40 soldiers. The accords
included the establishment and deployment of the Indian Peacekeeping force (IPKF) in the north
east of Sri Lanka in an attempt to disarm the LTTE. At the same time, the Sri Lankan
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government placed the predominantly Tamil areas in the north and east under emergency control.
The IPKF maintained a front engaging in heavy fighting with the LTTE in the northeast until
1990, when they finally withdrew. Fighting between the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka
resumed, termed the Second Eelam War.
In August 1994, Chandrika Kumaratunga was elected president in Sri Lanka and,
pledging an end to the war with the LTTE, announced a unilateral ceasefire. A round of peace
talks with the LTTE opened in October 1994.58 However, the peace talks made little headway
and came to an end when the LTTE sank a naval war ship in April 1995, beginning the Third
Eelam War.
While Jaffna fell to the Sri Lankan army in December 1995, the LTTE retaliated in the
heart of the capital with an attack on the Central Bank in January 1996, killing at least 50 people
and injuring 1,400 (BBC 1996), and the bombing of a commuter train near Colombo, killing 70
people and injuring 600 (New York Times 1996). Other significant attacks by the LTTE during
this period include a suicide bombing of Sri Lanka’s holiest Buddhist shrine, the Temple of the
Tooth, on January 25, 1998.
In October 1997, the United States banned the LTTE under anti-terrorism legislation.59
The Sri Lankan government subsequently launched their largest military operation in the hopes
of eradicating the LTTE from their jungle positions. However, the LTTE proved to be resilient
and following significant territorial gains by the LTTE, the Sri Lankan government declared a
nation-wide state of emergency in August 1998. Fighting continued intermittently and the LTTE
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were able to regain control of most of the Jaffna peninsula by 1999, and recapture most territory
it had lost since 1996.
In 1998, the LTTE approached the Sri Lankan government with an offer of ceasefire,
calling for another round of peace talks (Rotberg 1999). The negotiations continued for a number
of years without much result until 2002 with the signing of a ceasefire agreement between the
rebel leaders and Sri Lankan Prime Minister Ranil Wickremasinghe.60 This agreement included
provisions for the LTTE to consider a federal settlement based on a unified Sri Lanka, rather
than holding out for full independence. The Norwegian government played an important
intermediary role in the negotiations after February 2000.
Following the ceasefire agreement, a number of steps towards normalizing relations
between the LTTE-dominated parts of the country and the rest of Sri Lanka began, including the
de-commissioning of weapons, the reopening of the road linking the Jaffna peninsula with the
rest of Sri Lanka for the first time in 12 years, the resumption of passenger flights to Jaffna, and
lifting of the Sri Lankan government ban on the LTTE. Joint committees and taskforces between
the two parties were established to deal with issues such as humanitarian relief, refugee
resettlement, and constitutional issues.
The ceasefire was monitored by the Sri Lankan Monitoring Mission (SLMM), staffed by
monitors from Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland. While the ceasefire agreement
did lead to a reduction in armed clashes between the main parties to the conflict, both the LTTE
and the government forces also used the respite to consolidate and improve their positions, and
human rights violations persisted.61 The SLMM collected information about ceasefire violations,
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which included actions such as movement in the zone of separation, hostile acts against civilians,
and the illegal carrying of arms. The majority of incidents of ceasefire violations were by the
LTTE (Hoglund 2005). Negotiations for a final settlement dragged on and, after six rounds of
direct talks, the LTTE pulled out of the negotiations in April 2003.
In 2004, the LTTE faced a number of internal challenges. In March, an LTTE
commander from the eastern part of Sri Lanka, Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan (alias Colonel
Karuna), broke away from the group’s leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran, and led a splinter group
to leave the LTTE, drawing almost half of the LTTE soldiers with him. The split resulted in an
outbreak of fighting between the two LTTE factions, with the north claiming victory within a
month when the Karuna faction lay down their arms following the deaths of hundreds of soldiers
and bystanders. While the faction went underground, Karuna never stopped resisting
Prabhakaran’s leadership and eventually joined forces with the Sri Lankan security forces and
helped push back the LTTE’s stronghold in the east in 2008. Also in March 2004, a political
group, the Tamil Makkal Viduthalai Pulikal (TMVP), split from the LTTE to ally itself with the
government.
In December 2004, a tsunami devastated coastal communities in Sri Lanka, many of
which were in LTTE-dominated territory. In Sri Lanka, more than 30,000 people were killed by
the tsunami and a further 500,000 were displaced immediately after the disaster (CNN 2005). A
period of relative calm followed the tsunami as both the government and the LTTE worked to
provide services to the communities most affected. However, the assassination of the Sri Lankan
foreign minister, Lakshman Kadirgamar, in September 2005, allegedly by the LTTE, caused the
ceasefire agreement (in place since 2002) to collapse. In addition, the LTTE had become
increasingly isolated following the growing international consensus against engaging with
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groups that continued to use terrorism. For example, in May 2006, the European Union officially
labeled the LTTE a terrorist organization (Council of the European Union 2006).62
By December 2007, the government had begun operations in the north of the country, seeking to
oust the LTTE from its stronghold. Fighting was fierce and the toll on local civilians was high.
As reported by the UN Representative of the Secretary-General on the Human Rights of
Internally Displaced Persons (RSG-IDPs), up to 70,000 civilians had been displaced by the
fighting and there were high levels of allegations of extrajudicial killings, physical assault,
abduction, disappearances, forced recruitment, the use of civilians as human shields, prevention
of civilians from fleeing hostilities, and indiscriminate shelling of civilians.63
On January 2, 2008, the government formally announced its withdrawal from the 2002
ceasefire agreement and the conflict worsened over the course of 2008. The government forces
advanced steadily towards the LTTE stronghold and de facto capital of Kilinochchi, surrounding
it by November 2008, and capturing it by January 2009.
The situation for civilians caught between the two opposing sides was grim. There are
credible reports that the LTTE used civilians as shields in order to increase civilian casualties
and attract the attention of international community to broker a ceasefire (ICG 2010). The LTTE
stopped and often shot civilians attempting to escape their area of control (UN Secretary-General
2011). The Sri Lankan government troops were accused of shelling and bombarding areas
around the fighting in which civilians were concentrated (ICG 2010) and refusing to allow
humanitarian aid to reach civilians in the conflict zone during the conflict or immediately
thereafter (ICRC 2009).
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The final battles between the government forces and the LTTE took place east of
Kilinochchi on the eastern coast near the town of Mullivaykkal, where the LTTE was encircled
and defeated on a beach between the ocean and a lagoon. The LTTE conceded defeat on May
17, 2009. “This battle has reached its bitter end,” Selvarasa Pathmanathan, the Tigers’ chief of
international relations, said in a statement carried on the pro-rebel Tamilnet website. “We have
decided to silence our guns. Our only regrets are for the lives lost and that we could not hold out
for longer.” The death of Vellupillai Prabhakaran was announced the following day.

2.4 The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
Establishment of the LTTE
Vellupillai Prabhakaran first founded an organization called the Tamil New Tigers in
1972. In July 1975, Prabhakaran shot and killed the Mayor of Jaffna, Alfred Duraiappah, in the
first and very public major attack by the group. On May 5, 1976, he renamed the group the
LTTE. Initially structured as a traditional guerrilla force, it was restructured to become a more
broad-based armed resistance movement of the Tamil People (Balasingham 1983). In the
beginning, the attacks by the LTTE were modest: in 1977, the LTTE attacked and shot three
Tamil police officers said to be investigating the LTTE; in 1978, six more police officers were
shot; and they undertook a number of robberies of banks and buses (Pathak 2005). Their first
major engagement was in 1983, when the LTTE staged an ambush and killed 13 Sri Lankan
government soldiers in Jaffna.
Structure of the LTTE
The LTTE had a hierarchical two-tier structure, with a military wing and a subordinate
political wing, both under the supervision of the Central Governing Committee headed by the
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supreme leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. The political office was headed by Thamilchevlam (as
the political leader) and Anton Balasingham (in the role of political advisor). The military wing
was divided into an elite fighting unit, the Charles Anthony Regiment, an amphibious group (Sea
Tigers), an airborne group (Air Tigers), and a suicide commando unit (Black Tigers). Other
smaller units such as an all-female unit (Freedom Birds), a unit with recruits under the age of 16
(Baby Brigade), and a unit made up of orphans (Leopard Brigade) also existed.
The LTTE was very hierarchical and ruled by one leader, Velupillai Prabhakaran. Many
of his followers hailed Prabhakaran as a hero and took an oath of loyalty to his every word (Post
2007: 92). Some have characterized the sense of personal duty and obligation to the leader felt
by the LTTE cadres as a cult of personality (O'Duffy 2007). Prabhakaran characterized his
stature as a choice of the people: “I cannot help this kind of projection and characterization. I am
only concerned with the political liberation and social emancipation of oppressed people. My
people are aware of my commitment and trust me to lead them on the right path” (Tamil
National Leader Velupillai Pirapaharan’s interview, March 1986, quoted in (Post 2007).
During the first years of the conflict (from 1983-1987), the LTTE faced competition from
other Tamil factions and one of its objectives was the elimination of these challenges to its rule.
The unified structure of the LTTE and its willingness to use violence against these competitors
gave the group an advantage. This was also the period in which the LTTE first established its
civil administration, which continued to develop particularly after the withdrawal of the IPKF.
The first government structure established within the civil administration was the Tamil Eelam
Economic Development Organization (TEEDO), in charge of economic planning and
reconstruction in the region under the LTTE control (Mampilly 2011). Between 1990 and 1995,
when the LTTE controlled Jaffna and parts of Vanni, they experimented with local
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administrative bodies and began to build the institutional capacity for local governance (Stokke
2006). By the late 1990s, as the LTTE came to control significant parts of territory, they were
able to build on these early experiences of governance, building civil administration bodies
throughout the territories they controlled. Soon thereafter, the civil administration structures
bloomed to cover areas such as education, health, police, judiciary, and taxation. The Sri Lankan
government continued throughout most of the conflict, however, to provide services to the local
population, working with and often funneling funds through the rebel group’s administration
structures.
Following the ceasefire in 2002, the civil administration in LTTE controlled areas
changed in two ways: the easing of travel restrictions allowed for more centralization and
concentration of power in the north away from the eastern area and, second, in order to manage
the influx of post-conflict aid and international agencies, the LTTE created the Planning and
Development Secretariat (PDS). The areas controlled by the LTTE were described by some as
feeling remarkably state-like. For example, by 2005, moving across Sri Lanka and crossing from
Sri Lankan government-held territory into LTTE-held territory was described by one traveler as
resembling “a border crossing between two nation-states, with well-guarded border control posts
where travelers are required to show identity cards, goods are inspected and customs fees are
collected” (Stokke 2006).
The NGOs in the LTTE territory were able to supplement the efforts of the civil
administration, thereby increasing the capacity of the LTTE’s governance system significantly
until the fighting recommenced in 2007. The presence of the international organizations and the
aid they brought to the region allowed the LTTE to decouple their administration from Sri
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Lankan government sources of funding and, perhaps inadvertently, alter the dynamics of the
conflict away from negotiation towards military resolution (Mampilly 2009).
Congruence of international norms with local culture within the LTTE
In comparison with the KLA, the LTTE had a very different approach to creating their
normative environment. Rather than reaching towards traditional norms like the KLA, the LTTE
tried to reshape Tamil culture in a completely new way in areas under their control. Under the
guidance of Anton Balasingham, a Marxist intellectual writer who became the ideologue for the
organization, the LTTE created a socialist platform and planned a social revolution seeking to
upend the deeply conservative Tamil society, bound by a rigid caste system (Weiss 2012). The
leader of the LTTE, Prabakharan, was of lower caste himself and in many ways the LTTE
represented an inversion of the traditional social hierarchy.
A second element of the culture within the LTTE that is essential to consider is the
veneration of death, in particular, death for the cause. The fight for Tamil Eelam, in the LTTE’s
view, was one where every Tamil was expected to give everything for the struggle—money,
future, and even his or her life. Parents were expected to give up their children for the national
liberation struggle and threatened with violence or detention if they did not (Human Rights
Watch 2004). The devotion of the Tigers to the death and to their cause was exemplified by the
capsule of cyanide worn around their necks, to be drunk at the time of capture. The adoption of
the cyanide capsules between 1983 and 1984 reinforced the case for suicide bombers and, after
1987, suicide bombers and assassinations became a regular part of the LTTE’s tactics (Hopgood
2006). Between the first suicide attack by “Captain Miller” in 1987 and May 2009, at the end of
the conflict, the LTTE sent out an estimated 273 suicide attackers on 137 missions (Pape 2009).
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The importance of the celebration of death can also be seen in the example of burial. The
LTTE wrought significant change on the culture in the north and east with the introduction of
graveyards in which soldiers, termed martyrs, were buried. This was a significant break with the
past in a culture that cremated the dead. Cemeteries began to be venerated as temples and
monuments to war and struggle and the Tigers began commemorating the dead in a series of
powerful rituals, including Heroes Day on November 27, and Black Tigers day on July 5
(Roberts 2006).64 The gravestones in the graveyards were referred to as a memorial stone or hero
stone and were ritually garlanded with flowers.65 By these acts, the soldiers were both honoring
the dead, and also affirming that they themselves would be so honored on their deaths.
It is important to note the significance of the celebration of death and the dead alongside the
norms against terrorism and international humanitarian law which maintain the importance of not
killing civilians or those not involved in the conflict.
Conclusion
This chapter has provided an overview of the conflicts in the two cases, Kosovo and Sri
Lanka, outlining the development of violence in each case. It also provides a background on the
establishment and structure of the two organizations, with a focus on the normative environment
established and maintained by each group.
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The speeches given on Heroes Day by the leader of the LTTE are those under analysis later in this work.
See (Roberts 2006) for an in-depth examination of the creation of myth and meaning with the garlanding and the
meaning of the selection of flowers for the ritual.
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Chapter 3: Patterns of change: A state to non-state level
comparison
The discourse and behavior of states change as a result of changing international norms.
However, very little scholarly attention has been focused on how norms affect the discourse and
behavior of non-state actors. Andrew Cortell and James Davis note that “the first sign of an
international norm’s domestic impact is its appearance in the domestic political discourse”
(Cortell and Davis 2000). Applying that idea to non-state actors, this chapter examines
international norms in the discourse of two armed resistance groups, the Kosovo Liberation
Army (KLA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).
This chapter reviews evidence that armed resistance groups follow changes in the
hegemonic discourse and behavior and change their discourse to echo the changes at the state
level. It compares the patterns in the changes in the discourse of these groups with the changes
observed at the state level over the same period. The international norms analyzed are human
rights, international humanitarian law, humanitarian intervention, genocide, and the norm against
the use of terrorism.
The patterns observed in the discourse of the non-state actors under examination do not
mirror the changes at the international level exactly, and they vary across cases indicating that
the patterns of change in rebel groups’ discourse are not solely as a result of external pressures.
Evidence of two other factors’ effect on discourse is also explored: first, the timing of the use of
international norms, and second, the degree of hierarchical structure of the group. The timing of
when a group uses these norms is examined in the context of each conflict. Findings show that
the groups make changes in their discourse and incorporate international norms at significant
turning points during the conflict, particularly when international actors are involved in those
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turning points, indicating an intentional strategic use of these norms by the groups. The second
factor, structure, is investigated to determine if greater hierarchy within the group is a
precondition for the group’s ability to reliably incorporate international norms into the discourse.
The evidence from one case, the KLA, suggests that armed groups do require a certain level of
hierarchical structure before international norms enter their discourse in a significant way.
Structure as a variable in the second case was inconclusive, as the hierarchical structure of the
LTTE did not vary significantly over the period under examination.
The period of time under examination is from 1989 and the end of the Cold War through
the early 2000s. This is a period which saw a great deal of change in the relative strength of a
number of international norms, which provides for fruitful comparisons between state and nonstate levels.
This chapter begins with an overview of the changes in the salience of selected
international norms at the state level. It then examines how these norms might affect non-state
actors or how the norms might be translated into their local sphere. The chapter offers an
empirical analysis of changes observed in the use of these same norms in the discourse of the
two rebel groups, the KLA and the LTTE, and charts those changes against key turning points in
the conflict, such as negotiations for termination of the conflict, monitoring of the conflict by
influential outside actors, or imminent ending of the conflict. (The KLA is the primary case
study, and the LTTE is the secondary case.) The analysis is based on an analysis of the KLA’s
press releases, political statements, interviews and speeches, and LTTE leader’s speeches.
Finally, the chapter offers an analysis of the evolving structures of the two groups to gain insight
into how the structure of the group might affect the use of international norms in the discourse.
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3.1 States and international norms
International norms are not static. There is a constant interplay between state actors and
norms as state behavior affects norms and, at the same time, norms affect and change state
behavior and discourse. The changes in the norms may be sudden and result from a specific
incident or moment in time or the changes may be the result of a slow, evolutionary process. The
change may not be in the norm itself, but may be in the perception of the norm or in actors’
responses to the norm.
The international norms under examination are those which, for a variety of reasons, are
most relevant to armed resistance groups: human rights, because human rights violations and
abuses tend to increase dramatically during times of armed struggle; international humanitarian
law (IHL) and associated norms, because this body of law may be applied to all sides of an
armed struggle; humanitarian intervention, because the international response to conflicts in
recent years has included the option of a military intervention on humanitarian grounds;
genocide, because of the increased frequency of use of this term by either party during conflicts
and the connection between genocide and outside state action; and the norm against terrorism,
because rebel groups are frequently branded terrorists although they may or may not resort to
terrorist tactics in their struggle with a more powerful opponent. Each of these norms followed a
different path of change over the course of the 1990s and beyond, although all show a
strengthening of certain aspects of the norm over time. We would, therefore, expect to see
different patterns reflected in the use of these norms in the discourse of armed groups over the
same period.
Several of these norms are linked. For example, human rights and international
humanitarian law draw from distinct bodies of law, but there is a significant overlap as both
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proscribe the killing of civilians during conflict. This overlap became more significant in the
1990s when states gave increasing attention to the issue of civilian mortality during the conflict,
and states and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) began drawing on both bodies of law in
an effort to address the problem. Similarly, humanitarian intervention and the related
responsibility to protect (known as R2P), the norm which supports military intervention in
another state without that state’s consent with the aim of protecting innocent individuals from
death or gross human rights violations, draw from both human rights law and international
humanitarian law. The norm against terrorism also proscribes the targeting of civilians for
military or political objectives. Taken together, the norms of human rights, IHL, and against
terrorism circumscribe how armed actors are supposed to act during conflict.
Similarly to states, non-state actors are under pressure from outside actors (states or
NGOS, for example) to conform to changes in international norms. These norms might be
international norms under examination in this work, or indeed other norms such as religious or
cultural norms. Pressures on groups include such negative inducements like the reduction of
support or embargoes, or positive inducements like the increase in support or improved
legitimacy (the latter may be conferred through activities such as inclusion in negotiations or
dialogues). We can, therefore, reasonably expect groups such as armed resistance groups to
change their discourse as a result of that external pressure in some instances. In addition to
responding to outside pressures, these groups may also be consciously choosing to echo
international norms in their discourse for strategic reasons or in order to frame their conflict in a
way to make their local conflict more understandable or appealing to others.

88

3.2 Changes in international norms
A number of factors led to the rapidly changing international environment of the 1990s,
including a perceived increase in the number and length of intrastate conflicts and an increase in
states’ capacity and will to intervene collectively, due in part to the end of deadlock that
persisted during the Cold War. These changes led directly to changes in international norms as
states came to terms with a new world order.
Human rights
Between 1989 and the early to mid-2000s, activities by international organizations,
human rights groups, and states strengthened international human rights norms to the point
where they became a dominant theme in the discourse and actions of states. Although human
rights norms began to strengthen from the mid-1970s onwards, there was a more recent and
dramatic rise that was partly attributable to the post-1989 changes noted above.
The shift towards greater use of human rights language is described by legal scholar Antonio
Cassese in 1999: “it is a truism that today human rights are no longer of exclusive concern to the
particular state where they may be infringed. Human rights are increasingly becoming the
concern of the world community as a whole” (Cassese 1999: 22).
The increased focus on human rights at the state level following the end of the Cold War can
be measured in three ways: first, an increase in the accession to human rights systems, for
example as seen in Europe; second, an increase in human rights concerns discussed and acted
upon as international security concerns; and third, an increase in human rights enforcement
measures. All of these changes were reaching a peak in the mid-1990s resulting in a strong
likelihood that these changes at the state level, coming as they did within a relatively short
amount of time, would have also affected non-state actors, such as armed opposition groups.
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During the Cold War many states signed and ratified numerous human rights treaties;
however, it was also a period in which these human rights treaties had limited impact. Some
have argued that the Cold War allowed states to sign and ratify human rights treaties without
expecting many consequences, such as pressure from other states to live up to the treaties,
because those states could expect one of the superpowers to shield them from possible
consequences (Wotipka and Tsutsui 2008; Buergenthal 1997). This comfortable state of affairs
began to change with the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, which established human rights as binding
on all states of Europe and as a legitimate issue between states (Thomas 2001). At the end of the
Cold War, rhetoric about human rights at the state level altered: the status of human rights
improved, but enforcement action continued to be infrequent. Although human rights
instruments have weak or non-existent enforcement mechanisms, the treaties themselves do
confer certain legitimacy and allow for legal leverage to improve human rights situations within
countries (Donnelly 2006; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2005). The period following 1989 saw
human rights instruments begin to be more consequential as monitoring and promotional
activities began in earnest.
The first indicator of change is the accession to a regional human rights system, and the
expansion to the European human rights framework offers a good example. After 1990, there
were significant changes taking place. The European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms expanded from the original western European countries to be
signed by an additional 17 countries, all of which were Eastern European states and former
members of the Soviet Union.66 This is significant from an enforcement point of view because
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The Convention was originally signed by 14 members of the European Union and Turkey, so the jump in the
numbers after 1990 is significant. See Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
signatory list. Available on-line at the Council of Europe website.
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the Convention provides for adjudication of individual complaints about human rights violations
at the Human Rights Court in Strasbourg. Although the primary addressee of human rights
violations remains the applicant’s home country where the violation takes place, the court in
Strasbourg provides additional remedies for a violation of an individual’s human rights.
The second indicator, the growth of human rights as international security concerns, is most
apparent in the language used by the United Nations (UN) Security Council and their subsequent
actions. During the Cold War, neither human rights issues nor humanitarian issues were
addressed as security concerns and, therefore, not on the Security Council’s agenda. Indeed, for
the first two decades of the modern human rights era following the adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) in 1948, there was no mention of any humanitarian aspect
of any conflict (Badescu and Weiss 2010). Following the end of the Cold War, human rights
issues, including issues such as children in armed conflict and women’s rights, gradually became
security issues and for the first time warranted engagement by the UN Security Council. This
level of engagement by the Security Council in the post-1989 period was particularly striking
given the low degree of engagement during the previous decade (during which the Security
Council did not approve any peacekeeping operations).
In addition, after 1990, the UN Security Council began transitioning from discourse, or
merely condemning human rights violations, to practice, increasingly using a variety of
sanctions, for example, as an expression of disapproval. In the decade after the end of the Cold
War, the UN Security Council imposed economic sanctions 16 times, compared to only twice in
the period between 1945 and 1988.67 These sanctions had varying levels of severity: the most

http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=005&CM=&DF=&CL=ENG. Last accessed
12/20/12.
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Prior to the end of the Cold War, the two times the Security Council imposed sanctions under Chapter VII of
the UN Charter were in Southern Rhodesia in 1966 (Resolution 232) and South Africa in 1977 (Resolution 418).
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severe being comprehensive economic sanctions, for example in the cases of Iraq in 1990 and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) in 1992; partial economic sanctions, such as in Sudan in
1996; targeted financial sanctions, for example against the National Union for the Total
Independence of Angola (UNITA) and its senior officials in 1998; and arms embargoes, such as
on the republics of the former Yugoslavia in 1991, and on the FRY in 1998. While the efficacy
of sanctions is widely debated (see, for example Cortright and Lopez 2000; De Jonge Oudraat
2001; Pape 1998), the pattern of applying sanctions continued into the first decade of the twentyfirst century, with sanctions regimes imposed in countries such as Sudan, Cote D’Ivoire, the
Democratic Republic of Congo, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, and Libya, as well
as targeted sanctions on individuals.
The third indicator is the increase of enforceability measures; or rather a shift from principled
pronouncements to calls for more enforcement and action. Over time, there has been a move
from principled declarations (such as the UDHR) to enforceable principles. And with this move
came changes in the norm of criminal accountability for violations of human rights. These
changes are seen primarily in the kinds of prosecutions of human rights violations which took
place, namely, holding individual state officials criminally accountable for violations. This
change was termed the “justice cascade” by Kathryn Sikkink: “a justice cascade means that there
has been a shift in the legitimacy of the norm of individual criminal accountability for human
rights violations and an increase in criminal prosecutions on behalf of that norm” (Sikkink 2011).
According to Sikkink, in the justice cascade, there are three basic ideas: first, the most basic
violations of human rights—summary executions, torture, and disappearance—cannot be

After 1989, the Security Council imposed sanctions in Iraq (1990), the republics of the Former Yugoslavia (1991),
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992 and 1998), against the Bosnian Serbs (1994), Somalia (1992), Libya
(1992), Liberia (1992), Haiti (1993, 1994), UNITA in Angola (1993 and 1998), Rwanda (1994), Sudan (1996),
Sierra Leone (1997 and 2000), Taliban in Afghanistan (1999), and Eritrea and Ethiopia (2000).
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legitimate acts of state and thus must be seen as crimes committed by individuals; second,
individuals who commit these crimes should be prosecuted; and third, the accused also have
rights and deserve to have these rights protected at a fair trial. This new individual accountability
does not apply to the whole range of civil and political rights, but to a small subset of rights:
“physical integrity rights,” the “rights of the person,” or, when violated, “core crimes.” These
include prohibitions against torture, summary execution, and genocide, as well as against war
crimes and crimes against humanity (these are rights from only two or three of the 27 substantive
articles of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)).
One visible example of change was the increased accountability of sitting heads of states. A
landmark case in the development of the norm of accountability was the indictment of Slobodan
Milosevic of the FRY in May 1999 by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (ICTY).68 Milosevic was the first sitting head of state to be indicted for war crimes.69
Charles Taylor became the second sitting head of state indicted for war crimes, this time by the
Special Court for Sierra Leone in March 2003.
A second example of an increase in enforceability is the creation of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) in July 1998. Its founding treaty, the Rome Statute of the ICC, came into
68

The ICTY was established by the UN Security Council Resolution 827, on May 25, 1993. The court has
jurisdiction over four types of crimes committed on the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991: grave
breaches of the Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against
humanity (the latter category includes human rights violations, should they be part of a widespread or systematic
practice. Some human rights violations, if isolated in nature, do not reach that threshold of being considered to be a
widespread practice). The first indictment was issued in 1994. The UN Security Council has called upon the ICTY
to finish its work by December 2014.
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Milosevic, then President of the FRY, was indicted along with four deputies, Milan Milutinovic, the President
of Serbia, Dragoljub Ojdanic, the Chief of Staff of the Yugoslav army, Nikola Sainovic, the Deputy Prime Minister,
and Vlajko Stojiljkovic, the Minister of Internal Affairs. The five were charged with responsibility for deporting
740,000 Kosovo Albanians and for the murder of 340 others. The indictment had four counts: deportation; murder as
a crime against humanity; murder as a violation of humanitarian law; and persecution (Scharf 1999). Milosevic was
arrested by Serbian authorities in April 2001, and transferred to the ICTY in the Hague two months later. In October
and November 2001, Milosevic was also indicted for his actions in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina
respectively. His trial began in February the following year and ended in March 2006 with his death of a heart
attack.
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force on July 1, 2002. This court has jurisdiction over war crimes and crimes against humanity.
The court represents a new embodiment of the convergence of international law, such as human
rights law and humanitarian law, with domestic criminal law. The new accountability challenges
sovereignty and sovereign immunity. It not only extends to individual members of government,
but also extends to individual members of armed groups who may be equally accused of war
crimes or crimes against humanity.
Human rights and rebel groups
For armed resistance groups, the two indicators of the change in human rights norms at the
state level with the most direct effect on their operations were the growth of human rights as a
security concern and the increased enforceability mechanisms as the latter began to be
increasingly applied to individuals as well as states.
With the growing attention by the UN on human rights issues as security concerns, armed
resistance groups found themselves under greater scrutiny. Pressure on these groups from the
outside to begin to conform to the obligations inherent in these norms can be seen in the 1990s as
the General Assembly and the Security Council began calling on these groups directly to stop
human rights violations.70 In addition, these exhortations were accompanied in some cases by
negative enforcements such as sanctions, or positive incentives, such as support for groups’
causes in public fora, inclusion in a peace process, or, in more extreme cases, military assistance.
In many cases, the increased UN scrutiny was paralleled by increased scrutiny by international
NGOs such as Human Rights Watch (HRW) and Amnesty International.
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See, for example, resolutions on Liberia, Afghanistan, and Cote d’Ivoire, which call on parties to respect
human rights law and to cease human rights violations and abuses (S/RES/1261 (1998), S/RES/1471 (2003), and
S/RES/1479 (2003).
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In the example of Kosovo, in 1998, the UN Security Council turned its attention to the
situation in Kosovo and linked human rights violations to the security risk posed by the conflict
in each of three resolutions pertaining to Kosovo (UN Security Council Resolutions 1160, 1199,
and 1203, in March, September, and October respectively), and one Statement of its President
(S/PRST/1998/25) in August 1999. In addition, the Secretary-General also issued his own report
on October 5, 1998 (S/1998/912). These statements condemned the violence in Kosovo,
mentioned human rights violations as a security problem, and drew attention to the grave
humanitarian situation and impending human catastrophe. In 1999, the UN Security Council
issued two resolutions on Kosovo (UN Security Council Resolutions 1239 in May 1999, and
1244 in June 1999) and two Statements of the President, both in January (S/PRST/1999/2 and
S/PRST/1999/5). The volume of attention to the conflict by the UN Security Council is notable
and the direct references to all parties and Kosovo Albanians to halt the violence was a direct
appeal to the KLA.
Kosovo was also very much under scrutiny by NGOs, although the majority of the
reports until the end of the war focused on the human rights violations of the state, rather than
the KLA. This changed after June 1999 when the actions of members of the KLA vis-à-vis the
local Serb and Roma populations came under investigation.
The conflict in Sri Lanka, on the other hand, was never an item on the Security Council’s
agenda; however, the conflict was followed closely by other parts of the UN. UN Special
Rapporteurs produced regular reports on torture, involuntary disappearances, and other human
rights issues in Sri Lanka, naming both the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka as
perpetrators from 1990 onwards. Sri Lanka was also on the radar for international human rights
organizations from the end of the Cold War onwards. For example, HRW was reporting on
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human rights violations and abuses in Sri Lanka as early as 1990.71 Reporting in the region as
Asia Watch, HRW monitored all parties to the conflict, including the LTTE, pro-government
militias, and the Sri Lankan government. Their coverage used a mix of human rights law and
international humanitarian law, reporting on evidence that all sides were torturing individuals,
killing civilians, and executing soldiers without due process. The reports also urged the ending of
aid to Sri Lanka and the LTTE as a consequence of the violations of both bodies of law.
Amnesty International was also active in Sri Lanka from the late 1980s onwards, detailing
incidents of human rights violations such as torture, extrajudicial killing, and disappearances
(Amnesty International 1990).
The beginning of increased enforceability mechanisms would also have drawn the
attention of armed resistance groups. One such mechanism which was highly visible in Kosovo
would have been the ICTY: its establishment in 1993 and the subsequent indictments were
followed closely in Kosovo. The ICTY was decidedly relevant to the conflict in Kosovo because
its mandate covered crimes committed in Kosovo.72 The UN Security Council drew further
attention to the ICTY and the prosecutions in the Hague when it began calling for prompt and
complete investigations of all atrocities in Kosovo and for the cooperation of all parties with the
ICTY in the later months of 1998 (see, for example, UN Security Council Resolution 1203 of
October 23, 1998).
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See, for example, (Human Rights Watch 1990, 1).
On July 7, 1998, the Prosecutor of the ICTY announced that the situation in Kosovo was an armed conflict
within the terms of the mandate of the Tribunal.
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International humanitarian law
There were two significant changes within the broader norm of international
humanitarian law in the 1990s (although one began slightly earlier during the 1980s, and gained
momentum during the 1990s). The first was the increasing practice of non-governmental watchdogs, such as HRW and Amnesty International, to focus on violations of international
humanitarian law in addition to human rights law. The second was a shift in which some of the
laws of war—those pertaining to the protection of civilians—rose in prominence relative to
others as states began increasingly focusing on them.
As HRW and Amnesty International began watching for violations of international
humanitarian law, they focused in particular on violations of the laws pertaining to the protection
of civilians during conflict. With states and the media relying heavily on their reporting to inform
policy and frame specific conflicts, this development was significant (Lutz 2006). But this
development was also notable not only for what these groups were documenting, but for which
actors they were observing as well. According to international humanitarian law and the Geneva
Conventions, armed groups are expected to adhere to certain standards of conduct during
conflict. Thus, for the first time, armed groups themselves were under observation for their
actions and treatment of civilians.
In 1982, using Common Article III of the Geneva Conventions, which applies to internal as
well as inter-state war, HRW began to monitor the laws of war in addition to human rights law.
This meant that, for the first time, HRW was able to talk about violations committed by non-state
actors, such as armed resistance groups, as well as by governments. They first did this in Central
America, which allowed them, for example, to monitor the activities in El Salvador of both the
Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), a leftist rebel group, and the government
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for violations of international humanitarian law. Likewise, in Nicaragua, they monitored both the
US-supported Contras, a collection of right-wing rebel groups, and the Sandinista Junta of
National Reconstruction government (Sikkink 2011: 107). Following HRW’s lead, Amnesty
International began to incorporate the monitoring of international humanitarian law into their
activities in the early 1990s (Weissbrodt 1984).
The second shift was the rise in prominence of the norm of the protection of civilians.
The focus by the Security Council on this issue did not emerge until the late 1990s. In
September 1999, the Security Council requested a report on the issue by the UN SecretaryGeneral following the Council’s strong condemnation of the deliberate targeting of civilians in
situations of armed conflict.73 Concern on the part of the Security Council over the plight of
civilians in conflict had increased over the course of the 1990s with the crises in Somalia, the
Balkans, and Rwanda, in particular. These crises led to concern at the Security Council level that
the impact of war on civilians was of such magnitude that protection of civilians should be
considered an underpinning objective of the Council’s work. In late 1999 and early 2000, the
Council took up the protection of civilians in conflict as a thematic issue. For example, Security
Council Resolution 1296 dated April 19, 2000, states that “the deliberate targeting of civilian
populations or other protected persons and the committing of systematic, flagrant and
widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in situations of armed
conflict may constitute a threat to international peace and security.”74
The protection of civilians stems from the 1949 Geneva Conventions and their
subsequent protocols. However, both the definition of what constitutes protection of civilians and
73

The adoption of Security Council Resolution 1265 on September 17, 1999, called for the report, “Protection
of Civilians in Armed Conflict.” This was the first time the Council officially took up the issue of the Protection of
Civilians as a thematic issue.
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Note that this resolution references both international humanitarian law and human rights law—an example of
the increasing use of both bodies of law, and their overlap, in the discourse of states and international bodies.
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the Security Council’s role in the protection was fluid and evolved over the course of the 2000s.
While it cannot be said that the norm of the protection of civilians was new in the 1990s or
thereafter, given its basis in the 1949 Geneva Conventions, the attention to the issue at the state
level and the international level was new. It was not until 2011 that the full force of the focus on
the protection of civilians was felt with the authorization by the UN Security Council in March
2011 of the use of force in the protection of civilians in Libya. This was the first time that the
Security Council authorized the invasion of a functioning state giving this reason.
The focus on this aspect of international humanitarian law at the state level would almost
certainly have had an effect on non-state actors, who could also be held accountable under
international humanitarian law, and whose interactions with civilians had come under increasing
scrutiny.
International humanitarian law and rebel groups
After major shifts in the enforceability of human rights and humanitarian laws and the
changes in individual responsibility for breaking such laws, such as the creation of the ICC in
July 1998, for example, armed groups would have become more aware of the implications of
continued human rights abuses, and this is likely to be reflected in the discourse after this date.
The growing focus by states and by monitoring organizations on humanitarian law and
the protection of civilians—and the associated monitoring—would generate substantial pressure
on armed resistance groups to be more aware of these laws and tailor their discourse, if not their
behavior, to agree with these laws. While it would not be surprising for armed resistance groups
to be aware of the Geneva Conventions and their obligations in general, we would still expect an
increase in their efforts to incorporate these norms into their discourse and in their focus on
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civilians over the course of the 1990s and particularly after 1999, once it becomes such a central
issue at the state level and in international fora.
Humanitarian intervention
The norm of humanitarian intervention is quite possibly the fastest changing norm
growing from a barely recognized practice at the beginning of the 1990s to receiving broad
consensus among states about the importance of the responsibility to protect at the September
2005 World Summit. In a new environment where problems confronting states included “the
collapse of states, humanitarian emergencies, state terror against segments of the local
populations, civil wars of various types, and international terrorist organizations” (Holsti 2004):
318), states grappled for new approaches to these problems. While some have asserted that the
debates around humanitarian intervention are “in many ways a continuation of arguments about
colonialism” (Crawford 2002: 400), what was new was the emerging consensus behind the right
of outside actors to pierce the sovereignty of the state. The International Commission on
Intervention and State Sovereignty argued that “military intervention for human protection
purposes is justified . . . in order to halt or avert large-scale loss of life . . . or large-scale ethnic
cleansing” (ICISS 2001).
Throughout the tumultuous 1990s, states turned to intervention with varying degrees of
support and success, but in an overall pattern indicating increasing acceptance of the practice.
Military interventions in the 1990s occurred in: Liberia (ECOMOG 1990-97), former Yugoslavia
(UNPROFOR 1992-1995, IFOR 1995-1996 and SFOR 1996-2004), Somalia (1992-1993),
Rwanda (1994-1996), Haiti (1994-1997), Sierra Leone (ECOMOG 1997-1999, and UNAMSIL
1999-2005), FRY (NATO 1999), Kosovo (KFOR 1999-today), and East Timor (INTERFET
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1999-2000). Some of these interventions were with UN Security Council support and some
without.
Humanitarian intervention and rebel groups
The growing drumbeat towards acceptance of the norm of humanitarian intervention and
the responsibility to protect by states would be very likely to be heard by armed resistance
groups. Some scholars have already explored the effects of the rise of the norm of humanitarian
intervention on armed groups. For example, Alan Kuperman argues that the right to intervene
creates a moral hazard for armed resistance groups who are likely to engage in activities which
lead to increased civilian fatalities in order to improve the possibility of a humanitarian
intervention (Kuperman 2006).
Armed groups tend to be aware of events in their neighborhood (for example, the KLA
demonstrated first-hand knowledge of international involvement in the conflict in Bosnia) and
dramatic interventions, such as that of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in
Kosovo, are witnessed around the globe. With the growing acceptance of the norm, armed
groups would be aware that any conflict in which there might be an overwhelming number of
human rights violations and abuses might also be subject to international military intervention.
For some groups, this might be appealing, for others, decidedly less so. The KLA is an example
of the former, as they understood that a humanitarian intervention in Kosovo would be likely to
remove Serbian army from the area and thus support their cause. The LTTE, on the other hand,
having experienced a military intervention by an outside party, India, which harmed their cause,
found humanitarian intervention much less appealing.
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Genocide
Over the course of the 1990s, discussions among states that referred to events as genocide
increased compared to the Cold War Period when the term genocide was barely used.75
Genocide is defined by the 1948 Genocide Convention as the killing or causing of serious bodily
or mental harm to members of a group with the intent to destroy the national, ethnic, racial or
religious group.76 Article 1 of the Convention also assigns the signatories the duty to prevent
genocide and in the 1990s, for the first time, there began to be calls for such interventions.77
International attention to the genocide convention and the meaning of the term genocide
were sharply refocused by a number of events of the 1990s, such as the genocide in Rwanda
between April and July 1994 and the killings in Srebrenica in Bosnia in 1995 (termed genocide
by the ICTY). Hardly used since the signing of the Genocide Convention in 1948, the term
genocide once again rose to prominence and became a significant feature of states’ discourse as
they grappled with their obligations under the Convention in the aftermath of the mass killings of
civilians in the mid-1990s and later.
The events in Rwanda and in Bosnia contributed to the international environment which
pushed states to take more concrete steps such as the enforcement measures described above,
which, in turn, generated support for new emerging norms such as the responsibility to protect.
The violence in Rwanda in 1994, which resulted in the deaths of at least half a million people,
coupled with the lack of response from outside states was followed by soul searching in
75

The General Assembly only mentioned genocide once between when the Convention went into force and the
end of the Cold War, in General Assembly Resolution A/RES/37/123 of December 16, 1982, which called the
killing of Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps an act of genocide.
76
The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (commonly referred to as
the Genocide Convention) was signed in 1948, and entered into force on January 12, 1951. The full text can be
found at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/genocide.htm.
77
For example, in 1993 there were calls for an intervention in Bosnia by some parties (Schabas 2009).
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subsequent years and a focus on the need for action when genocide occurs (Desforges 1999). The
town of Srebrenica in eastern Bosnia, predominantly Bosnian Muslim, was declared a UN safe
area on April 16, 1993 and guarded by a small unit of the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR). In July 1995, despite its status as a safe haven, the town was attacked by the
Army of Republika Srpska and more than 7,000 people, mostly boys and men, were killed
(ICMP 2012). Subsequently calling the massacre at Srebrenica “the worst on European soil
since the Second World War,” the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan pointed to the need for
states to act collectively against crimes such as genocide, ethnic cleansing, and other crimes
against humanity (United Nations 2005).
Beyond the Genocide Convention, after the events of the 1990s, genocide as a crime
became a central focus of some of the new enforcement mechanisms, such as the ICTY and the
ICC. The General Assembly adopted a resolution in 2005, the World Summit Outcome, giving
each state the responsibily to protect its citizens from genocide (article 138), and allowing for
intervention by the United Nations to stop genocide through Chapters VI and VII of the United
Nations Charter (article 139).78Genocide is also one of the four mass atrocity crimes upon which
the emerging norm of the responsibility to protect is focused. The others are war crimes, crimes
against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.
Genocide and rebel groups
With the reemergence of the term genocide in the international discourse in the mid1990s, it is likely that armed groups would be more apt to use the term after 1994 or 1995. This
would be especially true for those groups for whom drawing international attention is a major
objective.
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See General Assembly Resolution A/RES/60/1, 2005 World Summit Outcome.
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In Kosovo, the term genocide had already been in use in the 1980s by Kosovo Serbs,
claiming that the Kosovo Albanians were systematically driving them from Kosovo (Smith
2010). However, the first time the KLA used the term was in March of 1998 in reference to
specific events in Drenica municipality. In Sri Lanka, the LTTE used the term genocide
sparingly throughout the 1990s, showing a small increase throughout the middle years of the
decade.
Terrorism
The norm against the use of terror as a tactic showed a slight strengthening at the
international level over the course of the 1990s. Debates on the definition of terrorism, which
had begun during the anti-colonial struggles for independence, continued at the state level during
this period, over the difference, or lack thereof, between a terrorist and freedom fighter. It was
not until the attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington, D.C. that states
engaged in a new discourse about terrorism and began taking aggressive steps against it.
Until the 1990s, terrorism at the UN was dealt with almost entirely by the General
Assembly (GA). The GA was working to develop a normative framework on terrorism and to
encourage cooperation among states on the development of a legal framework, establishing an
Ad Hoc Committee on Terrorism in 1996. From that point on, four treaties tackling terrorism
were under negotiation by the GA.79 However, the question remained of how to define terrorism
and still allow for legitimate actions by oppressed people. The UN Security Council was
involved in a handful of cases of terrorist attacks, such as the downing of Pan Am flight 103 over
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The treaties were the International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, adopted on
December 15, 1997 GA Res 52/164; the International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism GA
Res 54/109 adopted on December 9, 1999; and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear
Terrorism, GA Res 59/290, adopted April 13, 2005; a comprehensive convention to combat international terrorism
is still in negotiation.
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Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988, which led to accusations of Libyan support of terrorism
and eventual sanctions against the country.
During the 1990s, states slowly began developing a consensus about the illegitimate
nature of terrorism, marking the beginnings of the evolution of a norm prohibiting terrorism,
which we now see occurring more vigorously in the post-9/11 world. The UN Security Council
became increasingly engaged in the issue of terrorism, issuing the first sanctions for the support
of terrorism against Libya in March 1992, followed by Sudan in 1996, and the Taliban in 1999.
Sanctions stigmatized terrorism as an illegal activity that needed international attention and
response (De Jonge Oudraat 2004). States’ support of activities which can be labeled terrorism
has come under more criticism than before that date. There even appears to be a loose agreement
that a particular act of violence can be described as terrorism whenever a large group of states
regard that act as illegitimate (Keohane 2002).
Some states, notably Algeria, India, Sri Lanka, and Turkey, pressed for terrorism to be
included as a crime against humanity and subject to the jurisdiction of the ICC. This position was
rejected by many states who found that terrorism was not sufficiently well defined, that its
inclusion would politicize the court, and that the prosecution of terrorism would be better suited
to domestic courts (Cassese 2001).
Terrorism and rebel groups
The changes in the usage of the norm of terrorism in the discourse of rebel groups should
follow a different pattern than the pattern expected for human rights norms and IHL. We would
expect armed resistance groups to engage moderately with this norm throughout the 1990s,
refuting accusations that their actions were terroristic. And with the dramatic change in 2001 at
the state level of the discourse and engagement with this norm, we would expect armed
105

resistance groups’ discourse to show much more engagement with terrorism, as groups become
more energetic in their efforts to refute the label of terrorist.

3.3 Rebel groups and international norms
This chapter now turns to an empirical analysis of these international norms in the
language of two armed resistance groups: the KLA and the LTTE. These two cases are used to
test the above expectations of norm usage by armed resistance groups. This section will examine
the groups’ patterns of discourse to determine whether the changes correspond to local changes
in the conflict or to international level events in some cases, and to what extent the structure of a
group contributes to its ability to use international norms in its discourse.
The Kosovo Liberation Army and its discourse
Over the course of the four years from 1995 to 1999 that the KLA was engaged in
shaping their public image, their use of international norms in general in their public discourse
shifted considerably. The usage grew from very little use of any international norm at all for the
first year and a half that the KLA was making public pronouncements to a significant part of
their discourse by the final months of the war.
The table and chart below (Table 3.1 and Chart 3.1: Change over time of the use of
international norms language in KLA discourse ) show this evolution. This chart and table show
the number of times in a given period that the KLA made a reference to human rights,
international humanitarian law, humanitarian intervention, genocide, or terrorism between June
1995 and June 1999. These references are in public pronouncements made by the KLA. The
public pronouncements included in this analysis are press releases, political declarations,
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speeches, radio announcements on the KLA-sponsored radio station, and interviews.80 All of
these materials contain words spoken by or written by a member of the KLA. No articles written
by non-KLA journalists about the KLA, without direct quotes from KLA members, are included.
The total number of public pronouncements included in the analysis is 325.81 Table 3.1 and
Chart 3.1 capture the dramatic increase in the KLA’s exposure in the media after December 1998
when local journalists began to interview KLA members in earnest and the KLA launched its
own radio station. The increase of exposure to journalists was matched by an increase in the
output of statements and press releases by the KLA. The count of media items issued by the
KLA in each three-month period, expanded from single digit numbers to 136 items in the first
quarter of 1999 and reached 107 between April and June 1999.82,83 (See the first column in
Table 3.1 “Number of items.”)
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A significant number of interviews with KLA members in local newspaper contain verbatim excerpts of the
interviews, printing the KLA interviewees’ answers to printed questions from the journalist.
81
A full list of these documents is provided in Appendix 2. The radio broadcasts were transcribed and published
as three volumes. These data were primarily collected from archives in Kosovo, although some material had been
published in book form.
82
The number of items between April and June 1999 most likely would have been higher but for a period
during which the radio broadcasts supported by the KLA were interrupted when the building housing the radio
station RKL was destroyed.
83
For reasons explained more fully in the Methodology section in Chapter 1, this analysis does not include
interviews by foreign journalists, primarily to avert any potential contamination of the discourse by international
journalists and their own frames and biases.
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Table 3.1: Change over time of the use of international norm language in KLA discourse
Number of
items

Human
rights

Humanitarian
law

Humanitarian
Intervention

Genocide

Terror

Apr - June 1995

1

0

0

0

0

1

July - Sept 1995

0

0

0

0

0

0

Oct - Dec 1995

0

0

0

0

0

0

Jan - Mar 1996

1

0

0

0

0

1

Apr - June 1996

2

0

0

0

0

1

July - Sept 1996

3

0

0

0

0

2

Oct - Dec 1996

2

0

0

0

0

4

Jan - Mar 1997

5

0

0

0

0

3

Apr - June 1997

2

0

0

0

0

0

July - Sept 1997

2

2

0

0

0

1

Oct - Dec 1997

7

5

6

0

0

11

Jan - Mar 1998

8

6

6

0

3

3

Apr - June 1998

4

1

2

0

0

1

July - Sept 1998

9

4

5

1

0

3

Oct - Dec 1998

10

10

5

0

0

4

Jan - Mar 1999

136

106

94

24

5

35

Apr - June 1999

107

117

112

168

5

11

Total:

299

251

230

193

13

81

Source: Data were extracted from KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. The documents were coded for
the use of the international norms by using terms listed in the coding table, in Appendix 1.

From Table 3.1 (above) and Chart 3.1 (below), it can be seen that human rights norms
were introduced in the discourse in the third quarter of 1997 (specifically in August) and go on to
become a significant part of the discourse by the end of 1998, with 10 mentions in the final
quarter of 1998 rising more than tenfold to 117 mentions between April 1999 and June 1999.84
Humanitarian law references also increase over time beginning with 6 references between

84

It should be noted that human rights mentions include references to general human rights, human rights
conventions, and mentions of specific human rights such as the right to life, torture, arbitrary arrest and detention,
economic, social and cultural rights, and genocide. The mentions of genocide are also considered separately in
another category.
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October 1997 and December 1997 and, again, showing a dramatic increase to 117 references in
the final quarter of the conflict (April – June 1999).85
An example of the use of human rights language in the discourse of the KLA is from a
speech made at a funeral in November 1997. Rexhep Selimi, a founding member of the KLA,
and two other KLA members in uniform attended a funeral for a teacher, Halit Gecaj, who had
been shot by the Serbian police in his village. “Our best sons and daughters of our unprotected
people have been killed, imprisoned, massacred…[The Serbian invader] has killed children,
youth, teachers in schools, and farmers in their fields” (Elshani 2003). Selimi’s speech makes
reference to the right to life and to arbitrary arrest and imprisonment and represents one of the
first instances of the use of this kind of language in the KLA’s discourse. Previous press releases
had focused more on taking credit for activities undertaken by the KLA and using language
which framed the conflict in terms of colonial suppression.
An example of the use of international humanitarian law in the discourse is from October
1997: “The occupiers are taking revenge with violence and never-before seen terror against the
unprotected and unarmed civilian population. With this barbaric action, Serbia is breaking the
international laws of war” (Communiqué 37, October 23, 1997). This is the first reference the
KLA makes to international humanitarian law. Its use of this type of language increases
significantly from the end of 1997 onwards.
References to genocide are more targeted: the term genocide is used in the first quarter of
1998 in conjunction with mentions of the three massacres in Drenica municipality in March of
that year and again in the first quarter of 1999, referencing the alleged massacre in Racak.

85

International humanitarian law (IHL) mentions include references to IHL in general, specific mentions of IHL
conventions, the protection of civilians, harm to civilians, the treatment of prisoners, rules for occupying forces, and
destruction of cultural artifacts.
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Chart 3.1: Change over time of the use of international norms in KLA discourse
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Source: Data were extracted from KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. The documents were coded for the use of the international
norms by using terms listed in the coding table, in Appendix 1.
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It can also be seen that calls for or discussions of humanitarian intervention do not begin
until such an intervention is imminent, in the first months of 1999, at which point references to
humanitarian intervention begin in earnest. It was clear to members of the KLA that a military
defeat of the Serbian forces would not be possible without outside intervention.86 By 1999, it was
also clear to the KLA that the intervention by NATO would be to their advantage. The KLA was
also certainly aware of the intervention by the UN in nearby Bosnia. Kosovo Albanians had
watched the unfolding of the war in Bosnia very closely in an effort to understand how a conflict
would unfold in Kosovo.87 The adoption of this language by the KLA in January 1999 indicates
a perception by the KLA of the importance of echoing international positions.
References to terrorism (or the norm against the use of terror) follow a different
trajectory. This norm is present in the discourse from the beginning. Mentions of terrorism
continue until the end of the conflict in June 1999, with a peak in October 1997 and another
around the time of the massacre in Racak in January 1999 and immediately thereafter. The KLA
had been presented in the media in the FRY as a terrorist organization and some of their use of
the term terrorist is in refutation of those accusations. In October 1996, for example, when the
group was still small and little-known, it was engaged in refuting the charge that they were
terrorists:
The invaders can threaten to eliminate the KLA and our guerrilla units as much as they
want through their spokesmen in Belgrade or the violent ones in power in Kosovo, but we
are not afraid because our roots and support are with our people, who know very well that
our war is not a war of terrorism, but one of liberation (Communiqué 27, October 27,
1996).88

86

Interview with Ram Buja, Kosovo October 2010
Interview with Ram Buja, Kosovo October 2010.
88
Translation from the Albanian language to English was completed by the author, with the assistance of an
Albanian language expert, Blerina Xhangoli Morena, unless otherwise noted.
87
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However, relative to the upswing in the number of references to human rights and
humanitarian law language, the peak in the use of the norm against terrorism was relatively
small, only tripling from 11 mentions in October 1997 to a peak of 35 in the first quarter of 1999.
One characteristic of the data that makes the comparison of the relative importance of
each norm in the discourse over time more difficult is the massive uptick in the number of media
items produced in the last six months of the conflict. In order to control for this change in
number of press releases and interviews issued in each period, the following table and chart show
mentions of international norms in terms of saturation level, i.e., as a proportion of total media
items for that period (See Table 3.2 and Chart 3.2: Saturation of international norms in KLA
discourse). For example, if there are four press releases in one period and two mentions of
human rights, this will show as 0.5—half the media items in that period had mentions of human
rights. Also, if there are multiple mentions of a particular norm in several press releases during
the same period, the saturation will be greater than one. Controlling for the significant variation
in the number of media items shows more clearly the relative importance of each norm in the
discourse over time, rather than only an increase in the media exposure overall.
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Table 3.2: Saturation of international norms in KLA discourse
Human rights

Humanitarian
law

Humanitarian
intervention

Genocide

Terror

Apr - June 1995

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

July - Sept 1995

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Oct - Dec 1995

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

Jan - Mar 1996

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

1.00

Apr - June 1996

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.50

July - Sept 1996

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.67

Oct - Dec 1996

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

2.00

Jan - Mar 1997

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.60

Apr - June 1997

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

July - Sept 1997

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.00

0.50

Oct - Dec 1997

0.71

0.86

0.00

0.00

1.57

Jan - Mar 1998

0.75

0.75

0.00

0.38

0.38

Apr - June 1998

0.25

0.50

0.00

0.00

0.25

July - Sept 1998

0.44

0.56

0.11

0.00

0.33

Oct - Dec 1998

1.00

0.50

0.00

0.00

0.40

Jan - Mar 1999

0.78

0.69

0.18

0.04

0.26

Apr - June 1999

1.09

1.05

1.57

0.05

0.10

Source: Data were extracted from KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. The documents were coded
for the use of the international norms by using terms listed in the coding table, in Appendix 1.

From Table 3.2, and the accompanying Chart 3.2 (below), it can be seen clearly that the
international norms of human rights and humanitarian law began to be used in the third quarter
1997 and become a regular part of the discourse thereafter. Human rights and humanitarian law
references appear to be used with similar frequency, with both gaining roughly similar saturation
levels after September 1997, despite their levels varying from quarter to quarter. Humanitarian
law references lag slightly behind human rights references in terms of timing, but the pattern of
change for these two norms is similar.
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Chart 3.2: Saturation levels of international norms in KLA discourse

Saturation Levels: References per media item
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Source: Data were extracted from KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. The documents were coded for the use of the international norms by using
terms listed in the coding table, in Appendix 1.
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There are roughly three peaks which can be seen in the human rights and humanitarian
law language: the first in the second half of 1997, the second in October and November 1998,
and the third in April and June of 1999, right as the war was ending. All three of these points in
time were significant points in the conflict.
The first coincides with the KLA’s first push to announce itself as an organization to the
world. This period was a critical period for the KLA as they emerged from their underground or
clandestine period and began to be more visible as an actor in Kosovo. The transition for the
KLA from a small, secretive organization to one which was out in the open was fraught with
danger for the survival of the organization as a whole. The secret police of the FRY were
relentless and extremely good at tracking down members or suspected members of groups
opposing the state. At this crucial point, the KLA began framing its struggle using human rights
terms.
This is also a point at which the appeal to outside actors began in earnest (see Chart 3.3
Appeals to outside actors by the KLA, below). From April 1997 to March 1998, the KLA made a
significant appeal to international actors such as other states and the UN. The appeals were
typically for outside actors to take a stance against the authorities in Belgrade, rather than for
direct support for the KLA. For example, in November 1997, the KLA General Headquarters
said the following in a press release:
We appeal to international institutions and in particular to the members of the UN
Security Council, to the members of UN General Assembly, European Council and
European Parliament to take definitive position against the terrorist authority of Belgrade
and to support realization of our aspiration for freedom and independence. Continuing
indifference to the state terror committed against our people empowers the terrorist
authority of Belgrade to continue the ethnocide and genocide in Kosovo (Communiqué
44, November 22, 1997).89

89

Translated from the original Albanian by Gezim Visoka.
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Chart 3.3: Appeals to outside actors by the KLA
Saturation level: Appeals per media item

1.6
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
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0.4
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0

Appeal to Outside Actors
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Source: Data were extracted from KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. The documents were coded for the use of the international norms by using
terms listed in the coding table, in Appendix 1. “Appeal to outside actors” refers to a direct appeal made by the KLA to actors outside of Kosovo.
“Outside Actor Influence” refers to a KLA mention or discussion of the influence of outside actors on the events within Kosovo. This chart shows
the saturation of this language in the KLA’s discourse, showing the number of references per media item.
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The use of the term genocide in this communiqué was atypical as it referred to a general
state of genocide in Kosovo rather than referencing a specific event, which was more frequently
the case. The appeals to actors beyond the borders of Kosovo coincided with the transition of the
KLA from a shadowy, secretive organization to one willing to act in the open and included
human rights language, and is indicative of the KLA’s ability to use international norms
strategically when framing their struggle as one which echoed the concerns of states at the
international level.
A second peak appears in October and November 1998. This was the period in which the
negotiations for a ceasefire between the Serbian forces and the KLA, urged on by the UN, were
concluded on October 16, and after which the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE) Kosovo Verification Mission (KVM) force began its work. During this period
the KLA was engaged in negotiating an agreement and was having repeated interactions with
diplomats, OSCE monitors, and international human rights advocates. The nature of many of
these interactions reinforced the importance of international norms and emphasized the need for
the KLA to behave a certain way to be taken seriously as a legitimate player in Kosovo during
the conflict—and as a potential political leader after the conflict. One KLA leader, Rame Buja,
talked about a meeting with European diplomats in late 1998 that he attended alongside Jakup
Krasniqi (the KLA spokesman) and Fatmir Limaj (one of the KLA commanders in Drenica) and
the pressure they felt from outside actors.
They were there to test our willingness, our intentions to take part in a conference to end
the war. They thought we were only fighting to enrich ourselves, and they provoked us
quite straightforwardly. They said, “The Yugoslav Army is the third largest military in
Europe, you can fight it for a few days, but it will beat you.” I asked if any of them knew
world history and could tell us of any case over the whole world where a regular army
could win over a guerrilla force. None of them could. I said we were guerrillas, and we
are not going to put down our arms for a thousand years. They asked if we were ready to
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come to an international conference for Kosovo. Krasniqi replied that we were ready to
go beyond the sun to reach it.90
Towards the end of 1998, the UN Security Council was addressing the KLA in its
resolutions (for example, UN Security Council resolution 1199 in September which condemns
all violence by all parties). By the end of 1998, the UN Security Council was also drawing
attention to the ICTY as it began calling for complete investigations into all atrocities in Kosovo,
and for all parties to cooperate with the ICTY at this time. The ICTY had announced in July
1998 that it considered the conflict in Kosovo to fall under its jurisdiction. The KLA leadership
was most certainly aware of these developments and the implications for its soldiers as highly
publicized trials were underway in the Hague. Valon Murati, a member of the KLA in the Llap
region, and press officer for that region, said:
The higher ranks knew about the Geneva Conventions, UDHR, and about international
conventions. They were aware of the Tribunal—and we knew we would be watched in
retrospect… It was much harder to be part of it when everything was going on, children
being killed, homes burned…overall, I think we did better than I hoped.91

The ordinary soldier, however, was not aware of the developments in the Hague. Rexhep
Selimi, a KLA leader, said:
More than 90% of the fighters did not know about the Hague during the war. It was not
yet so famous. There hadn’t been any of the big trials yet. Also many of the guys were
not convinced that they would survive the war. The Hague was not a topic of the war.92

The third peak in the use of human rights and international humanitarian law language is
seen at the end of the war, increasing from approximately February 1999 until June 1999. This is
the period during the run up to the international conference held in Rambouillet, France, and the
subsequent NATO bombing campaign which lasted from March 24 to June 11, 1999. This was
90

Interview with Rame Buja, Pristina, Kosovo, October 2010.
Interview with Valon Murati, Pristina, Kosovo, October 2010.
92
Inerview with Rexhep Selimi, Pristina, Kosovo, October 2010.
91
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also a crucial period for the KLA to establish its legitimacy both with outside actors and the
domestic audience.
An additional example of the KLA’s use of language in order to bolster its legitimacy is
in their use of the term democracy. The first time democracy is used in their discourse is on
September 18, 1998. It is used twice more by the end of the year, but between January 1, 1999
and March 31, the term democracy is used 45 times. To appear to want to establish a democratic
system was essential to establishing the legitimacy of the KLA as a potential political successor
of the Serbian state after its removal during the conflict.
Thus, the three peaks in the use of human rights and humanitarian law language
correspond with turning points in the conflict at which times the KLA was at great pains to
establish itself as a legitimate actor and, later, as a legitimate political force in Kosovo.
An alternative explanation for the changes in the use of human rights language would be
that the increase in use of human rights language follows the increases in the violence of the war.
While explanation might account for some of the increases observed over time, the norm usage
does not match the pattern of violence experienced in Kosovo, and is, therefore, not as
convincing. The last two years of the conflict, 1998 and 1999, were marked by much higher
levels of violence overall and therefore we would expect higher levels of references to victims of
that violence, accompanying human rights references, and protection of civilian references.
However, the increase in the level of violence does not match the changes in the discourse and,
therefore, cannot be the only explanatory variable. For example, the summer offensive in 1998
by the FRY troops and Special Forces was a period of high levels of violence which resulted in
the displacement of a large number of Kosovar Albanians within Kosovo. This period
surprisingly coincides with a relative drop in the number of human rights and humanitarian law
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references in the discourse—in the first quarter, the saturation of these norms are 0.75 (for both
human rights and humanitarian law). These levels drop to 0.25 for human rights and 0.50 for
humanitarian law in the second quarter and rise only slightly to 0.44 and 0.56 in the third quarter
for human rights and humanitarian law respectively. During this period, between January 1998
and September 1998, at least 200,000 Kosovar Albanians were displaced within Kosovo, and an
additional 90,000 individuals had fled Kosovo and were sheltering in surrounding countries and
provinces (UN High Commissioner for Refugees 1998). However, the final months of the war,
from April to June 1999, do show the highest saturation levels of human rights and humanitarian
law language. This was the period during the NATO bombing campaign when the forces of the
FRY began their efforts to push Kosovo Albanians forcibly over the borders into Macedonia and
Albania.
References to the use of terror (both denials of the use of terrorism tactics and the
accusations by the KLA that the FRY was a terrorist state) follow a different pattern and are
present from the very beginning of the study period, in the second quarter of 1995 between April
and June 1995, with peaks in the fourth quarter of 1996 and again in the fourth quarter of 1997.
An example from August 1996 is fairly typical in that the KLA refute their label as a terrorist
group and try to position themselves as freedom fighters: “The decision-making centers should
be aware that we are not terrorists, as the Serbs are trying to call us, but that we are warriors of
liberty” (Communiqué 22, August 10, 1996).
A significant pattern to note in the use of the norm against terror is that the saturation of
references to terror stays fairly constant and begins to tail off when the other international norms
of human rights, humanitarian law and humanitarian intervention are introduced and become part
of the discourse. References to terror and terrorism drop off significantly after January 1998. It
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is probable that the replacement of one international norm (against terrorism) with two others
(human rights and IHL) is an indication of the relative strength these norms had at an
international level and of the traction the KLA believed they could get from using one or the
other. Given that most states had been arguing that states could not be terrorists (only non-state
actors could), it is probable that the KLA practice of calling the Serbian state a terrorist state was
not improving its legitimacy with the outside actors and states. The decline of the relative
importance of terrorism in the discourse shows that the KLA was aware that some norms carried
greater salience than others. The shift from one set of norms to another over time shows an
adaptive strategy.
Structure as a factor influencing discourse
The patterns of the changes in the discourse of the KLA can be further examined to see if
there is a connection between the changes in the structure of the KLA and its use of international
norms, as it shifted from a loose collection of atomized groups to a somewhat hierarchical
structure with a central command.
There are two possible mechanisms which would account for this. The first is one of
control: the literature on rebel groups supports the idea that a strong internal structure is needed
to control resistance fighters and their actions.93 The concept of control can be extended to
include control over the language used by the group: speaking to the media, producing public
statements, and shaping the public perception of the struggle. The second mechanism is one of
increased specialized knowledge: as an organization grows more hierarchical and complex,
individuals within the organization are able to specialize and grow more competent in one area,
or the organization may attract a different type of recruit to fill the gaps created by increased
stratification.
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See, for example, Zahar 2001 and Haer 2012.
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Turning first to the issue of control, in the case of the KLA and its evolving structure, we
would expect to see a strong correlation between when the group becomes more hierarchical and
when it adopts international norms in the discourse. If the mechanism of control due to increased
hierarchy is in effect, we would also expect to find direct evidence of such control on individuals
speaking with the media on behalf of the KLA, such as media contacts in each of the Operative
Zones, or media spokesmen overseas.
The KLA was initially a loosely linked horizontal organization of multiple cells throughout
Kosovo. The KLA over time established seven Operative Zones throughout Kosovo, each
headed by a different commander.94 The zones were partly determined by geographical features,
such as mountain ranges, which limited contact between groups in different parts of Kosovo. The
development of these zones was part of the KLA’s evolution from a more fluid horizontal
structure toward a hierarchical structure, with each area operating more or less independently,
and gradually cooperating and coordinating, and eventually, coming under control of the Central
Command. As the hierarchies grew within each zone as well as over the KLA as a whole, each
of the seven Operative Zones in Kosovo began to appoint its own media representative, or press
officer, tasked with liaising with the press, coordinating interviews and contacts with journalists,
and generally putting out information about activities.95
In June 1998, in part as a way to manage the large influx of recruits following the
Drenica massacres in March of that year, the KLA underwent reorganization and established a
political wing and a central command located in the Drenica Operative Zone. As part of the
overall reorganization, the KLA put in place structures to have more control over access to the
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The seven zones were Drenica (zone commander Sami Lushtaku), Pashtrik (zone commanders Musa Jashari,
Ekrem Rexha, and Tahir Sinani, Dukagjini (Ramush Haradinaj), Shala (Rahman Rama), Llap (Rustrem Mustafa),
Nerodime (Shukri Buja), and Karadak (Ahmet Isufi).
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Some of the zones issued their own press releases following local skirmishes or battles.
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media. This was in recognition of what KLA saw as a need to work actively on their image in
the press and with the outside world.96 In addition, journalists were demanding more interviews
with members of the KLA, and in order to handle the demand the KLA appointed an official
spokesman, Jakup Krasniqi, tasked with coordinating all official contacts with the KLA. An
announcement that month stated that only he could speak for the KLA.97 Krasniqi emphasized
recently that the reorganization was necessary partly to control what was said to the press by any
press officer within the KLA as the lack of control had led to some misunderstandings.98
Commander Remi, the Llap region Commander, agreed: “The biggest mistake the KLA made
was we allowed so many people to speak on our behalf.”99
The KLA underwent a further restructuring in November 1998 during the pause in the
fighting provided by the ceasefire of October 1998.
However, despite these efforts at reshaping the internal structure and creating the
appearance of control over contacts between KLA members and the media, interviews with KLA
press officers from the outlying regions indicate that this might not have held true in practice in
the zones outside of Drenica where the Headquarters was located. Each zone was allowed to
issue its own press releases. One KLA member in Llap said: “there was a strategy to change our
image, which came from the General HQ [in Drenica], but there were also press releases issued
by individual zones. Even the zones had the right to issue communiqués and regulations.”100 One
press officer in the south west area of Dukagjini said: “I spoke to the press, but didn’t get
direction on how to talk to the press. There was no real means to control what people would
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Interview with Jakup Krasniqi, Pristina, Kosovo, October 11, 2010.
“Shtabi i Pergjithshem ka vendos qe per zedhenes te tij te caktoj professor Jakup Krasniqin.” Koha Ditore,
June 11, 1998.
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Interview with Jakup Krasniqi, October 11, 2010.
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Interview with Rrustem Mustafa (a.k.a Commander Remi), Pristina, Kosovo, October 7, 2010.
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Interview with Nuredim Ibishi, Chief of Staff, Llap region, Pristina, Kosovo, October 7, 2010.
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say.”101 Another in the Llap region said: “we got instructions about what to say from [local
regional] Commander Remi.”102
Similarly, control from the headquarters over KLA spokesmen overseas, such as Bardhyl
Mahmuti in Switzerland and Pleurat Sedjiu in London, was not as strong as the structure might
otherwise suggest. Contact with commanders and troops on the ground was via satellite phone
and not always reliable. Sedjiu, who was meeting with both British government officials and
with major London media outlets, acting as the press officer there, said of the guidance he
received when talking to the media:
It all depended on the situation on the ground… I didn’t always have the chance to
consult with people in Kosovo. I couldn’t always check in to get advice on how to deal
with the media and the public. We had to think on our feet.103
Thus, while there was a structure in place, with specific individuals appointed to meet with
the press, the control from the top of the hierarchy over exactly what was said by local press
officers to journalists was not as strong in practice as the appearance of restructuring would lead
us to believe. Therefore, while there is an observed increase in the international norms in the
discourse after June 1998, when the reorganization of the KLA towards greater hierarchy
occurred, in practice, the control such hierarchy afforded over the message issued by the KLA
was not strong.
The analysis turns now to the second mechanism, which suggests that an increased structural
hierarchy would allow for increased specialization of tasks of KLA members, and thereby allow
for the development or accumulation of specific types of knowledge, such as knowledge of
international conventions and norms. Put another way, increasing hierarchal structure would act
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Interview with Ardian Gjini, KLA member and press officer, Dukagjini Operative Zone, Pristina, Kosovo,
October 8, 2010.
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Interview with Hysen Fazliu, KLA member, Llap Operative Zone, October, 2010.
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Interview with author, October 6, 2010.
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as a precondition for the acquisition and use of international norms. The evidence shows greater
support for this mechanism, compared to the mechanism of control. It is also likely that the
increasing appointment of press officers and the greater importance accorded to the press was
also connected to the significant increase we see in the number of press releases from the end of
1998 onwards.
At the point at which the KLA had begun to introduce levels of hierarchy in the spring
and summer of 1998, it had begun to attract a different type of recruit. The local press officers
appointed starting at this time were typically individuals with previous experience in the media,
those with a higher level of education than many of the regular volunteers, or those with foreign
language skills. Prior to this time, journalists would talk to whomever they could find, and
whoever was available. An example of the appointed press officer in the Llap Operative Zone
was Lirac Qirac, who had previous experience working at the newspaper Koha Ditore (in the
layout department) and was a known theatrical actor from a family of intellectuals and journalists
in Pristina.104 In the Dukagjini Operative Zone, Ardian Gjini was one of the press officers. At the
time of his appointment, he had recently returned from studying overseas and carried a copy of
the UN Declaration of Human Rights in his satchel along with his satellite phone and
grenades.105
When Adem Demaci, formerly founder of the Council for the Defense of Human Rights
and Freedoms and a highly regarded former political prisoner, became the general political
representative for the KLA in August 1998, the tone of the discourse shifted somewhat. His
office in Pristina, staffed by Albin Kurti who had led the students in protests as the head of the
Students Independent Union of the University of Pristina, issued communiqués directly. Many of
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Interview with Lirac Qirac, October 8, 2010.
Interview with Ardian Gjini, October 8, 2010.
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the interviews with Demaci and Kurti in the fall of 1998 and the early months of 1999 make
direct reference to human rights and emphasize the role the KLA had in protecting civilians. For
example, in February 1999, Kurti said: “the liberation army of the KLA, because of the nature of
the Serbian regime, is fighting not only a liberation war, but also a war for protection of life,
human beings, and human values” (Kosova Sot, 1999).
Thus, the increasing specialization of certain roles within the KLA that accompanied the
restructuring and the increasing hierarchical nature of the KLA, allowed for the entry of
individuals into the ranks of the KLA who brought with them specialized knowledge and a more
access to the terminology of international norms such as human rights. The uptick in the use of
human rights language and international humanitarian law language after June 1998, therefore,
can be partly accounted for by restructuring as a precondition for the acquisition of the detailed
knowledge of those norms.
The analysis now turns briefly to the second case, the LTTE.
The Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelamand its discourse
The LTTE, a long-standing separatist movement, was active for more than 30 years from
its founding in May 1976 to its military defeat in May 2009. Similar to the KLA, the LTTE’s
use of international norms in their public discourse changed considerably over time. The period
under consideration is from 1992 to 2006 as these are the years that the leader of the LTTE,
Velupillai Prabhakaran, made his annual speech to the troops available publicly. This speech is
considered by many to give the best annual “state of mind” of the Tigers.106 One advantage of
this case, compared to the KLA, is the longer span of time that the LTTE was active and making
public pronouncements, allows for a greater understanding of the development of language usage
over time.
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See, for example, Prakash 2008.

126

The table and chart (Table 3.4 and Chart 3.4: Change over time of the use of international
norms in LTTE discourse) below show the evolution of the use of international norms in
Prabhakaran’s discourse. The sources for this table and chart are the texts of the speeches given
annually by Prabhakaran.107
Table 3.4: Change over time of the use of international norm language in LTTE discourse
Human Rights

Humanitarian
Law

Humanitarian
Intervention

Genocide

Terror

11/27/1992

1

0

0

1

0

11/27/1993

0

0

0

0

0

11/27/1994

0

0

0

0

0

11/27/1995

1

5

0

1

0

11/27/1996

6

1

0

2

2

11/27/1997

5

1

0

2

2

11/27/1998

11

3

0

2

1

11/27/1999

3

2

0

0

1

11/27/2000

2

3

0

1

5

11/27/2001

8

0

0

4

26

11/27/2002

2

3

0

0

0

11/27/2003

0

2

0

0

0

11/27/2004

0

0

0

0

0

11/27/2005

3

0

0

0

9

11/27/2006

16

3

0

3

1

Total:

58

23

0

16

47

Source: Data were extracted from documents listed in Appendix 4. The documents were coded
for international norms according to the coding table in Appendix 1.

International norms in general, meaning references to norms as norms, rather than
references to a specific norm, are mentioned several times, showing keen awareness of the
importance of those norms. However, when these occur, they are immediately linked to the right
of self-determination, as if this international norm was the most important norm in the case of the
LTTE. It also appears that the LTTE drew on international law to offer legal justification for
their struggle.
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Please see Appendix 4 for a list of these speeches.
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Our political objectives conform with international norms and principles. Our people are
eligible for the right to self-determination. They have a right to statehood. Under
international law this right cannot be denied (Hero’s Day Speech, November 1993).108

Human rights norms are present in the sample from the beginning in 1992, but are
primarily clustered around two peaks, one in 1998, when mentions reached 11 references,
following six in 1996, and five in 1997, and a second peak in 2006, with 16 mentions. Both
peaks coincide with periods of heavy fighting. The peak in 1998, however, mirrors a similar
peak in the language of the KLA at a time when the norm was particularly strong at the state
level and coincided with the creation of the ICC in July 1998.
The connection between human rights and genocide is made explicit in a number of
speeches and occurs after the intense focus by states on genocide in the mid-1990s. The
following quote, from 1996, illustrates this:
The incidents of arrests, detention, torture, rape, murder, disappearances and the
discovery of the disappeared in mass graves reveal that a covert genocidal policy is
practiced in the army controlled areas. (Hero’s Day Speech, November 1996)

The majority of the references to human rights by the LTTE in 1998 are an attempt to
highlight the relative lack of attention to the plight of the Tamil people in Sri Lanka as a human
rights issue amid a growing international understanding of the importance of human rights. This
is a strong indication of the LTTE’s awareness of the changes in this norm at the state level. For
example:
The world community has always fought for the cause of the oppressed and it has always
raised its voice of protest or intervened whenever there have been incidents of human
rights violations, crimes against humanity or repression of minority nations in any part of
the world. But we are dismayed to note that the international community is observing a
muted silence over the colossal tragedy faced by the Eelam Tamils (Hero’s Day Speech,
November 1998).
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The Hero’s Day speeches were provided in English language translation by the TamilNet, www.Tamilnet.com, a
Tamil nationalist website that published articles about the Sri Lankan civil war in English, German and French.
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Chart 3.4: Change over time of the use of international norms in LTTE discourse
30

Number of references
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20
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Humanitarian Intervention

Human Rights

Humanitarian Law

Genocide

Terror

Source: Data were extracted from documents listed in Appendix 4. The documents were coded for international norms according to
the coding table in Appendix 1.
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Humanitarian law references, however, show a different pattern, with lower overall levels
and only a slight peak in 1995 with five references. In comparison to the KLA, the LTTE’s use
of human rights and international humanitarian law language is less closely linked.
The references to genocide appear to be more general, rather than referring to specific
events, contrary to the KLA case.
Our historical enemy, Sinhala Buddhist Chauvinism…has been conducting a genocidal
war against the Tamil nation (Hero’s Day Speech, 1996).
And:
Successive Sri Lankan Governments adopted a policy of genocidal repression aimed at
the gradual and systematic destruction of the Tamil nation (Hero’s Day Speech,
November 1997).
The references to genocide are fairly stable over time, with a slight peak in November 2001.
The peaks in the human rights and genocide language in 2001 coincide with the
negotiations for the ceasefire agreement, which had begun under the auspices of the Norwegian
government in 2000. The ceasefire agreement was signed in 2002.
The LTTE also never mention the norm of humanitarian intervention—they were not
interested in promoting any massive outside military intervention and preferred to keep the
conflict, albeit supported by outside sources such as the large Tamil diaspora, strictly between
the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government forces. The deployment of the Indian peace-keeping
force following the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord in July 1987 led to major military engagement with
the LTTE and left the group wanting to have little to do with outside military forces.
The references to terror are small in number until 2001 when a dramatic shift occurs:
Prabhakaran mentions it 26 times. In 2001 the LTTE began a massive effort to refute their being
labeled a terrorist organization and even seemed to question the definition of what a terrorist
might be. The speech of 2001 shows the LTTE struggling to maintain the distinction between
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freedom fighter (which was considered legitimate by the LTTE) and terrorist (which was not).
At the same time, Prabhakaran appears to be insisting on a broader definition of terrorism to
include state violence.
Our struggle has a concrete, legitimate political objective….We are freedom fighters. The
Sinhala state terrorists, who have failed in their efforts to crush our freedom movement
for the last two decades, branded our liberation struggle as terrorism (Hero’s Day Speech,
November 2001).

3.4 Conclusions
Both the KLA and the LTTE show significant variation in their talk of international
norms, and their patterns of discourse can offer some support for the expectations derived from
the overview of international norm change at the international level. Both groups show increases
in human rights language, although only the KLA pairs this increase with an increase in
humanitarian law language and discussion of the protection of civilians. Both groups show an
increase in 1998, at a time when human rights and international humanitarian law issues were
much discussed at the state level, and when international events such as the creation of the ICC
in July 1998 and the increase of the jurisdiction of the ICTY over Kosovo were highlighting the
importance of those norms for non-state actors. With the changes in the discourse on terror, the
LTTE offers a clear example of how a sudden shift in a norm at the international level can be
immediately reflected at the non-state level. However, because the discourse is so particular to
each group’s immediate environment and their goals, more in-depth analysis of the shift in the
norms in each case is required (and will be conducted in subsequent chapters).
Combining the two cases, it would appear as if the pressure from external forces to adopt
human rights language may have been particularly effective in the latter half of the 1990s. Both
groups show significant increases in the use of human rights language from 1998 onwards,
particularly at turning points in the conflicts, which would indicate a strategic element in the use.
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Usage of these norms also increased at times when international involvement was imminent or
present and the legitimacy of the group was in need of a boost. For both the KLA and the LTTE,
their use of international norms in discourse changed during periods of negotiation with outside
actors. In Kosovo, the fall of 1998 saw intensive negotiations with outside actors for a cease-fire.
During this period, and again in the early days of 1999 with the run-up to Rambouillet, the KLA
was striving to appear to be legitimate to outside actors. To do so, it began adopting language
and discourse familiar to these actors and to frame its struggle in terms which would resonate
with them in order to bolster its claims. For the LTTE, the peace-talks led by the Norwegians in
2002 provided an opportunity to appear as a legitimate and reasonable opponent for the Sri
Lankan government. With the LTTE’s practice of using terror tactics and the delegitimation of
such tactics in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, the LTTE would have been searching for
a discourse to shape international opinion. Finally, the sudden appearance and substantive
discussion of the meaning of terror in the discourse in 2001 indicates that armed groups are
aware of changes in the international environment and the use of international norms and do
respond very quickly to changes in these.
The analysis of the effect of the changes of structure on the use of international norms in
the discourse of the KLA indicates that the increase in the hierarchy allowed for specialization of
certain roles within the KLA which was accompanied by increased knowledge of international
norms. The increased specialization acted as a prerequisite for the KLA’s reliable use of
international norms from June 1998 onwards.
Overall, the patterns in the changes in the discourse of these groups show them acting
strategically and adopting international norms such as human rights, IHL, and genocide at
critical turning points in the conflict. Some norms, such as humanitarian intervention, are only
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adopted once the possibility of an intervention looks like it might become a reality. One norm
does not follow that pattern, the norm against the use of terror. This norm appears to lose
salience and relative importance over the course of the conflict for the KLA, and not to feature
in the LTTE’s discourse until the sea-change in the international response to terrorism in 2001.
The following two chapters turn to an in-depth examination of human rights and IHL
(Chapter 4) and the norm against terrorism (Chapter 5).
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Chapter 4: Human rights and international humanitarian law:
Evidence of incorporation of norms into the discourse of rebel
groups
This chapter analyzes the discourse of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the
Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) with particular focus on the changes in the use over
time of two international norms: human rights norms and international humanitarian law norms.
The chapter provides evidence to answer two overarching questions: why do armed groups adopt
these norms, and why are certain norms more likely than others to be adopted?
This chapter examines the micro-patterns in the variations of the usage of the two norms
and finds that day to day or week to week fluctuations in the usage of these are tied to local
events. The findings also point to variation in the local normative environment as a likely reason
why some norms, such as the protection of civilians, appear to be adopted into the discourse with
greater frequency in some conflicts than others.
In order to provide context for the subsequent analysis, this chapter begins with a brief
overview of the two bodies of law, human rights and humanitarian law, as well as the obligations
armed resistance groups have under each. The subsequent analysis focuses on three areas: first,
the change of discourse over time; second, evidence demonstrating the knowledge and use of
conventions in the discourse by the rebel groups; and, third, the frequency of the mention of
specific human rights violations, such as torture or the right to life, as well as specific areas of
international humanitarian law, such as protection of civilians or treatment of prisoners of war.
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4.1 Human rights law and international humanitarian law during conflict
This chapter focuses mainly on two sets of international norms: human rights norms and
international humanitarian law norms. Human rights norms are frequently cited during times of
conflict, because during periods of conflict rates of human rights violations tend to be higher
than during times of peace. They may also be cited to draw international attention to the behavior
of the parties, or to frame the conflict in human rights terms. Humanitarian law, which only
comes into effect during times of conflict, provides the framework for the behavior of the parties
in the conflict. Both bodies of law are cited during times of conflict by international
organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), and states external to the conflict, particularly
when there are high numbers of civilian deaths during the conflict.
These two bodies of law are quite distinct, with very different historical and philosophical
foundations. Human rights law, as defined by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(UDHR) and related treaties, outlines the basic rights each human being possesses with respect
to their state. International humanitarian law provides the rules that regulate conduct during
times of war, including the treatment of civilians during war.
The distinction between the two bodies of law is very clear during times of peace.
However, there are ongoing discussions and differences of opinion among jurists and courts
about which body of law to apply during times of conflict. If human rights law applies at all
times (which some states dispute), then which law should take precedence during times of
conflict? This is a particularly thorny issue when non-combatants are killed during conflict.
Under human rights law, no individual should lose his or her life, while under humanitarian law
civilian deaths should merely be minimized. The International Court of Justice (ICJ), in its
Advisory Opinion on Nuclear Weapons in 1996, endorsed a lex specialis interpretation, in which
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the body of law with the most conflict-specific approach (i.e., humanitarian law) should take
precedence. However, it complicated the matter with its 2004 ruling on the Wall in Occupied
Palestinian Territory, which articulated three separate options for the relationship between
human rights law and humanitarian law, stating that some rights are matters of international
humanitarian law; some are exclusively matters of human rights law; and some fall under both
branches of the law, without specifying which rights fall under which body of law, or in which
contexts (Tomuschat 2010).
Further, two states, the United States and Israel, have long maintained that human rights
law does not apply in times of war (Hampson 2008). However, despite long-standing objections
from both of these states, most states have accepted the ICJ position that human rights law and
humanitarian law can exist concurrently.
In addition to the complicated judicial interpretation of which body of law takes
precedence, there is increasingly an apparent blurring between these two bodies of law by parties
involved in the conflict (as subsequent parts of this chapter will show), non-government
watchdogs monitoring the conflict, such as Human Rights Watch (HRW), journalists covering
the conflict, and, at times, international organizations and state actors. The blurring may take
place for strategic reasons, for example, because enforcement mechanisms are stronger for
international humanitarian law than human rights law, or because these two branches of law
appear to be converging in certain areas, or, finally, because the parties involved may be unsure
of which body of law to apply.
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Armed resistance groups and their obligations under human rights and international
humanitarian law
The obligations for armed resistance groups under human rights law and international
humanitarian law are significantly different.
Armed opposition groups are not party to human rights conventions or treaties, which are
signed by states and primarily designed to protect individuals from the state. However, these
groups are frequently significant human rights abusers.109 This makes their growing use of
human rights language in framing their struggles puzzling. Highlighting the state’s violations of
human rights law can serve several strategic purposes. It provides a way to explain their
motivations and denigrate the state they are fighting by using language familiar to domestic and
international audiences. Also, by invoking human rights, they can trigger mechanisms already in
place to sanction states engaging in that behavior. However, this strategy also carries risks. By
framing the struggle in human rights terms, groups also draw attention to their own (often poor)
human rights records, which in light of the framing, can potentially undermine their legitimacy.
To complicate matters further, towards the end of the 1990s, UN bodies, notably the Security
Council, began to call upon all parties to conflicts to respect both humanitarian law and human
rights law, suggesting that there are international expectations that non-state actors abide by
human rights law.110
Turning to international humanitarian law, traditionally, international law laid out the
rules for engagement between states and was applied only to insurgents, a subset of armed non109

Vocabulary used in this work is as follows: non-state actors do not violate an individual’s rights. The term
violate is reserved for states. In this work, the term for non-state actors is abuse—thus non-state actors abuse human
rights.
110
See, for example, resolutions on Liberia, Afghanistan, and Cote d’Ivoire, which call on parties to respect
human rights law and to cease human rights violations and abuses (S/RES/1261 (1998), S/RES/1471 (2003), and
S/RES/1479 (2003).
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state actors in times of conflict. Insurgents were rebels recognized by one or more states once
they had proved they controlled territory and demonstrated that the conflict was of some degree
of intensity and duration, excluding, for example, riots and sporadic violence (Cassese 2005).
Today, armed non-state groups no longer have to be recognized by other states. Instead, the
conflict itself must reach a certain level for humanitarian law to apply.111 Once that condition is
fulfilled, humanitarian law applies to non-state armed resistance groups, whether labeled as
rebels, insurgents, or separatist movements. These groups have rights and obligations under
Common Article 3 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the Additional Protocol II of 1977, and
Article 19 of the Hague Convention on Cultural Property of 1954 (Clapham 2006). Groups may,
as part of their quest for legitimacy, use humanitarian law language when framing their
grievances, regardless of their status or the legal designation of the intensity of the conflict. They
may even use the language before the conflict has reached the level of an “armed conflict not of
an international character” in order to bolster their case that they are a legitimate armed actor and
on their way to becoming a state-like actor. This latter status would then garner them the
protection offered actors under international humanitarian law, such as protection of prisoners.
However, the states they are fighting resist this, trying to portray the armed group as criminals or
terrorists, in part to deny the legitimacy the groups crave, and in part to resist opening up the
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The Geneva Conventions common Article 3 applies to armed conflicts which are not of an
international nature; however, it is ambiguous as to what exactly can be defined as an armed conflict.
Subsequent clarifications in 1977 Protocol II, the rulings in the ICTY Tadic case, and the framework for the
ICC have tried to address these ambiguities. From Protocol II, the non-state actor involved in the noninternational conflict should be: “under responsible command, [and] exercise such control over a part of its
territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted military operations and to implement this
Protocol.” It further rules out internal disturbance such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and
other acts of a similar nature. In 1995, the Appeals Chamber in the ICTY Tadic case argued that IHL
should apply in all parts of a state, even if the state no longer has control over all parts, cover conflicts of a
protracted nature, and extend until a peaceful settlement is reached (i.e., beyond the cessation of hostilities).
The ICC Statute (Article 8) identifies acts as war crimes when committed in an internal armed conflict, but
does not limit the application of common Article 3 to conflicts of a protracted nature.
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conflict to international law. Different laws apply to domestic disputes and the last thing most
states want is a degree of international scrutiny of their domestic matters.
In sum, armed opposition groups have long-standing reasons to use international
humanitarian law in their discourse, but much less reason to use human rights language. Both
sets of norms are used in their discourse, but there is a lingering question of whether the groups
do so from a firm understanding of the two different bodies of law, or whether there is a basic
misunderstanding about what rights and obligations each body of law implies.

4.2 Human rights and humanitarian law norms in the discourse of the armed
resistance groups
This section analyzes the use of human rights and humanitarian law norms in the
discourse of the KLA, the main case, and the LTTE, the secondary case. It first examines the
change of the discourse over time, connecting these changes to events and apparent changes in
the groups’ strategies. Following is an analysis of the level of detailed understanding of both
norms, examining the references to specific conventions and treaties. This section then concludes
with an analysis of which human rights norms and which humanitarian law norms are most
referenced in the groups’ discourse.
Change of discourse over time: The KLA
Overall, the pattern of change of the use of human rights and humanitarian law shows an
increasing use of these norms in the KLA’s discourse, beginning in August 1997. The norms are
introduced at low levels initially, but swell to make up a significant part of the overall discourse
by the end of the conflict in June 1999. The analysis links the discourse to local events on the
ground and firmly situates it in the local context.
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The media materials and interviews issued by the KLA evolved over time and broadly
fall into three different periods: the Underground Period, roughly from June 1995 to September
1997; the Emergent Period, from October 1997 to October 1998; and, the Mature Period, from
November 1998 to the end of the war, in June 1999. Each of these periods is marked by
differences in the framing of the KLA’s struggle and the way international norms are
incorporated into their discourse.
The Underground Period: June 1995 – September 1997
During this early period, the KLA operated as a loosely interconnected web of different
groups with a limited number of cells throughout rural Kosovo. Within each cell, members were
well known to each other—often relatives, or long-time friends—and contacts beyond the cell
were limited to one or two individuals. One estimate put the group’s size at fewer than 150
members towards the end of 1997 (Bardhyl Mahmuti, a senior KLA member quoted in Judah
2000). To protect the identity of the individuals involved in the KLA, the wider population of
Kosovo and political elites knew very little about the KLA.
Kosovar politicians in the Democratic League of Kosovo (LDK) remained skeptical that
the KLA was an Albanian organization, rather than an elaborate cover by Serbian intelligence to
increase repression in the region.
We are not clear on what is happening, and we do not have data on the attacks on the
Serbian police stations, and thus cannot give a conclusion as to who is behind them, and
what their reasons might be. The truth is that such events are used to exercise extended
reprisals against the innocent population (Hidajet Hysent, Deputy Leader of the LDK,
Koha Jone, August 6, 1996).
Comparing early KLA documents with documents from other local groups established in
Kosovo at or before the same time provides context for the discourse adopted by the KLA. Other
local groups, such as the People’s Movement for Kosovo (LPK), used international norms
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(primarily self-determination, but also human rights language) in their discourse as early as
1993, indicating that the language of human rights was in use in Kosovo by non-state actors prior
to the significant increase visible in the language of the KLA. For example, the LPK, a precursor
of the KLA, and, for a brief time, the self-proclaimed political arm of the KLA, framed its
political agenda in terms drawn explicitly from international norms. In September 1993, its
published political program stated:
Initiated by the legitimate right of every population for freedom, independence, and selfdetermination, it is an undeniable right and a need for the Albanian population to fight
with all means and forms for liberation with respect to international norms (“Program of
the LPK,” Zeri I Kosoves, September 15, 1993).
Paragraph I of the program further clarifies: “the right of self-determination is a universal right
and one of the key principles of the UN, Helsinki, and Paris Charters” (Zeri I Kosoves,
September 15, 1993).
The program goes on to voice support for whatever means might be necessary to achieve
their stated goals of self-determination, independence, full human rights, and democracy,
including armed resistance (although the latter is condemned by the UN, Helsinki, and Paris
Charters). This program does show that the members of the LPK were attempting (however
imperfectly) to connect their struggle with international norms and frame the struggle in a way
that might resonate beyond the borders of Kosovo.
In contrast with the LPK published program, the first press releases from the KLA are
much simpler, with more modest goals. The connection to international norms is virtually nonexistent. The press releases (called “communiqués”) were written by KLA members within
Kosovo and faxed to trusted colleagues outside of Kosovo for wider distribution to media outlets
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and other potentially interested parties.112 The first publicly distributed communiqués appear to
have had three goals, broadly defined as: first, establishing the presence of the KLA, by taking
responsibility for attacks on police stations or other symbolic targets; second, cautioning against
potential leaks to the Serbian secret service, by announcing murders of alleged collaborators; and
third, reaching beyond the borders of Kosovo to engage a wider audience on the struggle within
Kosovo.
The first communiqué, issued in June 1995, claims responsibility for several attacks and
announces the presence of a central command, suggesting that the KLA was more than a group
of isolated individuals attacking vulnerable symbols of Serbian authority: “During the last two
months, the central command has commanded armed units for military actions, which were
executed according to plan. In April, the Serbian police station of Irzniq village was attacked”
(Communiqué 13, June 1995). Chillingly, the early press releases also detail the murders of
individuals assumed to be collaborators, or Serbs singled out for their anti-Albanian activities.
“On the 7th and 10th of July, our guerrilla units carried out two assassinations. The first was of a
collaborator with the Serbian regime, Shukri Krasniqi from Ostozubi, and the second was in
Podujeva, the criminal policeman Sredoje Radojeviq” (Communiqué 21, July 14, 1996).
The communiqués make regular references to these types of attacks on civilians, most
frequently referred to as collaborators or criminals. This language is used 33 times between June
1995 and September 1998, at which point these references cease. References to the murder of
civilians went on to be used in the trials at the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia (ICTY), in the Hague, as evidence of war crimes committed by KLA members. 113
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The first communiqué distributed in this fashion was numbered Communiqué 13. Communiqués 1 – 12 were
distributed internally.
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See, for example, the transcripts for the case against Ramush Haradinaj, the KLA commander of the
Dukagjini zone, http://www.icty.org/case/haradinaj/4.
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Missing from these early documents is any reference to, or understanding of,
international norms of either human rights or humanitarian law. Looking at these communiqués
from this perspective, not only is the KLA not using human rights language or referencing
humanitarian law to bolster their case during this period, they are doing the exact opposite:
taking responsibility for events which are human rights abuses, or, as the prosecutors at the
ICTY allege, war crimes.114
The strategic advantage gained from dissuading potential collaboration with the Serbian
secret police (SDB) would seem to outweigh the negative perception of the organization
appearing to be a human rights abuser or humanitarian law violator. It also suggests a simple
failure to see the norms as relevant to their struggle.
In addition, unlike the LPK program, references to long-term goals, such as independence
or democracy, are rare. Indeed, democracy is not mentioned as a goal until September 1998.115
Rather than references to self-determination, independence, or secession, the framing of the
struggle is stated more in terms of anti-colonialism, or as being against an invasion of their land:
“We want to let all the friends and enemies of our people know that we will continue our armed
war until we force our invaders to surrender from our lands” (Communiqué 20, June 27, 1996).
Another example from 1996 states: “We would like to state clearly to the current Serbian
political leadership that they must withdraw from our territories as soon as possible or our
attacks to liberate the country will be fierce and merciless” (Communiqué 22, August 10, 1996).
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By the time of the prosecution for war crimes at the ICTY, in November 2005, the defense argued that the
collaborators mentioned in these communiqués were in fact not civilians, but combatants, thus recognizing the
potential violation of humanitarian law that these acts represent. See ICTY Case No: IT-03-66-T, Prosecutor v.
Fatmir Limaj, Haradin Bala, and Isak Musliu. Paras 222, 223 and 224. This claim was rejected.
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Democracy is not mentioned in KLA-published documents until Communiqué 53, published on September
18, 1998.
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The Emergent Period: October 1997 – September 1998
The KLA began to emerge from the shadows in this period, making itself more known to
the public in Kosovo and the world at large. This is also the period during which the KLA
experienced a great deal of growth in its numbers and a reshaping and consolidation of its
internal structure, taking on more features of a centralized fighting force. This development also
had an impact on the shaping of its image and how the KLA cause was framed. In June 1998,
the KLA appointed its first official media spokesman, Jakup Krasniqi. The following month the
KLA appointed Bardhyl Mahmuti in Switzerland to represent the KLA outside of Kosovo.
Mahmuti appointed representatives in Germany, England, and the United States. In August 1998,
Adem Demaci, the leading political activist in Kosovo, was also appointed to a prominent role,
as political spokesman, based in Pristina.
In terms of discourse, the period is marked by the beginnings of the use of international
norms in the public discourse. Both human rights norms and humanitarian law norms begin to be
included in press releases, speeches, and political declarations. There are 17 mentions of human
rights violations during this period, compared with two during the previous Underground Period,
and 18 mentions of humanitarian law or humanitarian law violations, compared to none in the
Underground Period. In particular, this period sees the emergence of an important theme in the
presentation of the KLA: the idea that the KLA does not attack civilians (barring, of course, the
two previously mentioned categories of possible collaborators and those deemed to be
criminals). This view of the KLA was set in contrast to the actions of the Serbian police and,
later, the military and paramilitary groups, who were portrayed as attacking civilians as part of
their counter-insurgency campaign. This presentation of the KLA became the core of its
identity. A press release from October 1997 highlights this new development: “Unable to catch
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our army units, the occupiers are taking revenge with violence and unprecedented terror against
the unprotected and unarmed civilian population. With these barbaric acts, Serbia is breaking the
international laws of war” (Communiqué 37, October 23, 1997). And see also the press release of
March 12, 1998, which outlines the behavior by the KLA: “Through our actions to date, the
KLA has demonstrated that this army excludes any form of violence and terror towards an
innocent population. We assure everyone that we will not step back from this principle”
(Communiqué 44, March 12, 1998).
A turning point in the public perception of the KLA, as an organization, was the funeral
of a teacher, Halit Gecaj, on November 28, 1997. It was the first public event where KLA
members appeared in uniform. Falling as it did on Albania’s Day of Independence, the funeral
took on a mythical quality and drew a spontaneous attendance of thousands of mourners, many
of whom evaded road blocks to attend. Rame Buja, the KLA Chief of the Board for Public
Relationships and Civil Administration in 1998 and 1999, said of the funeral:
This big, massive funeral was something that had not been seen before then […] There
was no organization to get people to attend. They just came. Another thing that was
strange for our tradition—people applauded. This was a break with our tradition. During
this funeral, something emerged that was historical. And mobilization spread rapidly over
Kosovo after this time.116
Three KLA members, Daut Haradinaj, Rexhep Selimi, and Muje Krasniqi, made the first
public statement by the KLA to the gathered mourners. The speech given by Rexhep Selimi, who
played a central role in the establishment of the KLA along with Hashim Thaçi, and later was the
KLA’s Chief of Staff, paints a much more personal and vivid picture of the KLA’s struggle than
previously seen in KLA documents.
The Albanian people in their territories here in enslaved Kosovo have shouldered the
oppression and the burden of inhuman violence of the Serbian invaders for decades. Our
116

Interview with the author, October 2010.
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best sons and daughters of our unprotected people have been killed, imprisoned,
massacred… [The Serbian invader] has killed children, youth, teachers in schools, and
farmers in their fields (Elshani 2003).
According to members of the KLA, the combination of finally seeing members of the
KLA in uniform at a public event and the content of the speech was the beginning of the swing
towards the KLA in terms of public sentiment.117 This was not an unplanned appearance, but
was likely part of the beginnings of the campaign to make the KLA better known to the Kosovar
public at large: “Our public appearance at the burial of our beloved school teacher, Halit Gecaj,
on 28th of November was not a chance appearance, but rather an appeal to all those who
genuinely wish to commit themselves to the liberation of Kosovo” (Communiqué 40, December
5, 1997).
The Mature Period: October 1998 – June 1999
The Mature Period was marked by a large increase in the amount of press the KLA was
able to generate, through local newspapers, which were increasingly willing to interview
members of the KLA following their appearance at the Gecaj funeral, and through their own
media outlets. The KLA’s use of references to international norms increased significantly during
this period, both in real terms (the total number of references) and in terms of the saturation of
media events (the percentage of all discourse at the time). This period saw the implementation
of a ceasefire negotiated between Holbrooke and Milosevic on October 16, 1998, which was
monitored by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Kosovo
Verification Mission (KVM). It also included international efforts to broker a peace deal
culminating with the Rambouillet talks between February 6 and March 18, and finally, NATO’s
intervention, beginning with the bombing campaign on March 24, 1999.
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From author interviews with Rame Buja, Jakup Krasniqi, and Ardian Gjini, Pristina, Kosovo, October 2010.
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The goal of the discourse during this period appears to be to further discredit the Serbian
regime by increasing the critique of the actions of Serbian troops and the police force, using
humanitarian law and human rights language to do so. Mentions of the behavior of the Serbian
troops are frequently contrasted unfavorably with the behavior of the KLA troops. A second goal
appears to be to portray the KLA in more professional terms and to present the group as a
legitimate fighting force. There is an increase in the use of specific humanitarian law references
particularly with regards to treatment of prisoners. A third goal appears to be to present the KLA
as a group with a political vision of the future. This period also saw a substantial increase in the
number of references to humanitarian intervention.
The heightened efforts to de-legitimize the Serbian regime make use of both international
humanitarian law and human rights law. The regime itself (or the state) is portrayed as violating
human rights law by denying its citizens the right to life, while in other instances Serbian forces
are portrayed as harming civilian populations (a violation of humanitarian law). For example, in
the two quotes below the first uses human rights language, while the second references
humanitarian law, with an emphasis on Serbian forces:
There is no end to the state terrorism and systematic repression of the Belgrade regime in
Kosovo. The murder of children who are the future of every people and society shows
that the Serbian regime wants to kill the future of the Albanians in Kosovo. The
execution of dozens of Albanians, including women, children and the elderly, shows
clearly that the Serbian regime and state have launched themselves into classic fascism
(Communiqué 69/70, January 16, 1999).
And:
The complete Serbian defeat in the Llap region has led the Serbian occupation forces to
take revenge on the Albanian civilian population, women and children, and to threaten
OSCE observers, and foreign media correspondents (Communiqué 67, December 26,
1998).
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The frequency of press releases and interviews allows us to see to what extent the human
rights and international humanitarian law language during this period is attached to events at the
local level. The chart below (Chart 4.1: Weekly human rights and international humanitarian
law references during the KLA’s Mature Period, October 1998 – June 1999) shows, on a weekby-week basis, the number of human rights and international humanitarian law language in the
media items during the Mature Period. From Chart 4.1, it can be seen that references to human
rights and humanitarian law norms fluctuate closely together, although the peaks of human rights
usage are higher than those of the humanitarian law language.
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Chart 4.1: Weekly human rights and international humantiaran law
references during the KLA's Mature Period, October 1998 - June 1999
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Source: Data were extracted from the KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. The documents were coded for the use of the international norms by
using terms listed in the coding table, in Appendix 1.
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It appears that there is a close connection between events and the use of both sets of
discourse. For example, the jump in human rights language between November 12 and 18, 1998
was in response to attacks by Serbian forces on two Albanian villages, Negroc and Decan.
The KLA General Staff asks the international community, the Red Cross and the OSCE
observers to oblige the fascist regime of Belgrade not to abuse our self-restraint or to
allow their own insignia and cars to be used to enter Albanian villages to kill and
massacre people, as happened in Negroc, near Gllogoc and Decan, near Malisheve.
(Communiqué 62, November 14, 1998)118
The jump between January 14 and February 17 is in response to the massacre in Recak,
on January 15, 1999.119 The news of the massacre prompted numerous press releases and
interviews by the KLA. Between January 14 and 17, human rights language is used 24 times, and
international humanitarian law is referenced four times, in both press releases and in radio
broadcasts. Most mention the massacre and the loss of life in Recak. For example, the KLA
office in Pristina issued a statement on January 17: “In the Neredima Operative Zone the Serbian
criminal regime and their forces killed, massacred, and barbarically executed at least 46
Albanians aged between 12 and 80 years old” (Memo from the Office of the Political
Representative of the KLA, January 17, 1999).
The massacre was internationally significant, as the bodies were witnessed by the head of
the OSCE KVM mission, William Walker, who denounced what he saw as a crime against
humanity.120 While there is some dispute over exactly what happened at Recak, due to
differences among the accounts of eye-witnesses, the Serbian Interior Ministry, and the KLA, the
press attention to the massacre and the words of Walker helped drive international sentiment
towards intervention. Following the news of the massacre, autopsies were conducted on the dead

118

Translation provided by the BBC. Source: Albanian TV, Tirana.
The village is known as Recak in Albanian and Racak in Serbian.
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Interview with William Walker, “War in Europe,” Frontline, PBS.
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/walker.html.
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by two teams: a joint Yugoslav-Belarus team of pathologists and a forensic Finnish team of sent
by the European Union (EU). The Serbian account was that the dead were all members of the
KLA, while Walker and the KLA maintained that the dead were civilians. The Finnish team of
forensic pathologists carried out an autopsy on 40 of the 45 bodies (some with the assistance of
the Yugoslav and Belarus forensic experts, and their findings were published in 2001. The
findings detail causes of death, but not the manner in which they occurred, adding to the
confusion of what happened in Recak. The forensic report refuted the claims that the corpses had
been mutilated (Rainio, Lalu, and Penttila 2001).121
The spike between March 25 and 31 covers the first week of the NATO bombing
campaign, which was accompanied by an assault in Kosovo by Serbian forces. The final peak
also corresponds with an increase in violence by Serbian forces. The gap between April 1 and 7
follows the bombing of the KLA-supported radio station’s premises by Serbian forces. After
April 7, all the broadcasts were sent from mountain tops or bunkers since the radio station staff
were forced to be on the move.
The final goal of this period appeared to be paving the way for the KLA to assume a
leadership role in post-conflict Kosovo. The search for legitimacy was critical during this period
as the KLA leadership began to position themselves as players in a post-conflict setting. In the
final months of the war, the KLA political wing was planning how to govern Kosovo after the
war. Within weeks of the end of the war, Hashim Thaçi announced the formation of a new
political party, the Democratic Party of Kosovo (PDK), appointed ministers to positions, and
established an interim government (Perritt 2008: 153).
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At the trial of Milosevic in the Hague the case of Recak was heard as part of the Kosovo indictment. One
witness from KVM, Candian General Joseph Omer Michael Maisonneuve, based on what he saw when he entered
the village and on information from his verifiers, said he believed eight to 10 of the victims were KLA members,
and that the attack on Recak represented an operation against a weak defence force, but that force used was
disproportionate and not a legitimate miltiary action (Klarin 2002).
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Congruence of human rights and international humanitarian law with local culture in Kosovo
From the early 1990s, Kosovo Albanians had been withdrawing from participation within
the official state institutions in the areas of education, health, and justice, and turning to more
traditional modes of interaction (Krasniqi 2009 and Clark 2000). In the area of justice, one
alternative was to turn to traditional ways to solve disputes, using traditional laws and
mechanisms. In Kosovo, these traditional laws, known locally as the Kanun of Leke Dukagjini,
provided a framework which had governed the lives of Albanians for centuries.122 With regard
to the international norms in question, human rights and international humanitarian law, in
particular where these two bodies of law intersect during times of conflict, the laws of the Kanun
similarly provide some guidance as to which kinds of people may be attacked during violent
conflict. The Kanun prohibits taking the lives of children, women and the elderly in violent
confrontations between families (known as blood feuds) and these prohibitions demonstrate
congruence with international norms, particularly the protection of civilians during conflict. It is
notable that the mentions of deaths in the KLA press releases frequently specify that the civilians
killed were women, children, and the elderly.
This congruence of the local norms with the international norms made it more likely that
the KLA would begin using human rights language and international humanitarian law language
as it pertained to the protection of civilians in their discourse. The congruence is also reflected in
how members of the KLA described how they felt about their struggle. For example, Rexhep
Selimi, one of the founding members of the KLA, said he was very proud to belong to a group
that did not kill children. He also thought that while the soldiers had justification for revenge, as
many had lost families, their revenge would not be taken out on civilians. He said: “I am
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The Kanun of Leke Dukagjini was a set of traditional laws, first codified in the fifteenth century, which was
transmitted orally for generations until transcribed in the early twentieth century.
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convinced that the only order that [my troops] would reject is if we asked them to kill ordinary
civilians.”123
Unusually, he had an opportunity to voice these beliefs with other rebel groups:
After the war, I was invited to attend a conference given by the Geneva Academy for
Humanitarian Law and Human Rights, along with a number of leaders from other rebel
groups. I was invited to speak about my experience with the KLA. In the break, two
Tamil soldiers asked me what our secret of success was. I asked them “Do you kill
civilians? Do you kill women and children?” When they said “Yes,” (a little
shamefacedly), I told them they are going to lose.124
Another group in Kosovo that pursued violent resistance against the Serbian state was the
National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo (LKCK). The LKCK joined forces with the
KLA in 1998, but prior to their merger, had a similar approach to violence against civilians.
Valon Murati, a member of the LKCK, and later the KLA said: “A liberation organization should
not target civilians—this attitude prevailed wherever the LKCK was strong.” Murati argued that
targeting civilians and using terrorist tactics never achieved results, and did not end in victory.
“We had nothing against the Serb population—they are equally manipulated by the state.”125 It is
notable that both groups pursing violence in Kosovo at the same time had the same approach to
violence against civilians. This provides another possible link to the congruence of local norms
with international ones.
It should be noted, however, that if asked directly from where the basis of this norm came
from, it was difficult for the soldiers to pinpoint a source. Selimi said that he believed that the
idea was not something that came upon them spontaneously, but “maybe, it was something
spiritual.”126 Albin Kurti, who worked with Adem Demaci when the latter was the political
spokesman for the KLA, said: “The main reason why the KLA wouldn’t attack civilians was
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their character, formed by history.”127 And Murati listed among his sources of inspiration Frantz
Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth.
Change of discourse over time: The LTTE from 1993 – 2007
Similar to the KLA, one can argue that the LTTE also went through an Underground
Period, an Emergent Period, and a Mature Period. The Underground Period lasted from the
group’s founding until 1983. Activities during this Underground Period were limited to the
establishment of a strong network, fundraising (at times through robberies), and attacks on
policemen and civilians thought not to be supportive of the LTTE. In many ways the
Underground Periods for both the KLA and the LTTE were similar. This Underground Period
came to an end with an ambush of Sri Lankan soldiers in July 1983, when the LTTE emerged
from the shadows and began the so-called First Eelam War. The second period, or the Emergent
Period, extends from 1983 with this first major attack until 1999, when the conflict transitioned
from a guerrilla war to a more traditional conflict, with set-piece battles, and both sides entering
battles with thousands of combatants and heavy weaponry. The Mature Period lasted from 2000
until the end of the war in 2009, when the LTTE suffered comprehensive defeat. The period
under consideration is from 1993 until 2007, which are the years from which the texts of the
Annual Hero’s Day speech by Prabhakaran are available publicly. Therefore, only half of the
Emergent Period can be analyzed, and none of the Underground Period.
The Emergent Period: June 1993 – 1999
During this period, the LTTE was fully established as a fighting force and had taken on
the Sri Lankan army in numerous offensives. The years between 1987 and 1990 also saw
fighting in the Northeast area of Sri Lanka between the LTTE and the Indian army, which
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deployed a peacekeeping force to the island. During these years, the LTTE also demonstrated
their reach beyond their territory with two high profile assassinations of heads of state: former
Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in 1991 and Sri Lankan President Ranasinghe Premadasa in
1993. On the governance front, the LTTE had begun establishing a civil administration in the
territory it controlled. In 1994, a third round of peace talks between the LTTE and the
government was initiated, but, like the first two rounds in 1985 and 1989/1990, it ended in
failure. The Third Eelam War was launched in 1995.
The speeches in 1993 and 1994 are focused primarily on presenting the cause of the
LTTE as a fight for freedom, or a war of liberation. There are no mentions of human rights or
international humanitarian law in these speeches. Prabhakaran does talk about the deaths of
LTTE fighters, and celebrates these deaths, but does not frame this loss of life as a violation of
human rights: “Our heroes have sacrificed their lives for a just cause. Their demise does not
constitute an ordinary event of death. Rather, their death signifies a profound spiritual aspiration
for national freedom” (Hero’s Day Speech, November 1993).
In 1995, the peace talks with the Kumaratunga government collapsed, and the Sri Lankan
army made a significant push into LTTE territory. By December of that year, they had captured
the LTTE stronghold of Jaffna. The heavy toll on civilians is referred to in the speech, which
invokes the norms of international humanitarian law: “This war is not, as the government
claims, against the LTTE. This war is against the Tamil people, against the Tamil nation. […]
The strategic objective of this war is to annihilate the national identity of the Tamils by
destroying their life and property and their land and resources” (Hero’s Day Speech, November
1995).
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Prabhakaran also points to the LTTE’s good treatment of prisoners of war: “To promote
the peace process, we released the prisoners of war as a gesture of goodwill” (Hero’s Day
Speech, November 1995).
Starting in 1996, there are mentions of human rights violations for the first time. These
continue over the next few years with growing intensity, reaching a peak in 1998. These years
were also years of heavy fighting. However, not all the human rights references are to violations
of the right to life, which may indicate a broader interest in using human rights language at this
time beyond just mentioning losses due to the intensity of fighting. At same time, however, there
does not appear to be a matching increase in references to international humanitarian law.
In 1996, the speech highlights the Sri Lankan government’s use of torture, arbitrary arrest
and detention, and violation of the right to life, and makes claims that the government was
pursuing a genocidal policy: “The incidents of arrests, detention, torture, rape, murder,
disappearances and the discovery of the disappeared in mass graves reveal that a covert
genocidal policy is practiced in the army controlled areas” (Hero’s Day Speech, November
1996).
In 1997, the human rights violations mentioned are of a different category—economic,
social, and cultural—in addition to the core human rights violations:
The planned annexation of the traditional lands of the Tamils, the denial of their
linguistic rights, the deprivation of their educational and employment opportunities, the
disruption of their social and economic existence, the destruction of their natural
resources and the mass extermination of the Tamils during riots and military campaigns
indicate a genocidal policy (Hero’s Day Speech, November 1997).
In 1998, human rights become a significant part of the speech, with 11 separate mentions
during the course of the speech. Prabhakaran tries to draw international attention to the human
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rights situation in Sri Lanka, pointing out that human rights atrocities in other parts of the world
get far more attention.
Atrocities and injustices committed against the Tamil people for the last several decades
have been well-documented and submitted to international forums. […] The civilized
world has always given primacy to the universal value of human rights and freedoms.
What dismays us is that the countries which lead the civilized world are reluctant to raise
their voices against the uncivilized forms of oppression unleashed against the Tamils.
[…] One day the truths that are buried deeply in the mass graves of Tamil Eelam will
emerge from slumber and reveal the true face of Sinhala chauvinism (Hero’s Day Speech,
November 1998).
In 1999 Prabhakaran offers a human rights rationale for the goals of the LTTE: “The antiTamil racist political system—which totally disregards human rights and liberties—offers no
alternatives to the Tamils other than to fight, secede, and establish an independent Tamil state”
(Hero’s Day Speech, November 1999).
At no point in these speeches are there any references to human rights abuses or international
humanitarian law norm violations committed by the LTTE, despite attacks on civilians during
this time in bombings in Colombo and massacres in villages. The LTTE is not trying to explain
or justify their own violations—they simply make no mention of them. The increase in the use of
the human rights language towards the end of this period does not appear to be directly
connected to events on the ground. For example, there are no specific mentions of attacks in
particular areas or on particular days. This may be a function of the nature of the speech, which
is more of an annual summary of where the LTTE stands, rather than an indication that the
human rights language is adopted for another reason. However, the efforts in 1998 and 1999 to
draw the attention of outside actors to the human rights situation of the Tamils by referencing
human rights violations in other countries would indicate that these references are strategic, and
show an awareness of the importance of human rights discourse and norms at the international
level.
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The Mature Period: 2000 – 2009
During this period, the LTTE and the government of Sri Lanka agreed to a ceasefire and
engaged in peace negotiations mediated by Norwegian intermediaries between 2000 and 2003.
However, the inflow of international aid following the tsunami altered the delicate balance
between the government of Sri Lanka and the LTTE and, over time, both parties resumed
fighting. The Sri Lankan government defeated the LTTE forces in May 2009.
The use of human rights language varied considerably during this period. There were no
references at all in some years, while there were peaks at the beginning of the period in 2001
(eight mentions a year) and towards the end in 2007 with 16 mentions. Use of international
humanitarian law norms are overall much lower, not rising above three mentions in any one year.
The year 2000 was a year of significant fighting, and yet, there were few mentions of
human rights and humanitarian law norms in the annual November speech. Already in
negotiations mediated by the Norwegian government, Prabhakaran in this speech positions the
LTTE as a legitimate actor, seeking liberation from an occupation of alien forces. The one
mention of international humanitarian law paints the LTTE as abiding by these norms, and
therefore as a legitimate actor, while the Sri Lankan government portrays the LTTE as an
illegitimate terrorist organization. “Tamil Eelam war is conducted within the norms of
international humanitarian law pertaining to armed conflict. But the Sri Lanka government has
been deliberately distorting the nature of this war and its evolutionary historical background and
debasing it as a phenomenon of ‘terrorism’ ” (Hero’s Day Speech, November 2000).
In 2001, following the September 11 Al Qaeda attacks in New York and Washington
D.C., most of the speech is devoted to portraying the LTTE as a freedom movement, not a
terrorist organization. There are, however, also numerous mentions of human rights violations on
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the part of the Sri Lankan government alongside this effort to reframe the conflict in Sri Lanka
away from terrorism: “[The Sri Lankan] government, holding one of the highest records of
human rights violations amounting to genocide, has now joined the international alliance against
terrorism” (Hero’s Day Speech, November 2001).
After this point, human rights language faded from the speeches until another peak in
2007, when the Sri Lankan government began its two year military engagement to crush the
LTTE. This is the only period in which the number of references to international humanitarian
law norms is greater than those to human rights norms. Most of these references are to the
behavior of the Sri Lankan forces as occupation forces and their behavior towards local civilians.
In 2007, as the Sri Lankan army began its onslaught, Prabhakaran again used human
rights language.
The Sinhala state’s war of genocide destroyed the peaceful life of the Tamils. […] The
unjust war, the economic blockade, the restrictions on our people’s freedom of
movement, the killing of thousands, the displacement of hundreds of thousands, have all
deeply wounded the Tamil psyche. […] The Rajapakse regime, after unilaterally
abrogating the ceasefire agreement, is ruthlessly implementing its military plan to remove
the contiguity of the Tamil homeland. It has killed and disappeared thousands of our
people (Hero’s Day Speech, November 2007).
Another significant theme of this speech was the appeal to outside actors to step in and
reignite the peace process, coupled with the suggestion that the Sri Lankan government was
responsible for co-opting the peace process, undermining the efforts of outside organizations.
The speech also indicates an understanding of international norms at the state level and the
connection between human rights, outside actors, and outcomes in other countries, including
Kosovo. For example:
The world’s powers, even while taking forward their own geo-political interests, respect
human rights and democratic institutions. That is why nations like East Timor and
Montenegro broke free of their subjugation and gained their freedom with the help and
support of the international community. Even now, the international community
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continues to work for the freedom of nations like Kosovo (Hero’s Day Speech,
November 2007).
Congruence of human rights and international humanitarian law with local culture in northern
Sri Lanka
In contrast with the KLA, the LTTE did not draw on a traditional culture with
proscriptions for the taking of life. Indeed, there is evidence that the norms within the LTTE
were focused on the celebration of death—from the adoption of the cyanide capsules, to the
central role suicide bombing played in the struggle, to the creation of new burial ceremonies (see
Roberts 2006; Hopgood 2006; and Weiss 2012). The Tamil cause required a high level of
devotion from its followers, and Tamil areas under the control of the LTTE were asked to
sacrifice everything for the struggle. There were also significant areas of difference between the
norms espoused by the LTTE and the international human rights community, one being the use
of child soldiers. This would indicate that the LTTE would be less likely than the KLA to adopt
international norms of human rights and protection of civilians into their discourse, or to do so
less consistently.
The KLA and the LTTE
Overall, there are micro-level fluctuations as the discourse of the groups relates to events
on the ground, particularly visible in the case of the KLA, whose frequency of press releases and
speeches in the last six months of the conflict in Kosovo allows for a more finely grained weekby-week analysis. There is also a shift observed in the use of human rights and IHL norms as
objectives shift over time, showing the adaptive, strategic nature of the use of these norms in the
discourse of rebel groups.
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Knowledge and use of conventions
A key indicator of the extent to which a rebel group demonstrates its understanding of
human rights law and international humanitarian law is the frequency with which specific
conventions or treaties are mentioned in the discourse. And in addition to being able to frame the
conflict in terms of the concepts expressed in the human rights or humanitarian law conventions,
citing them correctly indicates a deeper understanding of the differences. The absence of
references to conventions in a group’s discourse, however, does not necessarily indicate the lack
of knowledge of the conventions. It may indicate simply that the group is not demonstrating its
knowledge publicly.
The two groups show a significant difference in this area. The KLA shows a pattern of
increasing understanding and use of the conventions in their discourse over time, to the point
where it becomes a noteworthy part of their discourse by the end of the war. The LTTE refer to
treaties or conventions only three times over the course of the fifteen years under observation.
The KLA and conventions
Over the course of the conflict, the KLA made references to conventions and treaties 95
times. Of these, the vast majority, or 69 (73%), were direct references to international
humanitarian law, either the Geneva Conventions specifically or to the laws of war in general.
Only one was a direct reference to a human rights convention. The remaining 25 mentions were
to unspecified international conventions.
The chart below (Chart 4.2: KLA use of conventions and treaties in the discourse) shows
the references over the course of the conflict. Three different types of references to conventions
are measured: first, references to international conventions in general; second, references to
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specific human rights conventions; and third, references to the international humanitarian law
treaties, namely the Geneva Conventions, Hague Conventions, or the laws of war.
The first reference by the KLA to conventions or treaties is not made until October 1997.
It is a reference to the laws of war. And it is not until October 1998 that we see significant
numbers of these specific references. In the first reference, the KLA states: “The occupiers are
taking revenge with violence and never-before-seen terror against the unprotected and unarmed
civilian population. With this barbaric action, Serbia is breaking the international laws of war”
(Communiqué 37, October 23, 1997).
Human rights activists have suggested that the KLA was aware of human rights
conventions, for example, one human rights activist at a leading human rights organization in
Kosovo, Behgjet Shala, said: “most people in the KLA had a basic understanding of human
rights. In the war they knew there were international instruments which had to be respected.”128
However, from the data in Chart 4.2 it is clear that the KLA only demonstrated their knowledge
after October 1997, and the demonstration of the knowledge increases significantly over time.

128

Author interview with Behgjet Shala, Director of the Kosova Helsinki Committee for Human Rights,
Pristina, Kosovo, October 2010.
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Chart 4.2: KLA use of treaties and conventions in the discourse
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It is noteworthy that the OSCE KVM, tasked with verifying a cease-fire between the two
sides, appears on the ground on October 24, 1998. As argued in Chapter 3, this occurs during a
key turning point when the KLA felt the need to increase their legitimacy with local and outside
actors. In the month of October 1998, there are significant increases in the use of conventions
and treaties in the KLA discourse.
At this point, towards the end of 1998, the KLA was recognized by international actors as
a legitimate fighting force, and was dealing directly with international actors on the ground on a
regular basis. It is likely that the interaction between the OSCE KVM and the troops on the
ground, and the implications of that interaction (namely, that the KLA was gaining international
recognition as a legitimate party to a conflict), prompted increased diffusion of the language of
humanitarian law and highlighted the implications of the recognition of the KLA as a legitimate
actor. Members of the KVM interacting with the KLA were well-versed in both human rights
law and international humanitarian law.129 However, as noted by the staff of the mission, the
KLA rarely exhibited detailed knowledge of human rights in interviews with the member of the
KVM. The Deputy Director of Human Rights for OSCE/KVM explained: “Clearly [the KLA]
felt ‘victimized’ as a collective community and the violent insurgency was a final resort to the
abuses of the Serbs, however, in my experience they did not use human rights language to either
describe theirs (or their community’s) treatment at the hands of the Serbs or their own treatment
of their opponent.”130
One example of a press release from November 1998 mentions conventions in general,
but demonstrates little detailed knowledge of the conventions: “Self-restraint was announced, not
because we are under any obligation from an agreement, but out of respect for international
129
130

Interview with Stephanie Blair, Deptuty Director of Human Rights, OSCE KVM, August 2013.
Ibid.
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conventions and to leave scope for politicians and diplomats to achieve a stable and peaceful
political settlement in Kosova” (Communiqué 62, November 14, 1998).131
When the KLA references the international humanitarian law conventions, they appear to
have a good grasp of the conventions, particularly the need to protect civilians during violence.
Most of their references are in response to attacks by Serbian forces, and the KLA is at pains to
point out that the Serbian side is violating the laws of war: “Being unable to catch our Army
units, the occupiers are taking revenge with violence and never-before-seen terror against the
unprotected and unarmed civilian population. With this barbaric action, Serbia is breaking the
international laws of war” (Communiqué Number 37, October 23, 1997).
There are fewer examples of the KLA announcing that their activities abided by the rules
in the Geneva Conventions as they pertain to the behavior of non-state actors towards civilians
and prisoners, but these do appear. For example, the KLA notes their activities to help protect
civilians on 21 occasions. In August, 1998, they state: “Our strategic withdrawal in order to
protect the civilian population was successful” (Political Declaration Number 7, August 13,
1998).
For the KLA, their image of a group fighting a good, clean fight was of utmost
consequence. One KLA press officer stated: “The important thing was that the KLA was not a
terrorist organization. We were fighting a clean war.”132
The increasing sophistication in the use of the conventions of international humanitarian
law in the discourse of the KLA may be linked to their attempts, over the course of the last year
of their struggle, to be seen as a legitimate organization with a formal hierarchy which was in
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Translation provided by the BBC.
Interview with Ardian Gjini, Press Officer for the KLA in the Dukagjini region, Pristina, Kosovo, October

2010.
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contrast to their image as more loosely-linked bands of rural fighters. The KLA repeatedly
emphasized their restructuring, which began in June 1998, as an indication of their status as the
legitimate fighting force of the Albanian Kosovar people. It was also under pressure from outside
organizations, such as HRW, to adhere to internationally accepted codes of conduct. For
example, HRW reported meeting with KLA’s Hashim Thaçi and Fatmire Limaj, in November
1998, to discuss the KLA’s commitment to the laws of war, and, specifically, the treatment of
Serbian civilians in KLA custody (Human Rights Watch 2001). In addition, towards the end of
the conflict, and coinciding with a significant increase in the use of humanitarian law
conventions in the discourse, the KLA attracted a number of professional soldiers to their ranks,
including Agim Çeku, who joined the KLA in February 1999, and was made Chief of General
Staff of the KLA in April of that year.
In terms of demonstrated knowledge of human rights conventions, there is only one
reference to a specific human rights convention. In March 1999, there is a reference to the
Convention to Eliminate Racial Discrimination (Broadcast, Radio Kosova e Lire, March 12,
1999). The lack of references to human rights conventions is notable, particularly in light of the
extensive grassroots human rights monitoring activity throughout Kosovo during this period, as
well as the crossover between some of these local human rights organizations and the KLA. For
example, the KLA Spokesman from August 1998 until the Rambouillet talks, Adem Demaci,
was the co-founder of one of the leading human rights organizations in Kosovo from the early
1990s onwards, Council for the Defense of Human Rights and Freedoms of the People of
Kosovo.
The final group of 25 references to conventions is broader and reference either
conventions in general, or, more vaguely, “documents of the UN.” For example, the following
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reference is vague as to which conventions it cites: “In accordance with the known and
sanctioned norms in the Charter and documents of the UN” (Communiqué 45, March 12, 1998).
Other references also conflate human rights and international humanitarian law: “The KLA has,
for a long time, declared that it respects all the war and peace conventions of the international
community” (Political Declaration number 10, September 27, 1998).
It is possible that these were intended to reference human rights documents, such as the
UDHR, but without the concrete citation, it is impossible to determine the level of knowledge of
the speaker. It is more likely that while the speaker knew conventions existed, he was unable to
cite the specific convention itself.
The LTTE and conventions
In contrast with the KLA, the LTTE mentioned conventions or treaties only a
handful of times during the period under examination (1993 to 2007). Of those, the most
frequent reference was not to human rights law or humanitarian law, but to the right of
self-determination. For example, the one mention of the UN Charter references the right
of self-determination: “The objective of our struggle is based on the concept of selfdetermination as articulated in the UN Charter and other instruments” (Hero’s Day
Speech, November 2002).
On Hero’s Day in 2000, Prabhakaran gives his only reference to international
humanitarian law in a speech in which he attempts to refute the characterization of the
LTTE as a terrorist organization, by presenting the group as a group legitimately
struggling for self-determination: “As a nation entitled to the right to self-determination,
our people reserve the right to defend themselves by armed struggle against State
oppression of genocidal proportions. Therefore, the Tamil Eelam war is conducted within
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the norms of international humanitarian law pertaining to armed conflict” (Hero’s Day
Speech, 2000).
While it is possible to see a development in the sophistication of the KLA’s use of
conventions in their speech, this is not the case with the LTTE. This may be for a number
of reasons. First, that the KLA was interacting with outside actors on a frequent basis
from October 1998 onwards, and recognized that these outside actors saw the use of
conventions in discourse as a marker of legitimacy. The LTTE’s interaction with outside
actors waxed and waned and it may be that there was no consistent pressure to
incorporate these conventions into the discourse; second, the KLA was undergoing
structural changes, becoming increasingly hierarchical, which may have led to increases
in the knowledge base of individuals engaged in public statements. The LTTE did not
undergo significant changes in its structural hierarchy, and all the speeches were made by
the same individual. Finally, the normative environment of the KLA demonstrated higher
levels of congruity with international norms than the LTTE, which may have made the
KLA more eager to demonstrate their knowledge of the conventions articulating those
norms.
Which human rights and humanitarian law norms?
The discourse can be analyzed by types of references to international humanitarian law
and human rights law to further parse exactly what the groups were talking about when they use
international humanitarian law and human rights norms in their discourse.
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The KLA by types of reference
Turning first to the KLA, the table below (Table 4.3: Humanitarian law norm references,
by issue) shows the references to different specific norms within international humanitarian law
from June 1995 until June 1999.
Table 4.3: Humanitarian law norm references by the KLA, by issue
Humanitarian law issue

Number of references

Percentage of total

Serbs harming civilians

130

45%

Humanitarian law conventions

69

24%

KLA harming civilians

42

15%

Protection of civilians

21

7%

KLA treatment of prisoners of war

19

7%

Serbian treatment of prisoners of war

7

2%

288

100%

Total Humanitarian law references

Source: Data were extracted from the KLA documents listed in Appendix 2.

The majority of the references (45%) accuse the Serbs of harming civilians during the
conflict. By comparison, the references to the KLA abiding by the laws of war comprise only
14% of the total references (including the two issues of protection of civilians and the treatment
of prisoners of war by the KLA). Thus, the KLA spent far more energy on depicting the Serbs as
violators of the Geneva Conventions than they did claiming they were adhering to them. Indeed,
an additional 42 references (or 15% of the total, approximately the same number of references as
those showing the KLA to be abiding) were references to the KLA harming civilians: either
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taking credit for assassinations of Albanian individuals seen as collaborating with the other side,
or for the death of Serbian policemen, of whom the KLA hoped to make an example.
As noted above, the amount of attention given to the protection of civilians is relatively
small, only 7% of the total. This is surprising given the amount of attention paid to the issue of
Serbs harming civilians.
Some attention is given to the treatment of prisoners of war. A total of 9% of the
references are to this issue, with the number of references to how the KLA was treating its
Serbian POWs being significantly larger than references to how the Serbian army was treating
KLA POWs. The majority of these references are to one incident of prisoner-taking by the KLA
in January 1999, when eight Serbian soldiers were taken prisoner, and subsequently released
after negotiations facilitated by KVM. The KLA emphasized how this incident showed that the
KLA was a legitimate fighting force, ready to shoulder a political role at the end of the conflict.
The Albanian people and the KLA more than once have given pragmatic examples that
they stand for a political solution to Kosovo’s problem. Is there a better example than to
set free eight soldiers of the most criminal army of Europe? Is there a greater generosity?
Is there better evidence that the Albanian people and the KLA do not want to take
people’s lives even when they are soldiers of the invading army? (Political Declaration of
the KLA, Number 23, January 17, 1999)
The chart below (Chart 4.3: KLA references to international humanitarian law, by issue)
demonstrates the distribution of the issues of international humanitarian law.
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Chart 4.3: KLA references to international humanitarian law, by issue
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Source: Data were extracted from the KLA documents listed in Appendix 2.

Turning to human rights categories, the majority of the references to human rights are to
the right to life, with 131 out of the total 253 references, or 51% of the total, in this category (see
Table 4.4: Human rights references by the KLA, by issue, and Chart 4.4: KLA references to
human rights issues as a percentage of total human rights references, below).
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Table 4.4: Human rights references by the KLA, by issue
Human rights issue

Number of
references

Percentage of
total

Right to Life

131

51%

Arbitrary arrest and detention

56

22%

General human rights

42

17%

Genocide

14

6%

Torture

5

2%

Economic, social and cultural
rights

4

2%

Human rights conventions

1

0%

253

100%

Total Human rights mentions

Source: Data were extracted from the KLA documents listed in Appendix 2.

The other large, single category is arbitrary arrest and detention, which received 56
mentions, or 22% of the total human rights references. Torture, a powerful human rights norm to
reference, gets surprisingly little attention, with only five mentions or less than 2% of all
references. This is despite accusations that the government of the Federal Republic of
Yugoslavia tortured individuals in detention, particularly military aged-men, but also boys,
throughout the conflict (see, for example, Amnesty International 1998; Amnesty International
1999a). The lack of mentions may be because some victims of torture were not released from
prisons until after the conflict, while in other cases, those who suffered violence at the hands of
the Serbian military or police but were not killed were considered somewhat fortunate. The
smallest category, even smaller than references to economic, social, and cultural rights (four
references), is to specific human rights conventions (only one reference).
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Chart 4.4: KLA references to human rights issues as a percentage of total human rights
references
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The prominence of the right to life in the discourse is comparable to the attention paid to
the Serbian forces harming civilians under humanitarian law. Essentially, these two groups of
references describe the same types of events, namely the killing of individual Albanian
Kosovars. They also make up approximately the same proportion of both humanitarian law
references and human rights references. The right to life and the prohibition against killing
civilians are the two cores of both bodies of law, and are the most shocking events to which the
KLA could draw the public’s attention. These areas of the international norms are precisely the
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area with which the local norms on the prohibition of taking the lives of women, children, and
the elderly as articulated in the Kanun have the most overlap.
On the ground, particularly during low level conflict, the distinction between these two
bodies of law and these two types of events can be hard to make. It may also rely on legal
technicalities that those involved in the day-to-day aspects of the conflict may not be best able to
determine, such as whether the overall level of fighting has reached the threshold for conflict at
which point international humanitarian law applies. In addition, in this conflict, as in others,
exactly who committed the killing may be difficult to determine, and may alter which body of
law applies. In the Kosovo conflict, for example, Serbian army troops, police forces, security
forces under the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP), and loosely integrated paramilitary
forces all participated in the attacks on civilians, sometimes together. Moreover, they sometimes
wore different uniforms or switched them, making the determination of whether these where
combat troops or regular Serbian policemen difficult, unless the participants were known to the
victims themselves (Human Rights Watch 2001). This determination also has direct bearing on
which body of law the death of a civilian falls under. For example, the death of a civilian at the
hands of the military falls under international humanitarian law, while it falls under human rights
law when at the hands of the police.
The LTTE by types of reference
Turning to the LTTE, the table below (Table 4.5: International humanitarian law
references by the LTTE, by issue) shows a pattern of references similar to that seen earlier with
the KLA: the majority of references to international humanitarian law are to the harming of
civilians by the Sri Lankan army. Nearly half of the references (48%) fall in this category. Again,
much less attention is given to how the LTTE is abiding by the laws of war, with only one
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reference each to the protection of civilians and to the treatment of prisoners of war by the
LTTE.
Table 4.5: International humanitarian law by the LTTE, by issue
Humanitarian law issue

Number of references

Percentage of total

Sri Lankan army harming civilians

12

48%

Treatment by occupying army

7

28%

Humanitarian law conventions

4

16%

Protection of civilians

1

4%

LTTE treatment of prisoners of war

1

4%

LTTE harming civilians

0

0%

Sri Lankan treatment of prisoners of
war
Total Humanitarian law references

0

0%

25

100%

Source: Data were extracted from the LTTE documents listed in Appendix 4.

One significant difference between these data and the data from the KLA is that the
LTTE refer to treatment of civilians by an occupying army seven times, while the KLA never
once refer to this aspect of international humanitarian law. The Geneva Conventions apply
whenever territory comes under the effective control of hostile foreign armed forces and outline
what the behavior of the occupying troops should be in that case.133 The use of this language by
the LTTE served to express their belief that the north-east territories of Sri Lanka were already a
separate state and to affirm that the Sri Lankan troops should be considered a foreign occupying

133

The duties of the occupying power are spelled out primarily in the 1907 Hague Regulations (articles 42-56)
and the Fourth Geneva Convention (GC IV, articles 27-34 and 47-78), as well as in certain provisions of Additional
Protocol I and customary international humanitarian law.
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army. An example of this type of reference describes the Sri Lankan military presence in
northern Sri Lanka as follows: “The military occupation is suffocating the civilian masses and
causing tensions…The occupying forces are using the civilians as their protective shields”
(Hero’s Day Speech, 2002).
In terms of human rights and the LTTE, the following table shows the distribution of
references by human rights issue (Table 4.6: International human rights references by the LTTE,
by issue). Three issues are most dominant in the discourse: the right to life (29% of total
references), genocide (29%), and general references to human rights (26%). Taken together,
these three account for 84% of the total references to human rights. References to the right to
life, as in the case with the KLA, are to Tamils being killed by the state. The focus on right to life
by the LTTE is a reflection of the dire human rights situation in Sri Lanka during the course of
the conflict. A UN report from December 1998 showed that Sri Lanka led the world in the
number of disappearances, with 77 in 1997 alone, and over 12,000 registered at that time, many
of which were later confirmed as deaths.134

134

See Report of the United Nations Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances of 28
December 1998 (UN Document E/CN.4/1999/62). “Disappearances” are defined in the UN Convention Against
Torture as “the arrest, detention, abduction or any other form of deprivation of liberty by agents of the State or by
persons or groups of persons acting with the authorization, support or acquiescence of the State, followed by a
refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty or by concealment of the fate or whereabouts of the disappeared
person, which place such a person outside the protection of the law.”
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Table 4.6: International human rights references by the LTTE, by issue
Human rights issue

Number of
references

Percentage of
total

Right to Life

19

29%

Genocide

19

29%

General human rights

17

26%

Economic, social and cultural
rights

5

8%

Torture

3

5%

Arbitrary arrest and detention

2

3%

Human rights conventions

0

0%

Total Human rights mentions

65

100%

Source: Data were extracted from the LTTE documents listed in Appendix 4.

Frequently, these references are made in conjunction with accusations of genocide
against the Sri Lankan government. For example, in 1996, the LTTE accused the Sri
Lankan government of pursuing a policy of genocide alongside accusations of numerous
human rights violations, including murder (a right to life violation): “The incidents of
arrests, detention, torture, rape, murder, disappearances and the discovery of the
disappeared in mass-graves reveal that a covert genocidal policy is practiced in the army
controlled areas” (Hero’s Day Speech, November 1996).
The relative lack of references to torture (5%) is surprising given that torture was
allegedly one of the most common human rights violations in Sri Lanka during the conflict
(Amnesty International 1999b). This rate is similar to the rate observed in Kosovo, and may
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likewise be because torture typically occurs in private settings (within prisons or detention), and
as a result may be less visible and less known to the public than other human rights violations.
One human rights issue in Sri Lanka to which Prabhakaran makes no reference in his
annual speeches is the issue of child soldiers. Children had been actively recruited and used in
the LTTE battalions since the earliest days of the conflict (Gunaratna 1998). As a result, the
LTTE was under significant pressure to curb this practice from international groups, such as
HRW, and from international organizations, such as the United Nations Children’s Fund
(UNICEF). The LTTE made repeated public pronouncements about ending recruitment and use
of child soldiers in May 1998, February 2001, and January 2003.135 Finally, a commitment by
both the LTTE and the Sri Lankan government, the Action Plan for Children Affected by War,
was signed in 2003. This agreement was negotiated by UNICEF. It provided for ways for
children to be released from duty as soldiers (Human Rights Watch 2004). In the annual
speeches, no mention is made of child soldiers—an indication that this human rights issue had no
or little resonance with his intended audience. As demonstrated by the continued use of child
soldiers up until the end of the conflict in 2008, there was no congruence with this norm and
local norms.
To sum up, both the KLA and the LTTE focused on the most extreme form of violations,
namely deaths of civilians at the hands of the state during the conflicts. References to events
described by each group can be seen as references to both human rights violations and violations
of international humanitarian law. On the whole and with regard to humanitarian law issues,
both groups focused on showing how the state was violating this body of law, rather than on how
135

In May 1998, the UN Under-Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict, Olara Otunnu, secured a
pledge from the LTTE not to use children under 18 in combat; in February 2001, the LTTE made the same pledge to
UNICEF deputy director, Andre Roberfroid; and in Janaury 2003, UNICEF executive director, Carol Bellamy, met
with the LTTE (Human Rights Watch 2004).
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they themselves were abiding by the body of law. Protection of civilians was mentioned
relatively infrequently by either party, as was the treatment of prisoners of war. After the right to
life, the other human rights issue frequently mentioned was genocide, particularly by the LTTE,
who tried to paint the Sri Lankan government as having a genocidal policy towards Tamils in Sri
Lanka. Two human rights issues, torture and arbitrary arrest and detention, are not appealed to
very much by either group, despite being well documented during both conflicts. This may
indicate a preference by the groups to draw attention to the most shocking and visible types of
violations.

4.3 Conclusions
Overall, it seems that rebel groups are making use of the international norms of human
rights and international humanitarian law in their discourse. There are similarities in the patterns
of usage of these norms between the two rebel groups under analysis, as well as significant
differences. The similarities include the types of human rights violations and international
humanitarian law issues cited: in both cases, the groups referred to the loss of human life and the
death of civilians most frequently. Another similarity was that human rights references were on
the whole more prevalent than international humanitarian law references, despite the apparent
convergence on a common issue—namely the loss of civilian lives.
In terms of the arc of norms usage for the KLA, there was a lag before the KLA began
using either human rights norms or international humanitarian law to frame their conflict, but
once they did, the usage of these international norms increased to become a significant part of
their discourse. At the beginning of the period under consideration, the Underground Period, the
KLA made no references to human rights or international humanitarian law, and demonstrated
no real understanding of either of these international norms. Indeed, they take credit for human
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rights abuses and war crimes, indicating a failure to see these norms as relevant to their struggle.
By the Emergent Period, the KLA had begun using human rights language. This period also saw
a swing towards improved public perception of the KLA. In the Mature Period, the KLA began
to use these international norms with dual purpose, both in a critique of Serbian troops and to
bolster their legitimacy. An important theme to notice in the discourse of the KLA at this time is
the emergence of the frame which presented the KLA as a group which did not attack civilians.
This frame developed during the Emergent Period and grew to be part of the essential identity
that the KLA presented to the public.
The arc of norm usage for the LTTE is less straightforward. The LTTE had three
different peaks in the number of references of human rights norms and international
humanitarian law norms, in 1998, 2001, and 2007. One of these occurred in 1998, and coincides
with the increase in the references of these norms by the KLA. It is possible that both groups
were responding in the same way to changes at the international level, such as the increase of
enforceability measures, and were presenting their struggles in the most favorable way they
could by incorporating human rights language and international humanitarian law norms.
The LTTE referred to international humanitarian law norms with much less frequency
than to human rights norms, and their use does not appear to be connected to human rights norms
in the same way that they are with the KLA. It is likely that the LTTE felt less need than the
KLA to be taken seriously as a fighting force by referencing international humanitarian law,
given the size and structure of the force that the LTTE had established. The KLA, on the other
hand, struggled to be seen as more than a diffuse, unstructured group of untrained fighters, and
their adoption of international humanitarian law into their language was a way to signal that they
were a more sophisticated fighting force. In addition, there was less congruence between the
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LTTE’s local norms regarding the protection of civilians than seen in the case of Kosovo, where
local norms reinforce the idea of protecting certain categories of civilians.
Demonstrated knowledge of conventions and use of specific norms
The analysis of the use of conventions in the discourse provides a closer look at how firm
a grasp the leaders of the groups have on the specifics of human rights norms and humanitarian
law. On this issue there is a significant difference between the KLA and the LTTE. The KLA
mentioned conventions fairly frequently, while the LTTE hardly do so at all. The KLA referred
to the Geneva conventions (or the laws of war) the most, but only made one reference to a
human rights convention. The increase in the use of the international humanitarian law
conventions occurs during the period when the KLA was struggling to be seen as a legitimate
political actor and knowledge of the Geneva Conventions might be a tool to demonstrate this
legitimacy with international actors with whom they were interacting. The LTTE only referenced
conventions four times during the 15 years under analysis, and showed little change over this
time.
The analysis of which specific norms or violations drew the most attention from the rebel
groups revealed that both groups focused on violations by the government forces, rather than on
depicting themselves as abiding by the same laws. Regarding international humanitarian law, the
focus was on the protection of civilians, primarily on the government forces’ violation of this
norm. The KLA pointed to Serb forces harming civilians seven times more frequently than they
mentioned the efforts of the KLA to protect civilians. The human rights references were
overwhelmingly to the loss of life, but mentions of arbitrary arrest and detention made up a
significant percentage of the references. The LTTE similarly focused on the Sri Lankan
government forces harming civilians, the loss of life and genocide. In both cases, there were
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surprisingly few mentions of torture, a relatively strong international norm, which may be a
result of how torture is a hidden phenomenon, the full extent of which may not be known during
the heat of a conflict. The focus on the state was part of an overall strategy to delegitimize the
state and its actions; however, the timing of the peaks in the discourse also indicate the
international norms were used at points when it was vital for the group to be seen as legitimate
by outside actors.
The similarities between which specific norms are used most frequently in the discourse
and the situations that they describe does suggest, however, that there might be an additional
complication: confusion on the part of the speaker over the differences between human rights
law and international humanitarian law. In the example of the KLA, both human rights norms
and international humanitarian law were drawn on frequently to describe the same incident,
indicating that either the distinction between the bodies of law was not clear to the speaker or
that there were strategic reasons for using both at the same time. The use of humanitarian law
language appeals to one type of audience, and offers certain types of benefits, while the use of
human rights language matters to a different audience and offers alternate benefits. Humanitarian
law language supports the perception that a group was of equal status as an adversary to the
government forces, while the use of human rights language emphasizes the identity of the dead
as victims. As Donnelly contends, “human rights is the language of the victims and the
dispossessed” (Donnelly 2006: 20).
Both of these frames would be useful at different times, from a strategic point of view. In
addition, while pointing out that humanitarian law violations were occurring might help with the
status of a group as a political challenger, a fighting force, no outside state will intervene
militarily to stop these. Human rights abuses, however, are another matter. The norm of
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humanitarian intervention, that is, military intervention to halt human rights abuses in another
state, was emerging during the 1990s, and was ultimately used to provide legitimacy for
intervening in one of the cases at hand, Kosovo.
One possible explanation for the use of human rights discourse by these rebel groups
might be that they started to use human rights language at a time when human rights discourse
itself was introduced to the country. However, the evidence presented in this chapter indicates
that this is not a particularly strong explanation. For example, human rights language in Kosovo
was present in the discourse of groups in the early 1990s, significantly prior to when the KLA
began incorporating this language into its discourse. In addition, a number of KLA soldiers had
been involved in human rights activism in Kosovo from the early 1990s onwards, before joining
the KLA, but the use of human rights language by the KLA as a whole comes much later.
Another possible explanation is in the connection of these norms in the discourse to local
events, such as particularly egregious actions by the government troops or police force. In the
case of the KLA, there is fluctuation in the use of the norm with local events: there is an increase
in human rights and international humanitarian law language at or around the time of specific
massacres, such as the Recak massacre in January 1999. However, the connection is not always
as close. For example, there are also other massacres, such as the attack on the Jashari family in
Prekaz in March 1998, which did not provoke spikes in human rights or humanitarian law
language. This would suggest that the other variables, such as the importance of the presence of
outside actors, and the importance of the resonance of the international norm locally, are also
important in determining how and when international norms are incorporated into the rebel
groups’ discourse.
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A third explanation, emphasizing the influence of outside actors, would suggest that
increases in human rights and humanitarian law norms would follow after periods of significant
interaction between rebel groups and international actors. In the case of Kosovo, there is a
significant increase in the use of these norms, particularly international humanitarian law norms,
in November 1998, the same time as there is a large jump in the numbers of international actors
on the ground dealing directly with the KLA. This was the period in which the KLA was
engaged in negotiating a ceasefire and was having repeated interactions with diplomats, OSCE
monitors, and international human rights advocates (e.g., HRW). However, as mentioned above,
the increase in the use of these norms first begins in the fall of 1997, predating much of the
intense activity of the international actors.
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Chapter 5: “We were fighting a clean war”: Rebel groups and the
norm against the practice of terrorism
Rebel groups, insurgencies, and armed opposition groups are frequently labeled terrorists
by the states they oppose. While there is no agreed upon definition of what constitutes acts of
terrorism and states and academics alike struggle to define the concept, it is clear that being
labeled a terrorist group has consequences for that group, both politically and financially. The
label undermines its legitimacy at home and abroad, and as a result, groups find the need to
contest that label and do so in a variety of ways.
This chapter examines the use of the norm against terrorism in the discourse of two
groups: the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE),
and analyzes the pattern of usage in the context of the events on the ground during each group’s
struggle. It analyzes to what extent the evidence for the use of the term terrorism in the discourse
of the two groups helps answer the central questions of this work: whether the groups use the
international norm strategically to boost their legitimacy; whether the norms against terrorism are
reinforced by the presence of outside actors; whether the degree of hierarchical structure alters
how the discourse is used; and, finally, whether differences in local normative culture can
explain differences in the use of norms between groups.
In this chapter, the evidence presented shows that both the KLA and the LTTE expend
energy to avoid defining themselves as terrorists or being defined by others as terrorists. Both
groups are, therefore, aware of the negative implications of being labeled a terrorist group—and
demonstrate an awareness of what the ensuing loss of legitimacy might mean for the group. In
addition, both groups spend considerable energy trying to portray the state as a terrorist state (in
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both cases, close to three quarters of the references to terrorism are to the state as a terrorist).
The portrayal of the state as a terrorist state is one way the groups hope to delegitimize the state
and call into question its right to continue to govern.
The analysis in this chapter further demonstrates that armed groups follow the changes in
the hegemonic discourse, and match their discourse to changes at the international level. Major
changes in discourse at the state level are reflected in changes in discourse at the non-state level.
The change in discourse of the LTTE regarding terrorism was significant in 2001 after the AlQaeda terror attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York and Washington D.C., events which
precipitated a major shift in discourse and behavior on the part of states towards terrorism. In
addition, the KLA, which began its operations in the mid-1990s, at a time when there was an
increasing move on the part of states away from supporting terrorist activities, took great pains to
point out their operations were not those of a terrorist group.
The question of why certain norms are adopted by these non-state actors and not others is
partially answered by this examination of the language of terrorism: the evidence indicates that
norm resonance does explain why the norm against terrorism is adopted into the discourse of
rebel groups. Those groups with internal normative cultures (either adopted or created) which
prohibit or condone certain activities are more likely to adopt international norms or the language
of those norms, which also prohibit or condone those activities. The different ways the KLA and
the LTTE engage with the norm against terrorism is reflective of differences in internal
normative cultures.
At a more detailed level of analysis, the changes in the discourse of these groups do
indicate that they were responding to the presence of outside actors and increased their efforts to
engage with the norm of terrorism when outside actors deemed likely to influence the outcome
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of the conflict were present. In the case of the KLA, the increases in the denial of terrorist
activities occurred at turning points for the KLA’s legitimacy: first when it was making its case
to the Kosovar people, and second, when it was imperative for the KLA to appear to be
legitimate to outside actors on the ground on two occasions: the first during the monitoring of the
ceasefire at the end of 1998, and the second, during the run up to and during the peace
negotiations in Rambouillet, France.
The analysis in this chapter does not, however, support the hypothesis that changes in the
internal structure of rebel groups toward a more hierarchical structure influences the discourse in
a positive manner. The analysis does not show a clear connection between changes in the internal
structure of the groups and the increased or diminished use of the language of terrorism in the
two groups.
This chapter will begin with an examination of what terrorism might be and the evolution
of the concept of terrorism. It then considers the changes in the norm over recent decades. The
sections which follow present data from two cases, the KLA and the LTTE, and provide a
detailed discourse analysis of how the norm against terror is used by the two groups. The chapter
concludes with a brief comparison of the two groups and the overall conclusions.

5.1 Terrorism: The evolution of the concept
Since the definition of what exactly constitutes terrorism cannot be broadly agreed upon,
the labeling of acts as terrorism, or a group as a terrorist group is not a neutral exercise of
semantics. Rather, terrorism is a political label: it is “an organizing concept that offers a moral
judgment” (Crawford 1993): 9). States typically accuse any group using violence within their
borders as a terrorist group, particularly those groups which threaten the state and state security
directly. When confronted by a separatist group, states tend to try to frame the conflict as a
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terrorist threat in order to disguise any ethno-nationalist causes of the conflict (Pokalova 2010).
The use of the terrorist label often has a prescriptive policy relevance as well as moral
connotation. For example, if a group is placed on a Terrorism Watch List it may be subject to
sanctions and suffer loss of material support. The use of the word terrorism is a political
language and it has an effect on the perceptions of the audience, and their expectations of how a
problem described as terrorism will be treated. For example, Richard Jackson’s analysis of the
discourse surrounding the so-called “war on terror” explains how the language of terror and the
use of the word terrorism have affected its American audience and policy in areas as diverse as
banking, finance, and the treatment of prisoners (Jackson 2005).
Governments have increasingly been officially designating certain groups as terrorists, a
designation which typically carries significant costs for the groups including a possible reduction
in funding, restrictions in movement of those associated with the group, and loss of legitimacy.
The US Government was the first to do so in 1997, with its Foreign Terrorist Organization list.
Other countries have followed. For example, the United Kingdom (UK) has maintained a list, the
Terrorism Act, since 2000. The European Union (EU) maintains two lists, one for groups
associated with Al-Qaeda and one for other groups. Each of these lists, while similar, do have
significant differences from the others. Beck and Miner argue that the variation in the
designation lists is more a result of social construction than a reflection of differences in the
actions by the groups themselves (Beck and Miner 2013). Comparing the lists compiled by the
US, EU and UK, Beck and Miner find only one quarter of groups designated as terrorist groups
are common to all lists, despite increasing standardization in mechanisms for the designations,
leading them to conclude that these legal classifications of terror derive more from local symbols
of threat, than actual assessments of danger.
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The notion that states can commit terrorism has been largely rejected by states
themselves, a position supported by the United Nations. The UN Secretary-General, in his 2005
report “In Larger Freedom,” stated: “It is time to set aside debates on so-called ‘state terrorism.’”
And he went on to argue that “the use of force by states is already thoroughly regulated under
international law” (United Nations 2005).136 Some scholars have agreed. For example, historian
Michael Hor states that “even when definitions of terrorism allow for state terrorism, state
actions in this area tend to be seen through the prism of war or national self-defense, not terror”
(Hor 2005: 20). For some academics focused on the field of terrorism, however, the agreement
of academics with states on this issue is a troubling development and has led to a myopic statecentric view of terrorism and violence within the field (Jackson 2008). Despite this resistance,
terrorism is a term now largely used for non-state actors, and these actors must engage with this
terminology and contest it in order to avoid the negative consequences of being labeled a
terrorist or being placed on one or more states’ terrorist lists.
Part of the confusion over the definition of terrorism stems from the constantly evolving
nature of the definition. Initially used during the French Revolution to refer to violence used as
an instrument of control to consolidate the power of the new revolutionary state, terrorism
evolved to refer to acts by non-state actors against the state, such as Gavrilo Princip’s
assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914. In the 1930’s it evolved
again to refer to the systems of repression developed by states against their own people, and was
applied to the Nazi regime in Germany, and Stalin’s regime in the Soviet Union (Hoffman 1998:
23).
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Some states do, however, still get labeled as terrorist states by other states. Israel is one state that frequently
receives this label. For example, as recently as 2012, the Turkish Prime Minister Tayyip Erdogan argued that Israel
was a terrorist state following its bombing campaign in Gaza (IHT 2012).
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After the end of World War II, it again took on revolutionary connotations, and was
applied to groups fighting colonialism. The term “freedom fighters” also gained currency during
the 40s and 50s, as members of these groups and their supporters argued that those fighting
colonial oppression were not terrorists, but fighting for their freedom. Thus, a subjective
distinction was drawn between terrorists and freedom fighters: terrorists were those who were
fighting oppression with violence, and labeled terrorists by some states, while freedom fighters
were those fighting for independence from colonialism, and labeled thusly by other states. A
number of states, particularly newly independent states, continued to offer support for those
labeled terrorists. In fact, those states considered the use of the term terrorist to be part of the
oppression exerted by stronger parties in a struggle which was, in fact, legitimate. This debate
over the use of the terms “freedom fighters” or “terrorists” continued and was at the heart of why
international organizations such as the UN were unable to address terrorism head on until the
attacks on September 11, 2001, when the debate took a back seat (Boulden and Weiss 2004).
Many struggles against colonialism (for example, in Algeria, Vietnam, and India)
justified the use of terror in the fight for self-determination. More recent examples of groups
justifying the use of terrorism as a strategy include Hamas in Israel and Palestine, and the Tamil
Tigers in Sri Lanka. Since the 1950s, however, most groups that take up violence to support their
cause try very hard to avoid being labeled as terrorists. Groups taking up violence, however, did
use and continue to use the terms terrorism and terrorist to describe the state with whom they
were fighting.
Primarily as a result of Cold War politics, the UN Security Council was unwilling to
regard terrorist acts, regardless of their severity, as a threat to peace and security until the end of
the Cold War (Saul 2005). It was not until 1985 that a UN Security Council resolution first used
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the term “terrorism.”137 This was followed by resolutions in 1988 and 1989, which treated all
acts of hostage taking and abduction as manifestations of terrorism, indicating that it was the
acts, rather than the motivations behind the acts, which the Security Council considered to be
terrorism.
During the 1990s, states began slowly developing a consensus about the illegitimate
nature of terrorism, marking the emergence of a norm at the state level prohibiting terrorism, and
which we now see occurring more vigorously in the post-September 11 world. The changes
included more engagement by the UN Security Council as it began issuing the first sanctions for
the support of terrorism against Libya in March 1992, followed by Sudan, in 1996, and the
Taliban, in 1999. Sanctions stigmatized terrorism as an illegal activity that needed international
attention and response (De Jonge Oudraat 2004: 153). Since the attacks of September 11, 2001,
the public delegitimation of terrorism has increased. States’ support of activities which can be
labeled terrorism has come under more criticism than before that date.
In sum, while there continues to be no overall consensus about the definition of terrorism,
there was a gradual change at the state level in the norm against terrorism over the course of the
1990s with increasing steps taken by states to stigmatize non-state actors using terrorism and
states supporting those actors. This change was not dramatic, but several steps, such as the
increasing use of official terrorist designation lists by states after 1997, put groups using violence
under additional pressure to avoid the label of terrorist. The pressure to do so increased
dramatically after the September 11 attacks. At the same time, states continued an effort to limit
the use of the term terrorist to apply only to non-state actors rather than to states themselves. For
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See S/RES/579 (1985) which expressed grave concern at the recent number of hostage-taking episodes
which had taken place in the previous year following the hijacking of airplanes on flights from Kuwait and Egypt,
among others.
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their part, non-state groups continued to try to use the same labels as states, and continue to try to
frame the states as terrorists, which became increasingly difficult as the anti-colonial period
waned.

5.2 Terrorism and the KLA
Overview
The KLA was accused of being a terrorist group by the Serbian government from its very
beginnings. As a group, the KLA struggled against this label and behaved as if being seen as a
terrorist group would undermine its legitimacy, both at home and abroad. The KLA came to see
themselves as a group which was fighting a clean fight, and was very conscious of the
importance of communicating that perception to outside actors. Beyond public perception,
however, being seen as a group that eschewed terrorism and terror tactics became a core identity
for the members of the KLA themselves. It is in the formation of this core identity that we can
see congruence between local norms and the norm against terrorism. Their identity as a group
that was not a terrorist group was seen as key to the legitimization process by the KLA members.
In addition, members of the KLA were very clear that they believed the actions of the group
helped shift international public opinion towards the group away from seeing it as a terrorist
organization, and that that change was central to their success.
When events occurred that could be considered the use of terrorist tactics, the KLA
would frequently deny their involvement. The denial of the events is significant because it
points to an awareness of the norm and the violation of the norm. This was true from the
beginning of the violent activities of the organization in 1995. This would indicate that the KLA
had already internalized the norm of terrorism and what it meant to be a terrorist and was trying
to take steps to ensure their behavior would not be seen as following traditional terrorist models.
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At the same time, during their active period, from mid-1995 to June 1999, in addition to
attacks on the military, the KLA’s actions led to accusations of attacking policemen and police
stations, placing explosive devices in public areas, assassinating Serbian and Albanian officials
and citizens, abducting or taking hostages, and downing an aircraft. All of these accusations
could be and were framed as terrorist activities. The Serbian government and officials from other
states (including the United States in the spring of 1998, a position from which they later
withdrew) dubbed the group a terrorist group. Typically, the KLA response was either to deny
that they, as a group, were involved in the incident, or to explain their activities as not being
terroristic in nature. The KLA often explained that their conflict was with the Serbian
government, and not with the Serbian Kosovars living and working in Kosovo.
KLA discourse analysis
The KLA made use of the concepts of terrorism and terror in their discourse throughout
the period under examination. While the frequency of use varies, the KLA introduced terrorism
into their discourse with their very first communiqué in June 1995.138 Their use of the term
terrorism in their language continues throughout the period under observation until the last days
of the open conflict in May and June 1999, when references to terror or terrorism were made in
the KLA-sponsored radio broadcasts on Radio Free Kosova (RKL). As with the analysis in the
preceding chapter, the focus of this analysis is on the changes in the use of the language of
terrorism by the KLA, not on whether, or by whom, specific acts were considered terrorism.
There are two distinct ways the concept of terrorism was used: the first was an attempt to
label the Serbian state as a terrorist regime, as part of an effort to delegitimize it; and the second
was an attempt to deny the activities of the KLA could make it a terrorist organization. By
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This early date is of note, as the KLA did not introduce other international norms, such as human rights and
international humanitarian law norms, until much later in the conflict.
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framing the conflict as one of a group of liberation fighters or freedom fighters fighting a
terrorist regime, the KLA was attempting to control the framing of the struggle and thereby
increase support for their cause. At the same time, it was important for the KLA to refute the
label of “terrorists,” both for their standing with the home audience and the international
audience they hoped to sway in favor of their cause. The Serbian state and media had dubbed the
KLA a terrorist organization from its inception, and was thereby coloring its own actions against
the group as legitimate counter-insurgency activities. Even before the first official communiqué
had been issued by the KLA in June 1995, their activities in Kosovo had been dubbed terrorist
activities by the Serbian press. For example, the assassination of the High Inspector of the
Serbian police in Gllogovc, Lutfi Ajazi, on November 9, 1994, was condemned as an attack by a
terrorist group in the Serbian language paper, Večernje Novosti, as reported by the Kosovo
Information Center on November 12, 1994 (Rilindja 1994). By June 1996, the Serbian political
parties had begun condemning the attacks by the KLA as terrorist attacks (Tanjug 1996).
The chart below (Chart 5.1: Terrorism in the discourse of the KLA) shows the frequency
of the use of the terms “terrorism,” “terrorist,” and “terror” in the discourse of the KLA over
time, broken down into the two opposing ways the terms were used: against the Serbian state
(“Serbian state as terrorist”) and to bolster the position of the KLA as liberation or freedom
fighters, rather than terrorists (“Denial of KLA as terrorists”).
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Chart 5.1: Terrorism in the discourse of the KLA
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Source: Data were extracted from the KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. The documents were coded for the use of the terms “terror,”
“terrorism,” and “terrorist” and categorized into two groups: references to the Serbian state and to the KLA.

Overall, of the total 81 references to terrorism, approximately three quarters of these, or
62 references, are in relation to acts committed by the Serbian regime, and dubbed state
terrorism. One quarter of the total, or 19 references, refer to the activities of the KLA. Thus, the
KLA found it far more important to paint the Serbian regime as terrorists (and therefore, by
implication, illegitimate), than to deny that their own activities were terrorist in nature. Indeed,
members of the KLA say their best defense was not to fight the label of terrorist with words of
their own, but with behavior.139 They claimed that not adopting terrorist behaviors was the best
defense against being termed terrorists, rather than attempting to deny it. Fighting “a clean
fight,” argued Rexhep Selimi, a member of the KLA General Staff and key battleground
commander, would allow the KLA to refute such charges by demonstrating the claimed
honorable nature of not only their cause, but their actions, as well.140 That said, the KLA did
expend some energy in denying in their public statements and speeches that they themselves
were a terrorist group.
A second chart (Chart 5.2: Saturation of terrorism in the discourse of the KLA) shows the
use of the term in the media items, controlling for the number of media items. The frequency of
media items varied considerably over time, increasing by many multiples by the end of the
conflict. In order to control for this variation, a calculation of how frequently the term was used
per media item (termed “saturation”) was used. This chart throws into greater relief the effort the
KLA spent in different periods using the term terror or terrorist.
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Rexhep Selimi, Member of the KLA General Staff, interview with author, Pristina, October 2010.
Ibid.
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Chart 5.2: Saturation of terrorism in the discourse of the KLA
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Source: Data were extracted from the KLA documents listed in Appendix 2. The documents were coded for the use of the terms “terror,” “terrorism,”
and “terrorist” and categorized into two groups: references to the Serbian state and to the KLA. Saturation measures how many references are made to
terrorism per media item, controlling for the variation of the number of media items produced each quarter.

Denial of KLA as terrorists
The attempts to deny that the KLA were terrorists appear to occur in two waves. These
waves are first from April 1996 to March 1997, and then from October 1998 to March 1999.
They were critical periods for the KLA to present their case to a larger audience and during
which it was essential that they not appear as terrorists. The first was at the beginning when the
KLA was emerging from the shadows (during the Underground Period from June 1995 to
October 1997) and was making its case to the local population, the Kosovar community in exile,
and more broadly, international organizations and other states.141 This period shows the highest
saturation of the use of the term terrorism in the discourse. A key question is why it was so
important for this group to establish this identity so early on, when the earliest audiences were
mainly local. Although the KLA hoped that outside governments were paying attention to their
faxed press releases, during the Underground Period the KLA went largely unnoticed.
The second wave occurs when the struggle had already attracted foreign attention and the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Kosovo Verification Mission (OSCEKVM) was on the ground in Kosovo from October 1998 to March 1999. It was the period when
the KLA were meeting with and interacting with outside observers on a regular basis, and
making their case as law-abiding freedom fighters in the run up to the conference in Rambouillet
in February 1999.
Why the KLA focused on denying that they were a terrorist group during the first wave is
arguably connected to how their actions would be perceived through the prism of local norms. In
the case of the KLA, such local norms are embodied and understood through the laws of the
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For the purposes of this research, the time in which the KLA was active in shaping public perception of their
activities has been divided into three periods: the Underground Period (June 1995 – September 1997), the Emergent
Period (from October 1997 to October 1998), and the Mature Period (November 1998 – June 1999). Each period is
marked by differences in framing of the KLA’s struggle and the way international norms were incorporated into
their discourse.
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Kanun of LekDukagjin, which articulated rules for legitimate targeting during violent
interactions. One foot soldier in the KLA, from the Dukagjini region said: “The Kanun was
behind all our actions. We all know it, and it is part of us.”142 The laws in the Kanun governing
blood feuds, which were prevalent in Kosovo until a public campaign led by Anton Cetta to end
the feuds, culminated in a public gathering of forgiveness in 1991 and resurfaced again after the
end of the conflict, prescribe with a particular degree of specificity who may be targeted with
violence.143 If followed, these laws would prohibit indiscriminate killing of individuals not
directly involved in a feud. The types of violence associated with terrorism—for example,
attacks of ordinary people in public places—would be seen as a violation of these laws. As
recently as 2005, a lawyer from Pristina, Tome Gashi, said: “in some places in Kosovo these
customs are applied much more than the law” (Musliu and Lani 2005).
More directly, a commander from the Dukagjini region in western Kosovo said of the
Kanun during and after the conflict:
Kosovar Albanian society stands between the Kanun of LekDukagjin and the state-based
rule of law. We have never had our own state; Kosovo had autonomy, had its own
judicial system, but Albanians never accepted that as their own, and so they had to follow
their own law. It was law within the law, state within the state; although the court might
have sentenced someone to 15 years in prison on a murder charge, the Kanun was much
more powerful than the court (Mangalakova 2004: 11).
A second source to provide understanding of the local normative environment are the
historical ballads, or Kenge Kreshnikesh. A major theme in these ballads is the resistance to an
unjust external government by a small band of heroic warriors. In these ballads the armies or
their representatives are attacked (and often defeated), but local populations are for the most part
142

Author interview with GC, Pristina, Kosovo, October 2012.
The many ongoing blood feuds in Kosovo were brought to an end in 1990 and 1991 by the Reconciliation
Committee to Reconcile Blood Feuds in Kosovo, led by Anton Cetta. The campaign to end blood feuds culminated
with a huge meeting of up to 100,000 people to “forgive the blood” on May 1, 1990 (Clark 2008: 60). Following the
end of the conflict in 1999, local journalists documented a return of blood feuds in rural areas, particularly in the
western regions of Kosovo, and notably some involving former senior KLA members (Xharra, Hajrullahu, and
Salihu 2005; Xharra 2005).
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untouched. These battles are just battles, with the heroes winning through a combination of wit,
cleverness, and behaving in the right manner. Some tactics, favored by terrorist groups, would
not conform to these heroic ideals. Thus, taking into account the local normative environment,
the emphasis from the beginning in the KLA press releases on framing their activities as not
terrorism suggests that the KLA was attempting to frame their activities as acceptable behavior
and continuing in the Albanian tradition of local resistance.
In May 1996, the KLA resisted this label of terrorist, and characterized the war in
Kosovo as one of liberation (a term which brings to mind freedom fighters, a theme of the
ballads): “The Albanian people’s armed war does not have a terrorist nature, or an interethnic
war character or a religious one. It is a war for the liberation of Kosovo” (Communiqué 19, May
1, 1996). And more explicitly, in August 1996, the KLA issued a press release with the
following message: “The decision-making centers should be aware that we are not terrorists, as
the Serbs are trying to call us, but that we are freedom fighters” (Communiqué 22, August 10,
1996).
The mention of the intended audience of the Communiqué , “the decision-making
centers,” gives an indication of whom the KLA hoped to sway with these words. They are clearly
reaching beyond the local communities, and, even, beyond potential donors in the exile
community with this wording. It indicates that the KLA hoped or expected outside governments
and government organizations to be listening and to be shaping their opinions accordingly. The
interplay between the terms terrorist and freedom fighters is a familiar one, and underlines the
difference the KLA wanted to emphasize—one group is not legitimate, while the other is.
Two months later, in October 1996, the KLA framed their struggle using terrorism
discourse again: “Our war is a liberating war. It is not one of terror or anarchy. It does not have a
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religious or chauvinist character” (Communiqué 26, October 10, 1996). With the distinction, the
KLA is contrasting their goals (liberation), with other goals they could deem as illegitimate
(terror or anarchy). Again, in the following reference, the KLA frame their struggle as one of
liberation, eschewing the terrorist label:
The invaders can threaten to eliminate the KLA and our guerrilla units as much as they
want through their spokesmen in Belgrade or the violent ones in power in Kosovo, but we
are not afraid because our roots and support are with our people, who know very well that
our war is not a war of terrorism, but one of liberation (Communiqué 27, October 27,
1996).
Significantly, in the above communiqué, the KLA was also engaged in distinguishing
between the image of a terrorist and that of a guerrilla, guerrillas being considered as an army
fighting oppression, in contrast to terrorists.
For members of the KLA interviewed recently, the importance of the language of
terrorism continued to be apparent: “The important thing was that the KLA was not a terrorist
organization. We were fighting a clean war.”144
The second period when the KLA wanted to shape their image so as not to appear as
terrorists was from October 1998 until March 1999. This period coincides with the arrival of the
OSCE observers and the gearing up for military intervention by international actors. At this point
in their struggle, the introduction of outside observers who were present in the field and tasked
with monitoring the behavior of the parties to the conflict appears to have had a significant effect
on how the KLA portrayed its actions at this time.
The KLA responded strategically to the presence of these actors, with an attempt to
control how their actions were perceived. During this period, they emphasized that their actions
were not random attacks on civilians, but the actions of a legitimate group, using legitimate
tactics in their armed struggle. The efforts to frame the discourse during this period are
144

Interview with Ardian Gjini, Press Officer for the KLA in the Dukagjini region, Pristina, October 2010.
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connected with specific references to tactics which suggest the KLA were at pains to point out
were not those of a terrorist group. For example, in November and December 1998, the KLA
disavowed kidnapping, a tactic popular with some terrorist groups: “The KLA expresses concern
at and disassociates itself from the kidnapping of people of whatever nationality” (Communiqué
62, November 1998).145,146 This theme was repeated a month later, in December: “The KLA is
not behind the kidnapping and later killing of Zvonko Bojaniqi, who was kidnapped and killed in
territories well in control of Serbian forces. Behind these killings must be the Serbian secret
police or any other force that wishes to compromise our war of liberation” (Communiqué 65,
December 18, 1998).
In addition, the Spokesman for the KLA Headquarters, Jakup Krasniqi, mentioned that
the portrayal of the KLA as committing terrorist acts was a significant consideration in the push
to reshape the image of the KLA over the course of 1998:
Especially during 1998, there were two factors that obliged us to improve and present the
very aim of KLA to the national and international audiences. These had an important
role as well as an internal and an external factor. The internal factor, because at the
beginning, especially after February and March 1998, the media and different people
[within the KLA] started giving out different opinions on KLA, without being ordered to
do so…but also for the fact that externally, segments of the KLA were being seen as a
group of armed people whose intention is to commit terrorist acts.147
The KLA was very concerned about their image, and a significant part of that image was
presenting themselves as a group which was not terrorists. It appears that the KLA was aware
that this struggle was one of framing and appearances (and therefore perceived legitimacy), not
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Translated by the BBC.
During the course of the conflict, but especially in 1998, people in Kosovo went missing. They were of all
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killing these individuals. Some of the missing were later discovered in graves in Kosovo or Serbia, while others
escaped with tales of captivity and harsh treatment.
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2010, translated by Iliriana Kacaniku.
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one of firepower. As one member of the KLA said recently, “our image mattered more than
guns.”148
The audience for this portrayal of the KLA as not terrorists was international as well as
local. To be perceived as a terrorist group by other states would have limited the KLA’s ability to
be in contact with outside governments and to garner their support. For example, the KLA
representative in London, Pleurat Sediju, in describing his efforts to meet with British
government officials, stated: “the UK officials did not approach us until they were sure we were
not terrorists.”149
As early as 1995, Sediju, then a member of the LPK before joining the KLA and
becoming their London-based spokesman, was tasked with studying terrorist groups to determine
when and why they became known as terrorists in an effort not to follow the same path:
In 1994 or 1995 I received an assignment from the LPK to study the IRA [Irish
Republican Army]. We were looking for the point at which it shifted from being a
liberation movement to a terrorist group. It helped a lot in our strategy, and with our
propaganda. I prepared an analysis of when that happened.150
The KLA considered that states and international organizations were a key group to
convince of their non-terrorist intentions, but they were not always successful in doing so. As
early as 1996 key external observers were characterizing the activities of the KLA in Kosovo in
ways which colored the KLA as a terrorist group. One of these carried particular weight: in
February 1998, the US Special Envoy for Kosovo, Richard Gelbard said: “We condemn very
strongly terrorist actions in Kosovo. The UCK [KLA] is, without any question, a terrorist group”
(AFP 1998).151 He was later quoted as saying: “I know a terrorist when I see one and these men
are terrorists” (BBC 1998). The February pronouncement indicated that the United States did
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not consider the KLA to be a legitimate actor. This labeling of the KLA as a terrorist group went
beyond a political statement and had consequences on the ground. Within three days, the Serbian
government had launched a counter-insurgency campaign against the KLA and had targeted
specific villages considered to be at the heart of the KLA organization. The results were
massacres in three villages, Likoshan, Qirez, and Prekaz, in March, 1998. Some members of the
KLA have suggested that there was a connection between the announcement by Gelbard and the
subsequent offensive by the Serbian government, as, in their view, the announcement indicated
that the US had withdrawn the appearance of their support for the KLA, and attacks on the KLA
would now not be condemned.152 Gelbard soon appeared to be backing away from his
classification of the KLA as a terrorist group. On March 13, 1998 in his appearance before the
House International Relations Committee in Washington D.C., Gelbard said that the KLA had
“committed terrorist acts,” but had “not been classified legally by the US Government as a
terrorist organization” (NYT 1998, 10). By June, the US State Department spokesman, James
Rubin, announced that the US did not regard the KLA as a terrorist organization, even though
members of the KLA might have engaged in acts of terrorism (Lungescu 1998). In June, when
Richard Holbrooke first met with the KLA, the local KLA commander for Junik, Gani Shehu
said: “we’re going to fight to the end, we had no choice.” He later recounted that “I told him we
were fighting for freedom. We were countering Serbia’s propaganda that we were a terrorist
organization. Serbia had said we were a fundamentalist organization. After this meeting, this
propaganda didn’t make any sense anymore.”153
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Interview with Gani Shehu, local KLA commander in Junik, and the first KLA member to meet with Richard
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During this period, from the early part of 1998 through the summer of 1998, the KLA’s
efforts to avoid being seen as a terrorist group waned somewhat. They did, however, begin
ramping up the accusations that the Serbian state was a terrorist state.
Accusation of Serbian state as terrorist state
The second and more prevalent way the KLA used the language of terror and terrorism
was in an effort to portray the Serbian government as illegitimate by painting them as terrorists.
This effort becomes more pronounced in the Emergent and Mature Periods (from November
1997 to June 1999). These are the periods during which the Serbian government escalated its
counter-insurgency activities from arresting and imprisoning individuals suspected of
involvement with the emerging KLA (such as the arrest and trial of 15 Albanians accused of
terrorist acts in July 1997), or the targeted killing of suspected KLA members (such as the death
of senior KLA member Zahir Pajaziti on January 31, 1997), to sending troops into Kosovo to
attack KLA positions and villages suspected of harboring KLA sympathizers.
While accusations by the KLA that the Serbian government was a terrorist government
increased during the Emergent and Mature periods, this effort was evident from the very
beginning of the KLA’s public pronouncements. The first communiqué of the KLA, published in
June 1995, indicated how the KLA wanted to characterize the actions of Serbian government
with regard to the Albanian population: “We call to attention the civilian population of Serbia
and Montenegro to think about their future in Kosovo and not to be part of the terror committed
by the invading military and police troops against Albanians” (Communiqué 13, June 1995).
As shown in Chart 5.2, there are two notable spikes in the number of times the KLA used
terrorist language to describe the Serbian regime: the first between October and December 1997,
and the second between January and March 1999. The first spike coincides with the period when
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the KLA emerged from the shadows and began appearing in public. The communiqués from this
period are longer, more detailed, and more expressive than the communiqués from the previous
Underground Period, which tended to be terse missives of one or two paragraphs. During this
period, the KLA was becoming more conscious of its image and beginning to try to control the
narrative of the conflict in Kosovo, presenting their view of the enemy. Whenever the Serbian
government is mentioned during this period, it is often with the word “terrorist” or “terroristic”
attached to it.
On November 20, 1997, the KLA described their struggle: “The foreign occupation and
the dismembering of our national body are unfair and illegal, so our war is of self-defense; [it is]
just, liberating and legitimate. The invader’s war is terroristic; the defender’s war is liberation”
(Communiqué 39, November 20, 1997).
On December 8, 1997, a communiqué self-consciously addressed the international
community, painting the Serbian regime as the terrorists:
We repeat to the international centers that are interested in this peninsula that our struggle
is a just struggle of liberation. It is the occupier who is waging a war of terrorism. We
think that the time of resolutions that you vote for, but which put no obligation on the
Serbian terrorists, is now over (Communiqué 40, December 5, 1997).
The second spike occurs between January and March 1999, as NATO and foreign powers
put increasing pressure on Serbia and Milosevic. During this period, the KLA appear to be intent
on tarring the Serbian regime using the language of terrorism and thereby offering confirmation
to the outside world that an attack against the Serbs would be justified. Many of the references
from this period also refer to massacres as a manifestation of terror, mentioning specifically the
massacre in the village of Recak on January 15.154 On January 17, 1999, the KLA depicted the
Serbian government thus:
154

The village is known in Albanian as Recak and in Serbian as Racak.
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The state terror and systematic repression of Belgrade has not stopped in Kosovo. The
offensives and the terroristic campaigns of the Serbian regime forces have become our
harsh daily routine….The Serbian regime does not want a political solution for Kosovo.
It wants Kosovo, not only as an occupied colony, but also depopulated by Albanians. It is
going to realize this goal by terror, massacre, and genocide (Koha Ditore 1999a).
The focus of the KLA on the events of Recak is notable as the events were publicized
widely internationally and allowed for a more aggressive stance by the United States: “The
terrible images of Racak—flashed across television screens and front pages around the world—
had the effect of galvanizing the Clinton administration into action” (Dobbs 2000: 414).
President Bill Clinton said at the time that “this was a deliberate and indiscriminate act of murder
designed to sow fear among the people of Kosovo” (James 1999).
Drawing attention to the actions of the Serbian military and paramilitary at this time, and
labeling their actions as terroristic, allowed the KLA to continue to delegitimize the Serbian
regime. The massacre at Recak was also a breach of the ceasefire agreement of October 1998,
which had held shakily, at best, with both the KLA and the Serbian authorities violating the
terms of the ceasefire at multiple points.
In their political declarations of the period, the KLA also compares its behavior with that
of the Serbian government: “The noble spirit of the KLA is the biggest moral, political and
diplomatic victory of the KLA, compared to the terror of the Serbian state. [T]he criminals in
Belgrade have lost their reasoning and commit massacres of civilians” (Political Declaration 23,
January 17, 1999).
They also condemn actions which they paint as terroristic: “The KLA condemns
yesterday’s act of bomb throwing in which three people were killed. …this is an act of the
Serbian terrorists, and executed with criminal cold-blood by the terrorists of Belgrade” (Koha
Ditore 1999b).
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In their strategy of accusing the Serbian state of being a terrorist state, the KLA is acting
as a witness to the actions of the Serbian government, similar to the way that other non-state
actors such as Human Rights Watch might when witnessing human rights abuse, albeit as a nonstate actor with a specific interest in seeing the government tarred with this brush. While the
KLA’s motivation is different from the motivation of non-governmental organizations, in terms
of the pattern of the use of the discourse, the KLA appears to be acting more like these non-state
actors, drawing attention to norm violations of states and trying to alert outside actors, such as
states and international organizations, to these abuses. This drawing attention to the Serbian
state’s behavior was part of the KLA’s strategy to delegitimize the state in Kosovo, and it did so
at important points in the conflict, such as the period between January and March 1999, when
outside states were weighing intervention in the conflict.
KLA summary
Overall, there are a number of conclusions that can be drawn from the references to the
norm of terrorism in the language of the KLA. First, the discourse does offer support to the
hypothesis that these non-state actors are norm echoers. The norm against the use of terrorism
was building over the course of the 1990s and support for organizations that used tactics which
could be described as terroristic was dwindling. The KLA made a significant effort from their
first public pronouncement in 1995 to portray themselves as not being terrorists, and continued
to do so throughout the period under examination, from the middle of 1995 until June 1999.
Based on the interviews with KLA members, this effort was part of a conscious decision to
portray the KLA as fighting a just war against oppression using legitimate tactics.
Second, looking more closely at the peaks of the usage of the language of terror indicates
that these peaks occur during periods when the enhancement of the legitimacy of the group was
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critical: during their initial outreach to the public, and then in the presence of outside actors
during the ceasefire and the build up to the peace negotiations. Two points in time at which
outside actors were influential were between October and December 1998, when the OSCE
mission was ramping up its presence in Kosovo, and again between January and March 1999. In
the former period, the KLA’s discourse focused on claiming the KLA was not a terrorist group.
In the latter period, the KLA focused on denouncing the Serbian government as a terrorist state
during a time of increasing international attention to Kosovo immediately prior to and during the
Rambouillet conference. During these two periods, the KLA strategically increased the
frequency of the use of the norm against terrorism in their discourse.
The issue of legitimacy is a significant factor in both the KLA’s denying that it was a
terrorist group and in its accusations that the Serbian state was a terrorist state. The denial of
terrorist activities occurred at turning points for the KLA’s legitimacy: first when it was
emerging from the shadows and making its case to the Kosovar people, and second, when it was
imperative for the KLA to appear to be legitimate to outside actors on the ground. The portrayal
of the Serbian state as a terrorist state was related to the KLA’s need to delegitimize the state
with which it was fighting—continuously pointing to the Serbian state as a terrorist was an
attempt to further separate the Albanian population from the authority of the state—a state that
terrorizes those in its protection is not a legitimate state.
Third, norm concurrence had a role in the adoption of the norm against terrorism. The
emphasis placed on not being a terrorist group appeared to go deeper than simply a framing
issue, to become part of the KLA’s internal identity. Such an internalization of norms is more
likely to take place when there is concurrence between those norms and local norms, which does
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appear to have been the case for the KLA in Kosovo at the time. The adoption of the image of a
group that does not use terrorism was essential to the development of the KLA’s identity.
One hypothesis which does not receive support from the analysis of the norm against
terrorism is that the pattern of usage of international norms is partially dependent on the
evolution of the structure of the group itself. The data demonstrate no significant link between
the emergence of a more structured hierarchy within the KLA in the summer of 1998 and the
peaks in the usage of the norm against terrorism in their discourse. Indeed, the use of the
language of terrorism appeared to be more prevalent during the period when the KLA was less
hierarchical. This lack of connection between the hierarchical structure of a rebel group and the
use of the words terror or terrorism in the discourse of the group appears to be an exception,
when compared to the use of other international norms, such as human rights and international
humanitarian law in the discourse, under review in this work. Evidence presented in earlier
chapters suggested that the internal structure of the KLA had an effect on the use of some
international norms through the mechanism of specialized knowledge—greater levels of
hierarchy allowed for the development of specialized knowledge within the ranks of the KLA, or
the recruitment of more specialized individuals into the ranks of the KLA. The pattern observed
in the use of terrorism in the discourse does not follow this pattern, and this variation may be due
to the way the label terrorism and terrorist is applied by states and other actors to groups,
regardless of their size and structure, requiring those groups to engage with the norm early on in
their development, regardless of their level of internal heirarchy.
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5.3 Terrorism and the LTTE
Overview
The pattern of discourse and behavior of the LTTE with regards to the norm against
terrorism is quite different from the patterns displayed by the KLA. Overall, in their discourse,
the LTTE did not respond directly to accusations of terrorism, and references to terror and
terrorism are at a low level, apart from in one year, 2001. In addition, the pattern of attacks on
civilian targets was also significantly different.
The LTTE was accused of being terrorists from their inception in 1977 by the
government of Sri Lanka. From the very beginning of its struggle, the members and leadership of
the LTTE chose tactics which included assassinations and attacks on soft, or civilian, targets that
are typically classified as terroristic. These civilian targets included bus stations (Colombo
1987), temples (Temple of the Tooth, Kandy 1998), villages (Palliyagodeela 1991, among
others), and banks (Central Bank bombing 1996). In addition, the LTTE was also known for their
targeted assassinations of political figures, both in Sri Lanka (for example, Prime Minister
Ranasinghe Premadasa in Colombo 1993 and up to 25 members of parliament throughout the
conflict) and abroad (for example, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in India in 1991).
One particular tactic that was very different from the KLA was the use of suicide
bombers, a tactic the LTTE pioneered. The first suicide attack was early in the conflict, on July
5, 1989, when an LTTE soldier, known as “Captain Miller,” drove a truck into the army camp in
Nelliady in Jaffna.155 After that time, suicide attacks were used recurrently, assassinating
political as well as military targets. The total number of these attacks vary according to the
source, and may be as many as 316, although the LTTE only claim 273 (de Mel 2007).
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Robert Pape points to the similarities between this attack and the attack by Hezbollah on the US Marines in
Beirut in 1983, and argues that these groups were learning from each other (Pape 2009).
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In terms of the perception of the LTTE by states other than Sri Lanka, by the mid-1990s,
when the norm against terrorism was gaining more traction at the state level, other states began
taking concrete steps to condemn the LTTE as a terrorist organization. For example, the US
placed the LTTE on its list of terrorist groups in 1997. The UK followed suit in 2001. One LTTE
officer admitted that being on the international terrorist lists hurt the reputation of the group
(O'Duffy 2007: 281). However, others argued that the effect of the proscription following
September 11 was limited, and any curtailment in the LTTE’s ability to fundraise was temporary
(Chalk 2000). In May 2006, the EU officially labeled the LTTE a terrorist organization (Council
of the European Union 2006, 1-3), which had the direct effect of freezing the funds and financial
assets of the LTTE in Europe. By 2008, during the final military push by the Sri Lankan
government, the LTTE was increasingly isolated from outside support. The FBI called the LTTE
“the most dangerous and deadly extremists in the world, […] because its ruthless tactics have
inspired terrorist networks worldwide, including the Al-Qaeda in Iraq” (FBI 2008).
LTTE discourse analysis
Overall, in the discourse of the LTTE there is a different pattern than that seen with the
KLA—the speeches mainly ignore the norm against the use of terrorism until the massive
changes to the political landscape wrought by the events of September 11, 2001. A contributing
factor to this absence is likely to be that the LTTE began their operations in the late 1970s (with
their first major attack not until 1983 with an ambush on a military patrol), a time at which there
was no international consensus whatsoever about the definition of terrorism, and followed the
period in which groups fighting colonial powers were supported as freedom fighters. There is no
significant change in the LTTE’s discourse over the 1990s even as states began inching towards
a more widespread prohibition against terrorism. However, that changed following the attacks in
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New York and Washington D.C. in 2001. In November 2001, the LTTE launched a massive
effort to question the label of terrorist, and even the definition of what a terrorist is (see Chart
5.3: References to terrorism by the LTTE, below). Much of the speech given in November 2001
is dedicated to maintaining the distinction between a freedom fighter (which is labeled
legitimate) and a terrorist (which is not). The number of mentions of terrorism in the speeches
prior to 2001 is few, and on the whole, they mainly discuss the characterization of the LTTE as a
terrorist group as propaganda, but very little effort is exerted in challenging that characterization.
There was a second smaller peak in 2005 when the Ceasefire Agreement (CFA) of 2002 had
begun to unravel and fighting had resumed on both sides.
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Chart 5.3 : References to terrorism by the LTTE
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“terrorist” and categorized into three groups: references to the Sri Lankan state, to the LTTE, and to terrorism in general.
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In 2001, after the attacks in New York and Washington, and following the robust
response of states to the attacks and to terrorism in general, the LTTE began contesting the
definition of terror in earnest. In July of that year, the LTTE had carried out a suicide attack on
Bandaranaike International Airport, destroying eight of the air force's planes and four Sri Lankan
Airlines planes, and critically wounding the Sri Lankan economy that year. Rather than argue
simply that the LTTE itself was not a terrorist organization, Prabhakaran argued that the
definition as put forth by states was too narrow:
The use of violence in all modes of struggles to attain specific goals is defined as
terrorism by international governments. This narrow definition has erased the distinctions
between genuine struggles for political independence and terrorist violence. This
conception of terrorism has posed a challenge to the moral foundation of armed struggles
waged by liberation movements for basic political rights and for the right to selfdetermination (Hero’s Day Speech, November 2001).
In this speech, we see the LTTE engaged in a real effort to challenge how the states,
particularly Western states, appeared to be coming to a consensus on what terrorism really was.
This contestation over the definition was crucial because it appeared that, following the attacks
of September 11, states had moved beyond the debate over the definition of terrorism that had
led to deadlock at the United Nations for many years and into a period of action. Without this
contestation, the LTTE risked being labeled a terrorist group at a time when that label would
have real practical implications for the functioning of the LTTE itself. Prabhakaran appears to
be clinging to the old divide between freedom fighter and terrorist: “It is crucial that Western
democratic nations should provide a clear and comprehensive definition of the concept of
terrorism that would distinguish between freedom struggles based on the right to selfdetermination and blind terrorist acts based on fanaticism” (Hero’s Day Speech, November
2001). And later in the same speech: “We are freedom fighters. The Sinhala state terrorists, who
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have failed in their efforts to crush our freedom movement for the last two decades, branded our
liberation struggle as terrorism” (Hero’s Day Speech, November 2001).
Prabhakaran further attempts to align the LTTE on the side of anti-terrorism, in an effort
to distinguish the LTTE from “real terrorists,” who would be, presumably, illegitimate: “We
welcome the counter-terrorist campaign of the international community to identify and punish
real terrorists” (Hero’s Day Speech, November 2001).
In 2001, the LTTE were engaged in peace talks with the Sri Lankan government. The
Norwegian government had played an important intermediary role in those talks from February
2000 onwards. In November 2001 it would have been of utmost importance to appear to be a
legitimate actor in the negotiations and thus the efforts to dispute both the label of terrorist, and
the definition of what makes a terrorist, were crucial. Within a month of this speech, in
December 2001, the LTTE announced a ceasefire, to which the government responded
favorably, lifting the economic embargo of the LTTE territories and announcing a ceasefire of its
own. The full CFA was signed on February 22, 2002. Following the CFA, a multinational
monitoring force, the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM), was established, with
approximately 75 personnel from Scandinavian countries based in Sri Lanka, tasked with
monitoring and recording violations to the CFA by either party. After 2001, references to
terrorism tail off again until a second peak in 2005.
What is of particular interest in these references to terrorism in this speech is that taken
as a whole, they are more concerned with contesting the definition of terrorism, not in attempting
to change the perception of what the LTTE was actually doing and the tactics it was actually
using. In fact, the contestation relies mainly on a definition of what a terrorist is based on the
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motivation of the actor, not his deeds. This is in sharp contrast to the KLA discourse, where
specific deeds were disputed.
In 2005, there is a second peak in references to terror—both denying that the LTTE was a
terrorist organization, and in attempting to paint the government of Sri Lanka as a terrorist state.
Again, we see Prabhakaran questioning the definition of terror: “there is no clear, coherent,
globally acceptable definition of the concept of terrorism” (Hero’s Day Speech, November
2005), and arguing that the lack of clarity in the definition has led to the LTTE being branded a
terrorist group erroneously.
Just and reasonable political struggles fought for righteous causes are also branded as
terrorism. Even authentic liberation movements struggling against racist oppression are
denounced as terrorist outfits. In the current global campaign against terror, state
terrorism always finds its escape route and those who fight against state terror are
condemned as terrorists. Our liberation organization is also facing a similar plight
(Hero’s Day Speech, November 2005).
Once again, in 2007, Prabhakaran tries to separate out terrorists, who in his framing are
racists or fanatics, from an armed group with a political objective. With this framing,
Prabhakaran acknowledges that there are groups whose acts are not acceptable, but it is because
they lack a legitimate political goal. Therefore, by implication, actors with legitimate goals
cannot commit acts of terrorism, because the ends justify the means: “We are not terrorists,
committing blind acts of violence impelled by racist or religious fanaticism. Our struggle has a
concrete, legitimate, political objective” (Hero’s Day Speech, November, 2007). This
characterization of what terrorism is was contrary to the defintions being discussed at the state
level during this period. By contesting the definintion of terrorism, Prabharkaran was attempting
to reframe the struggle in Sri Lanka away from the discussions of terrorism.
One final point of analysis is the examination of the possibility of changes in internal
structure being a factor in the changes in the use of international norms in the discourse. By the
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beginning of the period under examination(1992—2007), the LTTE had already established an
extremely hierarchical command structure, with both the military wing and subordinate political
wing under the supervision of the Central Governing Committee, headed by the supreme leader,
Velupillai Prabhakaran. There were no significant changes in the structure of the organization in
2001 which would account for the changes observed in the discourse. Further, the split in the
ranks of the LTTE in 2004, with the departure of Colonel Karuna and subsequent internal strife,
does not appear to have had any impact on the use of the term terrorism in the discourse. It
would seem that the hypothesis that a growing internal hierarchical structure would lead a group
to increase its use of international norms would not hold true in the case of the LTTE and the
norm against terror.
LTTE summary
Overall, two significant findings are derived from the analysis of the LTTE. The first is
that armed resistance groups do respond to sudden significant changes in international norms at
the state level: after the changes in the international norm against terror, following September 11,
2001, we see the LTTE engaging with the norm and with international actors in contesting that
norm and its application to the group aggressively. The second finding is that which norms are
adopted into the discourse, and ultimately the behavior of armed resistance groups, is influenced
by the congruence of that norm with local norms and culture.
In the discourse of the LTTE and their response to the norm against terror, the LTTE was
not demonstrably concerned with the label of a terrorist group until September 11, 2001, at
which point the engagement with the norm was to contest the definition of terrorism, rather than
to directly contest the perception that the group was a terrorist group. From our understanding of
the prevailing norm within the LTTE of the acceptance of death, it would appear that there is
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significantly less overlap than in the KLA case between the norm against terrorism and the
behavior it proscribes and the local norms within the LTTE. This indicates that the lower degree
of congruence between the international norm and the local norms made it less likely that the
norm against terrorism would be accepted by the LTTE.

5.4 A comparison of the KLA and the LTTE
A comparison of the discourse of these two groups over the duration of each group’s
conflict reveals significant differences in the discourse and in each group’s interaction with one
international norm: the norm against terrorism. There are some patterns of discourse which are
similar between the two groups—each group does attempt to portray itself as not being a terrorist
group, while attempting to delegitimize the state they are fighting by labeling them terrorist
states.
There are, however, significant differences in the use of the language of terrorism in the
discourse of these two groups when examined more closely. The KLA makes frequent mention
of specific tactics, refuting ones which are frequently termed terroristic, such as kidnapping and
bombing civilian buildings. This indicates that there was a translation of what the norm means
into a recognition of the implications of the behavior of the KLA troops. This is borne out by the
interviews with KLA members who emphasized that the behavior of the KLA troops was of
utmost importance—they could not be seen to be attacking Serb civilians or engaging in
traditionally terroristic actions. In addition, from the few numbers of direct attacks on Serb
civilians during the war, it can be seen that the norm against terror was translated into action,
albeit imperfectly.156 The LTTE, on the other hand, engaged primarily with the norm

156

This changed after the end of the conflict, as the level of violence against civilians increased dramatically
during the first year following June 1999, and sporadically after that, in, for example, March 2004, when human
rights violations by former members of the KLA increased. Attacks on civilians were condemned by the former
KLA leadership but the condemnations did not appear to have an effect on the levels of violence. Changing patterns
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immediately after September 11, 2001, and did so in order to contest the definition of terrorism,
rather than to refute any specific actions. The contestation does show an awareness of the
growing importance of the norm; however, the discourse does not show that the LTTE
considered a strong connection between the norm and legitimacy, and the LTTE continued to
engage in acts such as assassination and killings of civilians throughout the life of the
organization.
The examination of the local norms shows how differences in these contributed to the
difference we see in the discourse. The KLA turned to traditional norms, laws, and culture, such
as the Kanun of LekDukagjin, within which there existed norms against the targeting of certain
groups of individuals, such as women, children, and the elderly, during periods of intercommunal or interfamilial violence. The resonance between these traditional norms and the
norms against the use of terror contributed to the KLA seeking strongly to portray themselves
through word and action as a group not engaging in terror. It is also significant that the KLA
included in their refutations of terrorism specific acts that overlap with the prohibitions in the
Kanun and other traditional codes of conduct. The LTTE, on the other hand, created a new social
order, and a culture in which each Tamil, young and old, male and female, had a duty to give of
themselves to the struggle for Tamil Eelam. The celebration of death which grew up as a result
of the struggle would not have resonated with the norm against terror according to which certain
groups are considered illegitimate targets. Again, it is significant that the discourse on terror and

of violence after the conclusion of formal conflict have been documented, with reasons being revenge, reprisals and
lack of security enforcement (Boyle 2006). The documented levels of violence in Kosovo after the end of the war,
which included attacks on Serbs, Roma, and Albanian Kosovars in which former members of the KLA were
implicated (as well as returning refugees and criminal gangs from Albania), indicates that there might be a different
logic at work when rebel groups transition into different forms as post-conflict organizations (see, for example,
Human Rights Watch 1999; and Human Rights Watch World Report 2000). The study of such groups as they
transition into protostate roles is an area of possible future research.
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terrorism is centered on the concept of terrorism itself, rather than specific acts attributed to the
LTTE, which are rarely refuted in the LTTE discourse.

5.5 Conclusions
Overall, the analysis demonstrates that rebel groups engage vigorously with the norm
against terror. They may refute the labeling of terrorist in multiple ways: deny involvement in
specific activities; deny use of specific tactics; argue that their cause justifies their use of force;
argue that their choice of target was legitimate; contest the definition of terrorism; and argue that
they are freedom fighters, not terrorists. At no point do the groups embrace the term terrorist,
despite their often questionable choice of tactics. The analysis also shows that the use of the
norm is not static over time: there are distinct patterns in the use of the norm, which, it has been
argued, is linked to the need for legitimacy at specific points and the presence of outside actors.
The examination of the discourse of these two groups has shown that with respect to the
norm against terrorism, rebel groups are norm echoers. The KLA, becoming active during a
decade in which the norm against terrorism was strengthening at an international level, strongly
contested the label of terrorist, and considered the moment when they received the label of
terrorist by a powerful outside actor as a nadir in the pubic presentation of their cause. The
LTTE began their operations during a period when the sanctions against terrorism were more
muted, which is reflected in their lack of engagement with the label terrorist. There is a dramatic
change in the discourse of the LTTE, however, following the events of September 2001 and
subsequent forceful actions by states, when the LTTE began vehemently to contest the label of
terrorist.
This analysis further shows that non-state actors behave in a similar fashion to states
when it comes to determining which international norms to adopt in their discourse and actions:
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the norms most likely to be adopted are those which resonate with local norms and practices. In
the case of the KLA, which drew from traditional cultural norms in order to establish itself as a
legitimate force fighting for the rights of Kosovar Albanians, international norms which
resonated with some parts of those traditional cultural norms, such as those against the use of
terror tactics, were likely to be incorporated into the discourse. The KLA refuted specific actions
condemned as terror tactics. By contrast, the LTTE, which broke from traditional culture and
created a new social structure in which there was little resonance with norms against terror, the
contestation of the label of terrorist took the form of contesting the definition of terrorism as a
concept (and that only after a sea change in states’ engagement with the issue).
Both groups demonstrate that a need for legitimacy underlies the engagement with the
norm against terrorism. The KLA expressly defined its internal identity as a legitimate actor to
include the identity of a group eschewing terrorism. It also demonstrated its ability to act
strategically, and adopt language eschewing terrorism at critical junctions: during its public
establishment within Kosovo, and when its legitimacy was under scrutiny by outside actors. The
LTTE, on the other hand, engaged with the norm in a different manner: it was only when their
legitimacy was threatened by the changes in the international environment with regard to the
norm against terror that they began to engage seriously with the norm itself.
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Chapter 6: Conclusion
This dissertation examined changes in the discourse of rebel groups and analyzed the
patterns of usage of a number of international norms in the groups’ discourse to answer the
questions of why rebel groups use these norms, and why groups are more likely to refer to some
norms than to others. The focus of the research was on human rights norms, international
humanitarian law, and the norms against terror: three areas of norms which seek to modify
behavior of participants in violent conflict.
Overall, there is evidence to suggest that rebel groups echo the broad pattern of change in
discourse and behavior exhibited by states: as states increasingly turned to human rights
discourse and focused on the protection of civilians in conflict during the 1990s, rebel groups
largely echoed that pattern. Both groups under examination, the Kosovo Liberation Army
(KLA) and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), increase their use of human rights
language over time, although only the KLA pairs this increase with a rise in humanitarian law
language and discussion of the protection of civilians. Both groups show an increase in 1998, at
a time when human rights and international humanitarian law issues were much discussed at the
state level, and when international events such as the creation of the International Criminal Court
(ICC) in July 1998 and the increase of the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Tribunal for
the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) over Kosovo were highlighting the importance of those norms
for non-state actors. The KLA began to adopt human rights language and international
humanitarian law in its discourse while reducing the relative frequency of its use of references to
terror and terrorism. While labeling its host state as a human rights violator or a state terrorist
served a similar purpose of delegitimizing the state, the KLA’s increasing preference for using
human rights language or international humanitarian law language over terrorism language to
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describe the actions of the state, is an indicator of which norms were in ascendancy. With the
changes in the discourse on terror, the LTTE offers a clear example of how a sudden shift in a
norm at the international level following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 can be
immediately reflected at the non-state level.
These groups, however, are not merely echoing the discourse from the international level
as passive recipients: they are adopting international norms into their discourse for strategic
reasons, namely to increase their legitimacy with local and international audiences. By tracing
the patterns of norm adoption throughout the course of the conflict and matching peaks of
fluctuation with events on the ground, this research has shown that rebel groups increase the
frequency of their use of international norms at key turning points in the conflict, such as during
negotiations for ceasefire or peace agreements. This indicates that the rebel groups are using
these norms strategically to boost their legitimacy at those key points.
For both the KLA and the LTTE, their use of international norms in discourse changed
during periods of negotiation with outside actors. In Kosovo, the fall of 1998 saw intensive
negotiations with outside actors for a cease-fire. During this period, and again in the early days
of 1999 with the run-up to the multinational Conference on Kosovo at Rambouillet, the KLA
was striving to appear to be legitimate to outside actors. To do so, it began adopting language
and discourse familiar to these actors and framing its struggle in terms which would resonate
with them in order to bolster its claims. For the LTTE, the peace-talks led by the Norwegians in
2002 provided an opportunity to appear as a legitimate and reasonable opponent to the Sri
Lankan government. With the LTTE’s practice of using terror tactics and the delegitimation of
such tactics in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, the LTTE searched for a discourse to
shape international opinion in its favor.
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The analysis of the use of conventions in the discourse provides a closer look at how firm
a grasp the leaders of the groups have on the specifics of human rights norms and humanitarian
law. On this issue there is a significant difference between the KLA and the LTTE. The KLA
mentioned conventions fairly frequently, with their usage increasing over time, while the LTTE
hardly did so at all. Most of the references made by the KLA were to the Geneva conventions,
and most of those references were in conjunction with references to the harm of civilians. The
significant increase observed in the KLA’s use of the international humanitarian law conventions
occurs during the period when the group was struggling to be seen as a legitimate political actor
and knowledge of the Geneva Conventions might be a tool to demonstrate this legitimacy with
international actors with whom it was interacting. The increase was also occurring during the
time the KLA was laying the groundwork for transitioning from a fighting rebel group into a
group ready to govern. The LTTE only referenced conventions four times during the 15 years
under analysis, and showed little change over this time, indicating that for the LTTE the
demonstration of this knowledge was not considered to be essential.
The analysis of which specific norms or violations drew the most attention from the rebel
groups revealed that both groups focused on violations by the government forces, rather than on
depicting themselves as abiding by the same laws. Thus, their focus was primarily on
delegitimizing their host states. Regarding international humanitarian law, the focus was on the
protection of civilians, drawing attention to the government forces’ violation of this norm. The
human rights references were overwhelmingly to the loss of life, but mentions of arbitrary arrest
and detention made up a significant percentage of the references. The LTTE similarly focused
on the Sri Lankan government forces harming civilians, the loss of life, and genocide. In both
cases, there were surprisingly few mentions of torture, a relatively strong international norm.
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Incidents of torture during conflict, however, may be less public and widely known than, for
example, deadly attacks on civilians, and for that reason, may not have drawn as much attention
from the rebel groups. The focus on the behavior of the state was part of an overall strategy to
delegitimize the state and its actions; however, the timing of the peaks in the discourse also
indicate the international norms were used at points when it was vital for the group to be seen as
legitimate by outside actors, perhaps particularly in contrast with a delegitimized state.
Looking more closely at the norm against terror, the analysis demonstrates that rebel
groups engaged vigorously with this norm. They refuted the labeling of terrorist in multiple
ways: denying involvement in specific activities and use of specific tactics; arguing that their
cause justified their use of force; contending that their choice of target was legitimate; contesting
the definition of terrorism; and claiming that they were freedom fighters, not terrorists. At no
point do the groups embrace the term terrorist, despite their often questionable choice of tactics.
The analysis also shows that the use of the norm is not static over time: there are distinct patterns
in the use of the norm which are linked to the need for legitimacy at specific points and the
presence of outside actors. Both groups demonstrate that a need for legitimacy underlies the
engagement with the norm against terrorism. The KLA expressly defined its internal identity as a
legitimate actor to include the identity of a group eschewing terrorism. It also demonstrated its
ability to act strategically and adopt language denouncing terrorism at critical junctions: during
its public establishment within Kosovo and when its legitimacy was under scrutiny by outside
actors. The LTTE, on the other hand, engaged with the norm in a different manner: it was only
when their legitimacy was threatened by the changes in the international environment with
regard to the norm against terror that it began seriously to engage with the norm itself.
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The research shows, however, that the patterns of norm usage are complex at a microlevel and indicates that rebel groups respond to local events on the ground and these events
influence the micro-fluctuations in their usage accounting for some of the week-to-week
variation observed. The KLA’s discourse in 1998 and 1999 shows it responded to events on the
ground and changed its discourse as a result of troop movement, significant attacks, or major
events such as massacres.
The research demonstrates that rebel groups do appropriate international norms for their
own use and do so in patterns consistent with their need to boost their own legitimacy, but how
does it address the question of which norms rebel groups favor? The evidence presented supports
the hypothesis that rebel groups are more likely to adopt international norms which demonstrate
congruence with their own local normative environment. This analysis shows that non-state
actors behave in a similar fashion to states when it comes to determining which international
norms to adopt in their discourse and actions: the norms most likely to be adopted are those
which resonate with local norms and practices.
The examination of the local norms shows how differences among them contributed to
the difference we see between the discourse of the KLA and the LTTE. The KLA drew on
traditional norms, laws, and culture, such as the Kanun of Leke Dukagjin, within which there
existed norms against the targeting of certain groups of individuals, such as women, children,
and the elderly, during periods of inter-communal or interfamilial violence. The resonance
between these traditional norms and the international norms of human rights, the protection of
civilians, and the norms against the use of terror contributed to the KLA seeking strongly to
portray themselves through word and deed as a group not engaging in attacking civilians. The
LTTE, on the other hand, created a new social order and a culture in which each Tamil, young
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and old, male and female, had a duty to give of themselves to the struggle for Tamil Eelam. The
celebration of death which grew up as a result of the struggle would not have resonated as
strongly with the international norms of human rights (particularly right to life), the protection of
civilians, or norm against terror, all of which consider certain groups illegitimate targets. This
difference can be traced to the discourse and the more subdued pattern of engagement with these
norms shown by the LTTE.
Examining the norm against terrorism through this lens, the research reveals differences
in the discourse of these two groups. When using the language of terror, the KLA made frequent
mention of specific tactics refuting ones which are frequently termed terroristic, such as
kidnapping and bombing civilian buildings. This indicates that there was a translation of what
the norm means into recognition of the implications for the behavior of the KLA troops. This is
borne out by the interviews with KLA members who emphasized that the behavior of the KLA
troops was of utmost importance—they could not be seen to be attacking Serb civilians or
engaging in traditionally terroristic actions and to do so would be detrimental to their cause. The
LTTE, on the other hand, engaged primarily with the norm only after September 11, 2001, and
did so in order to contest the definition of terrorism, rather than to refute any specific actions.
The contestation does show an awareness of the growing importance of the norm; however, the
language used does not indicate that LTTE considered there to be a strong connection between
the norm and legitimacy, and the LTTE continued to engage in acts such as assassination and
killings of civilians throughout the life of the organization.
Finally, the research provides some support for the hypothesis which suggests that rebel
groups require a certain level of internal structure or hierarchy before they can begin to
incorporate international norms consistently into their discourse. The evidence presented in the
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case of the KLA suggests that as the group became increasingly hierarchical, it allowed for the
both the specialization of certain roles within the organization and the recruitment of individuals
who brought with them more expert knowledge of international norms.
To conclude, this dissertation demonstrates that rebel groups echo patterns in the
discourse of states, and do so to promote their own legitimacy at key turning points in the
conflict. Which international norms rebel groups use most frequently is partially determined by
the congruence of those norms with their local norms and beliefs. Finally, a group is more likely
to adopt international norms into its discourse when its internal structure has become more
hierarchical and specialized.
Contribution to the literature
This dissertation contributes to the literature on both international norms and rebel
groups—it engages directly with the literature on norms and adds to the understanding of norm
diffusion among actors by challenging existing models of norm diffusion, it extends the field of
norm research to a new actor, and it adds to the literature on rebel groups by deepening our
understanding of rebel groups’ discourse and struggles for legitimacy during conflict.
In arguing that rebel groups are acting strategically at key points in the conflict by
echoing international norms in their discourse and in emphasizing the agency of the rebel groups,
this study challenges the constructivist models of norm diffusion and the cascade of norms across
populations of actors both of which are largely structural. The emphasis in this dissertation on
the agency of the local actors and their choice of which international norms to use and when,
questions both the applicability of the models developed to explain norm diffusion among states
to non-state actors and the limitations of the models as they apply to any actors. It also adds to
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the growing literature in international relations which opens up the study of the relationships
between states to include non-state and transnational actors.
The research also extends the understanding of the effect international norms have to a
new set of actors. By considering how and why rebel groups echo international norms in their
discourse, this study extends the discussion of norm diffusion and transmission to a new,
previously under-researched actor, the rebel group. Previous work on non-state actors and norms
has focused primarily on non-governmental groups as norm entrepreneurs engaging with states
and changing state-level dynamics. This study focuses on a different process—how non-state
actors engage with the normative language developed by states and how and why they choose to
echo those norms back to the states themselves. By focusing on rebel groups, critical but understudied actors in conflicts throughout the world, this study illuminates how these groups make
use of the international language of norms to frame their own struggles and in their quest for
legitimacy.
Finally, this study adds to the small but growing literature on non-state actors’
engagement with international norms. By moving between the local and the international level,
this research connects the rich and thick anthropological work on particular groups or regions
with theories about international norms. The study of rebel groups as they negotiate the complex
territory between international and local normative spheres sheds new light on theories of
congruence and salience.
This research is also useful for policy makers, as it provides additional ways for those
engaged in negotiations with rebel groups to understand why groups may echo international
norms and what it might mean when they do. It further provides insight into which turning points
may be the most fruitful moments to engage these groups in discussions of international norms
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and the behaviors they encompass, such as protection of civilians, and provides insight into
which groups are most likely to be willing to engage fruitfully in these discussions.
Areas of future research
The research begun in this dissertation, with its focus on non-state actors, discourse, and
international norms, can be extended in a number of different ways: to new rebel groups; to
different types of actors; to different time periods; to explorations of potential connections
between discourse and behavior; and finally, to different norms. The hypotheses regarding the
strategic use of norms, the structure of the rebel groups, and the salience of international norms
at a local level developed in this research can be further tested by investigating the use of the
same norms explored in this work, namely, human rights, international humanitarian law, and
terrorism, in the discourse of other rebel groups.
The research can also be furthered by examining the discourse of rebel groups after the
end of the conflict as they transition from being rebel groups into other institutions. Of particular
interest would be the examination of groups, like the KLA, which transition from rebel group
into political parties or protostates over the course of the post-conflict period. Conceptually
different from rebel groups, these transitional organizations may follow different patterns of
norm adoption.
In terms of different time periods, this research focused on the 1990s, the post-Cold War
era, a period which saw a significant shift in some international norms, such as human rights, at
the international level. One other historical period which would add greatly to our understanding
of how rebel groups might echo changes on the international level is the post-World War II era,
when the foundation of the UN and accompanying declarations, such as the Universal
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Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) (adopted in 1948) and other conventions, such as the
Geneva Conventions of 1949 shifted the international normative landscape radically.
Another area of fruitful research is the exploration of the relationship between the
discourse of rebel groups and their behavior. This avenue of research could examine the
connections between the rebel groups, their discourse, and their likelihood of signing on to
international instruments governing behavior, such as the Mine Ban Treaty. It could also explore
whether changes in the discourse are followed in any way by changes in behavior, by mapping
patterns of accusations of human rights violations or abuses alongside patterns in discourse.
Finally, another meaningful exploration would be the comparison between the use of
secular norms discussed in this work, and religious norms, such as those enshrined in sharia law.
In addition, the study of the patterns of usage of norms in the discourse other than the so-called
“good norms,” (such as human rights), to include “bad norms,” such as rape during conflict,
mutilation of civilians or opposing forces, or ethnic segregation, would provide an alternative
view of how discourse may be used by rebel groups to frame their struggles.
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Appendix 1: Code book

Code
International Norms
1. Human Rights

2. Self-determination
3. Terrorism

4. Humanitarian law

5. Humanitarian
intervention

Description
Specific mention of international
conventions
All human rights (sum of 1a
through 1f)
Specific mention of HR
conventions
Right to life (any mention of death,
killing, by the state, or members of
state organs, such as policemen)
Torture (any mention of torture by
the state)
Arbitrary arrest & detention (any
mentions of arbitrary arrest,
detention or imprisonment by the
state)
Economic, Social, Cultural rights
(includes right to education,
language, right to work, etc.)
Any specific mention of genocide
Any reference to self-determination
Acts of terror committed by
Serbian troops or Serbian state
Denial of acts of terror committed
by KLA
All humanitarian law (sum of 4a
through 4 cy)
Protection of civilians
Harm of civilians by Serb forces

CONV
HR
1a

HR CONV

1b

HR LIFE

1c

HR TORT

1d

HR AAD

1e

HR ESC

1f

GENO
SD
S TERROR
NOT K
TERROR
IHL

4a

Harm of civilians by the KLA

4bx

Harm of civilians labeled
collaborators by the KLA
Treatment of POWs by Serbian
forces
Treatment of POWs by KLA

4by

Any reference to humanitarian
intervention n the conflict by
outside actors

5

4cx
4cy

IHL PROT
IHL S
HARM
IHL k
HARM
IHL HARM
K COL CIV
IHL S
PRISON
IHL K
PRISON
H INT
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6. Behavior of troops
7. Goals

8. Internal Structure
9. Outside actors’
influence
10. appeal to outside
actors
11. Other dominant
discourse

How troops are characterized

6

B TROOP

Secession (mention of wanting
independence for a separate state)
Unification of all subgroups
Overthrow of central government
Description of the internal structure
of the KLA
Any mention of outside actor’s
influence (positive or negative)
Any appeal by the KLA to outside
actors to engage in the situation in
Kosovo
References to other specific words
used in the discourse
Marxist / Communist
Colonialism / occupation
Democracy
Freedom
Religion

7a

G SEC

7b
7c
8

G UNI
G OVER
INTERN

9

OA INF

10

AOA

11a
11b
11c
11d
11e

MC
COL
DEMO
FREE
REL
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Appendix 2: KLA documents
“Amerikani nga Detrioti erdhi ta cliroje Kosoven.” Kosova Sot, January 5, 1999.
“Armiku ka per qellim eskalimin e nje lufte te pergjitshme.” Koha Ditore, March 4, 1999.
“Asnje vendim politik pa pelqimin e Adem Demacit.” February 23, 1999.
“Bardhyl Mahmuti: Kyeshte konflikt ndermjet dy ushtrive, ushtaret e zene jane rober lufte.”
Kosova Sot, January 12, 1999.
“Bardhyl Mahmuti: Pritet te lirohen disa ushtare te zene rober.” Kosova Sot, January 12, 1999.
“Bisedimet I japin perspective pavaresise.” Koha Ditore, February 26, 1999.
“Bshota: Po shfrytezohet vija vertikale e UCK-se.” Koha Ditore, March 4, 1999.
“Buja: Kemi treguar se nuk jemi ata qe marrin jete njerezish.” Koha Ditore, January 16, 1999.
“Cdo kush e ka te qarte se UCK-ja tashme paraqet formacion te regullt ushtarak.” Koha Ditore,
February 14, 1999.
“Cdo urdher I Shtabit te Pergjithshem do te respektohet.” Koha Ditore, February 14, 1999.
“Cfaredo marreveshje, pa SHBA-ne dhe NATO-n-nuk ka vlere.” Kosova Sot, February 18, 1999.
“Communiqué 13.” June 1, 1995.
“Communiqué 16 [sic, but should be 61].” Arta, October 31, 1998.
“Communiqué 18.” Zeri I Kosoves, February 22, 1996.
“Communiqué 19.” Zeri I Kosoves, May 1, 1996.
“Communiqué 20.” Zeri I Kosoves, June 27, 1996.
“Communiqué 21.” July 14, 1996.
“Communiqué 22.” Bota Sot, August 10, 1996.
“Communiqué 24.” Zeri I Kosoves, August 30, 1996.
“Communiqué 26.” Zeri I Kosoves, October 10, 1996.
“Communiqué 27.” Zeri I Kosoves, October 27, 1996.
“Communiqué 28.” Zeri I Kosoves, January 16, 1997.
“Communiqué 29.” Zeri I Kosoves, January 23, 1997.
“Communiqué 30.” Zeri I Kosoves, February 6, 1997.
“Communiqué 32.” Zeri I Kosoves, April 3, 1997.
“Communiqué 33.” Kosovo Daily Report, May 20, 1997.
“Communiqué 35.” Koha Ditore, August 8, 1997.
“Communiqué 36.” Zeri I Kosoves, September 18, 1997.
“Communiqué 37.” Zeri I Kosoves, October 23, 1997.
“Communiqué 38.” Kosovo Daily Report, October 20, 1997.
“Communiqué 38.” Zeri I Kosoves, November 7, 1997.
“Communiqué 39.” Zeri I Kosoves, November 20, 1997.
“Communiqué 40.” Bujku, December 3, 1997.
“Communiqué 40.” Zeri I Kosoves, December 11, 1997.
“Communiqué 41.” Bujku, January 8, 1998.
“Communiqué 42.” Zeri I Kosoves, March 5, 1998.
“Communiqué 43.” Bujku, March 4, 1998.
“Communiqué 44.” Zeri I Kosoves, March 12, 1998.
“Communiqué 45.” Bujku, March 11, 1998.
“Communiqué 46.” Zeri I Kosoves, March 26, 1998.
“Communiqué 47.” Koha Ditore, May 13, 1998.
“Communiqué 48.” Koha Ditore, June 20, 1998.
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“Communiqué 51.” Albanian TV Tirana, August 26, 1998.
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Appendix 3: Timeline for the Kosovo case
March and April 1981

Student demonstrations in Pristina turn violent.

November 1988

Autonomous regions of Kosovo and Vojvodina within Serbia have
their autonomy curtailed.

March 28, 1989

The Assembly of Serbia met to revoke the autonomy granted to
Kosovo in 1974.

September 1991

Referendum in Kosovo results in a 99.8 % vote by the population in
favor of independence.

October 1991

Kosovo parliament declares independence.

Winter 1993

Small group favoring violence forms in Kosovo, calling itself the
KLA.

November 1994

UN Human Rights Rapporteur notes the human rights situation in
Kosovo is deteriorating.

June 1995

The KLA issues its first press release, or communiqué.

November 1995

The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, known as the Dayton Accords, signed in Dayton,
Ohio.

April 1996

The KLA coordinates separate attacks in different towns, on the
same day.

March 1997

Unrest in neighboring Albania and associated looting of military
stores floods black market with cheap guns.

September 1, 1997

Agreement reached between Ibrahim Rugova and Slobodan
Milosevic on education matters in Kosovo.

October 1997

Student demonstrations on the streets of Pristina.

February 1998

The Serbian forces begin moving against the KLA in earnest.
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November 1997

February 1998

First public appearance of KLA members at a funeral for a local
teacher in the village of Lausha.

The US special envoy to the region calls the KLA a terrorist group.

March 1998

Serbian forces attack three villages in the Drenica region, a KLA
stronghold—Likoshan, Qirez, and Prekaz.

May 1998

Richard Holbrooke becomes the US Special Envoy to the Region,
and travels to Belgrade, and Kosovo.

June – August 1998

Fighting in Kosovo worsens as a large summer offensive conducted
throughout Kosovo by both the Serbian military, providing artillery
and tank support, and Serbian special police forces, which went
from village to village, engaging the KLA.

June 1998

13 NATO countries participate in Operation Determined Falcon,
aerial maneuvers near the border of the FRY’s airspace.

June 1998

The KLA reorganizes and establishes a political wing.

July 1998

The KLA appoints Jakup Krasniqi as their first official spokesman.

September 1998

UN Security Council Resolution 1199 issued. Acting under Chapter
VII of the U.N. Charter, the Security Council members demand that
all parties cease hostilities immediately and take steps to improve
the humanitarian situation on the ground.

September 1998

NATO issues an ACTWARN (Activation Warning) for phased air
campaign over Yugoslavia.

October 1998

Both parties agree to a cease-fire and the OSCE launches a ceasefire verification mission (KVM) on October 25, 1998.
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October 1998

November 1998

The North Atlantic Council (NAC) of NATO issues activation
orders, known as ACTORDs, for both limited air strikes and a
phased air campaign in FRY on October 13, 1998.

The KLA undergoes further reorganization and stratification, with
the introduction of nine official departments.

January 1999

The KLA launches its radio station, RKL, on January 4, 1999.

January 1999

Wide reports of a massacre at the village of Recak on January 15,
1999.

February 1999

Discussions between Serbian officials and the Albanian delegation,
which included top commanders from the KLA, held in
Rambouillet, France.

March 1999

The Kosovo Albanian delegation signs the Interim Agreement on
March 18 in Paris, and, following a final warning visit of Richard
Holbrooke to Belgrade, NATO bombing of the FRY begins on
March 24.

June 1999

Milosevic accepts NATO’s terms for settlement, and KFOR troops
enter Kosovo on June 12.
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Appendix 4: LTTE documents list
November 27, 1992

Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Hero's Day Speech

November 27, 1993

Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Hero's Day Speech

November 27, 1994

Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Hero's Day Speech

November 27, 1995

Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Hero's Day Speech

November 27, 1996

Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Hero's Day Speech

November 27, 1997

Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Hero's Day Speech

November 27, 1998

Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Hero's Day Speech

November 27, 1999

Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Hero's Day Speech

November 27, 2000

Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Hero's Day Speech

November 27, 2001

Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Hero's Day Speech

November 27, 2002

Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Hero's Day Speech

November 27, 2003

Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Hero's Day Speech

November 27, 2004

Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Hero's Day Speech

November 27, 2005

Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Hero's Day Speech

November 27, 2006

Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Hero's Day Speech

November 27, 2007

Velupillai Prabhakaran’s Hero's Day Speech
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Appendix 5: Timeline for the Sri Lanka case

May 1976

Velupillai Prabhakaran forms the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam
(LTTE).

July 1977

In the general election, the Tamil political party, the Tamil United
Liberation Front (TULF) sweeps elections in Tamil areas and wins
eighteen seats in the legislature, including all fourteen seats contested in
the Jaffna Peninsula.

August 1997

Outbreak of anti-Tamil violence in Sri Lanka.

July 1979

Passage of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, which gives Sri Lankan
government powers to arrest and hold suspects.

July 1983

In an escalation of the violence, the LTTE ambushes and kills 13
government soldiers in in Jaffna. Immediately following the ambush,
anti-Tamil riots break out all over Sri Lanka.

July 1985

Peace talks held in Thimpu, Bhutan between the Sri Lankan government
and a number of Tamil groups, including the LTTE.

July 1987

Rajiv Gandhi elected Prime Minister of India, and signs the Indo-Sri
Lankan accords on July 29, 1987, which include provisions for included
the establishment and deployment of the Indian Peacekeeping force
(IPKF) in the north east of Sri Lanka in an attempt to disarm the LTTE.

July 1987

Forty Sri Lankan soldiers die in the first LTTE suicide bomb attack on
July 5, when a soldier from the Black Tiger unit, known as “Captain
Miller” drives a truck laden with explosives into a Sri Lankan army camp
in Jaffna.

April 1989

Peace talks resume.

March 1990

Last Indian troops from the IPKF withdraw from Sri Lanka.
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June 1990

LTTE resumes fighting, ending 14 months of peace talks, and the Second
Eelam War begins

May 1991

Former Indian premier Rajiv Gandhi killed—allegedly by an LTTE
suicide bomber.

May 1993

President Ranasinghe Premadasa of Sri Lanka killed in LTTE bomb
attack.

August 1994

Chandrika Kumaratunga elected president in Sri Lanka, and, pledging an
end to the war with the LTTE, announces a unilateral ceasefire.

October 1994

A round of peace talks with the LTTE begins.

April 1995

December 1995

The LTTE sink a Sri Lankan naval war ship, ending the peace talks, and
beginning the Third Eelam War.

Sri Lankan army captures Jaffna from the LTTE.

January 1996

LTTE attack the Central Bank in Colombo.

October 1997

October 1997 the United States banned the LTTE under anti-terrorism
legislation

January 1998

LTTE attack one of Sri Lanka’s holiest Buddhist shrine, the Temple of
the Tooth on January 25, 1998 with a suicide bomb.

August 1998

Nationwide state of emergency declared by Sri Lankan government

September 1998

January 2000

LTTE unsuccessfully try to restart peace talks on condition of third party
mediation.

An explosion outside the Sri Lankan prime minister's office in Colombo
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kills 13 people.

February 2000

Norwegian government plays an important intermediary role in the
negotiations between the two parties after this date.

July 2001

The LTTE attacked the Katunayake air base destroyed eight military
aircraft and damaged 10 others on the tarmac, before attacking adjacent
international airport, Bandaranaike, where they were able to destroy or
damage nearly half of the national civilian aircraft.

February 2002

The Sri Lankan government and the LTTE sign a Norwegian-mediated
ceasefire Cease Fire Agreement (CFA). Its monitoring body is known as
the Sri Lanka Monitoring Mission (SLMM).

March 2004

Split within the ranks of the LTTE. Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan (alias
Colonel Karuna), an LTTE commander, breaks away from the group’s
leader, Vellupillai Prabhakaran.

December 2004

A tsunami devastates coastal communities in Sri Lanka, including LTTE
controlled areas.

September 2005

The CFA collapses following outbreak of violence.

November 2005

Mahinda Rajapaksa, prime minister at the time, wins presidential
elections. Rajapaksa oversees a shift towards a military strategy from the
existing political strategy.

April 2006

January 2008

May 2009

Violence begins to escalate again.

The government formally announces its withdrawal from the ceasefire
agreement.

The military defeat of the LTTE.
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